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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness and the 
effects of commercial policy employed by underdeveloped countries for pro-
moting economic development. It is assumed that the economic objective 
assigned first priority by underdeveloped countries is development, or 
economic growth, rather than most efficient allocation of existing re-
sources. 1 
Based on this assumption, the analysis has a two-fold emphasis. First 
is emphasis on the potentialities of unifying commercial policy decisions 
toward the predominant objective, development. This is in contrast to the 
tendency for commercial policy decisions to be made in pursuit of a variety 
of often conflicting objectives that are adopted out of expediency during 
i' 
possibly severe but often temporary crises such as a sudden worsening of 
the terms of trade or decline in foreign exchange balances. The second 
emphasis is on the relative effectiveness of the particular commercial pol-
icy devices—tariffs and foreign trade subsidies, quotas, and exchange con-
trols—in promoting economic development. 
The literature on underdeveloped countries contains discussions of 
elements of both of these points of emphasis, but we know of no overall 
treatment of the two together. The analyses of particular commercial poli-
cy devices have concentrated on one or another of the three principal com-
mercial policy instruments, with most recent attentions paid to exchange 
1 For a discussion of the reasons and basis for this assumption, see 
p. 2$ below. 
1 
2 
controls,^ rather than a systematic comparison of their relative effective-
ness and possible co-ordination in a commercial policy system for promoting 
development. Discussions of the general uses of commercial policy for de-
velopment have tended to concentrate on appropriate objectives in terms of 
development needs3 rather than on the suitability of specific commercial 
policy instruments for assisting in the fulfillment of those objectives. 
Economic development is here taken to mean a sustained increase in 
real national income per capita. This definition, basically, is common in 
the literature on underdeveloped countries despite recognized difficulties 
of precise formulation for statistical measurement^ and despite the fact 
that it ignores some important welfare considerations.£ Taken into account 
in the definition are changes in populations and price levels, while ig-
nored is the nature of the distribution of income. 
High population growth potentials in most of the underdeveloped coun-
tries are threatening to counteract any benefits to be derived from efforts 
2 Cf. E. R. Schlesinger, Multiple Exchange Rates and Economic Develop-
ment, International Finance Section, Princeton University Press, 1952j 
United Nations, "The Application of Multiple Exchange Rates in Selected 
Asian Countries," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. V, 
No. 3, November, 195U, pp. 19-30. 
3 Cf. G. Kyrdal, An International Economy, Harper & Brothers, New York, 
1956, chap. XIIIj United Nations, "Trade Policy as a Means of Implementing 
or Promoting Economic Development, with Special Reference to ECAFE Coun-
tries" (prepared by the GATT Secretariat), Economic Bulletin for Asia and 
the Far East, Vol. VIII, No. 1, May, 1957, pp. ti-17; C. P. Kindleberger. 
Economic Development, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1958, chap, llu 
U See S. Kuznets, "Measurement of Economic Growth", Problems in the Study 
of Economic Growth, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 19 U9, 
pp. 137-172. 
5 See, especially, J. Vmer, International Trade and Economic Develop-
ment, The Free Press, Glencoe, 111., 1952, pp. 120-129] also, N. S. Bucha-
nan and H. S. Ellis, Approaches to Economic Development, -The Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund, New York, 1955» chap.T; G. M. Meier and R. E. Baldwin, Economic 
Development: Theory, History, Policy, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 
1957, pp. 2-10j Kindleberger, o£. oit., pp. 1-10. 
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at economic development that result in increases in aggregate income. This 
fact lends a greater sense of urgency in these countries to achievement of 
a high rate of economic grovrbh. Although no judgment is made m this study 
as to what would constitute a desirable distribution of income, it may be 
an important determinant of whether or not growth can be maintained. Fur-
thermore, it is presumed that some concern for widening the distribution 
of the benefits of development in underdeveloped countries is a political 
necessity for retention of power even in a totalitarian state. It is pos-
sible, however, that the necessary spread of benefits varies more or less 
inversely with the centralization of political power." 
The precise lines of demarcation as between developed and underdeve-
loped countries are arbitrary regardless of what criteria are used as a 
basis for classification. It is not, however, essential for purposes of 
this study that a precise line of demarcation be drawn. Many of the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of underdeveloped economies also characterize 
economies of countries near the dividing line but on the "developed" side 
in any classification based on a single criterion such as income per capita. 
Consequently, the observed effects of commercial policy actions in margi-
nal countries on either side of a line of demarcation are likely to be as 
relevant for the analysis of this study as effects in cases drawn from 
countries that can be more clearly classed as underdeveloped. 
It may suffice, therefore, merely to note some distinctive aspects ge-
nerally recognized to characterize so-called underdeveloped economies. The 
6 Kindleberger suggests that more equal distribution of income may occur 
with development. Ibid., p. 8. See also S. Kuznets, "Economic Growth and 
Income Inequality", American Economic Review, March, 1955* pp. 1-28. 
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countries that would be classified as underdeveloped on the basis of any 
criteria vary in the degree to which such aspects characterize each, yet 
most of such characteristics apply broadly to each of such countries. In 
relation to the problems of economic development, important conditions dis-
tinguishing underdeveloped countries are social and political in nature as 
well as economic. 
Economically, underdeveloped countries are marked not only by low in-
comes per capita and extremely unequal distributions of income,7 but also 
by low ratios of capital to labor and capital to land.8 Labor tends to be 
heavily concentrated in primary production, i. e., extractive industries, 
especially in subsistence and/or export agriculture.9 Transportation and 
communication facilities are meager and inefficient by developed-country 
standards.!^ All of these conditions contribute to inadequacies in the de-
velopment of the exchange economy in terms of small, inefficient and frag-
mented markets.11 Of significance in this regard is the lack of well organ-
ized money markets with financial institutions and arrangements primarily 
confined to larger urban areas and related to foreign trading relations.^ 
7 See T. Morgan, "Distribution of Income in Ceylon, Puerto Rico, the 
United States and the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, December, 1953* 
pp. 821—83Uj S« Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American 
Economic Review, March, 195S>* PP. 1-28. 
£5 Data indicating these ratios are largely indirect as well as limited 
in exbent, yet the data available, e. g., energy consumed per capita, rail-
road mileage per area unit, etc., indicate tremendous differences between 
developed and underdeveloped countries. See Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit., 
pp. if.6l-i4.63 (t)j Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, Macmil-
lan & Co., Ltd., London, 1951* pp. U86-U89 (tJT 
9 See W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production, The 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1953* pp. 356-7 (t). 
10 Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit., pp. i|.6l—U63 (t). 
11 M. R. Solomon, "The Structure of the Market in Undeveloped Economies," 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 19M3, pp. 519-537. 
12 Ibid.* p. 536. See also United Nations, "Mobilization of Domestic 
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Social conditions and population characteristics in underdeveloped 
countries make for inertia and, in some areas, even outright resistance 
to change. Illiteracy percentages are high and health standards are 
low, 13 which means uneducated, untrained and debilitated populations. 
Furthermore, the population majorities in most underdeveloped countries 
live in rural areas or small villageslU where social patterns tend to 
be family or kinship oriented. Under such conditions, behavior is large-
ly habitual and rooted in tradition. Finally, there is on the part of 
those individuals or groups in underdeveloped countries who suffer the 
greatest poverty, privation and ignorance a tendency toward fatalistic 
acceptance of their lot.15 
In the political situation of underdeveloped countries, factors 
which make for political instability are of particular significance for 
development. This potential instability stems from certain cleavages 
regarding understanding and aspirations as between various oppositional 
groups.16 In effect, the leaders and the educated of the underdeveloped 
Resources for Economic Development and the Financial Institutions in the 
ECAFE Region," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. 1, 
August 1950, p. 2bj R. Tnffin, "Central Banking and Monetary Management 
in Latin America," Economic Problems of Latin America (S. E. Harris, ed.), 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York,~T9UU* p. 101*. 
13 See Meier and Baldwin, op_. cit., p. 296 (t). 
Ill See Woytinsky and Woytinsky* op. cit., pp. Ill|-ll8. 
15 For discussions of these and other social aspects in underdeveloped 
countries, see H. Belshaw, "Some Social Aspects of Economic Development 
in Under-developed Countries in Asia," Underdeveloped Areas (L. W. Shannon, 
ed.), Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, pp. 190-19l|. (Reprinted from 
Civilizations, Vol. U, No. 1|, 19$k») Also, R. Linton, "Cultural and Per-
sonality Factors Affecting Economic Growth," The Progress of Underdeveloped 
Areas, B. F. Hoselitz, ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952, 
pp. 73-88. 
16 Suggested by James S. Coleman in a joint political science and eco-
nomics seminar at Coe College during the spring semester of 1959• 
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countries live in a different world from the mass of their fellow citi-
zens, yet in proximity. In many cases, lack of understanding and common 
cause result in doubt and mistrust even in those countries with a rela-
tively greater degree of political democracy. This situation threatens 
the viability of the democratic regimes, as well as the more totalitarian, 
in the face of both internal and external pressures. 
The aspirations—both for their country and for themselves—of the 
educated, especially the young, newly educated, differ from those of the 
mass of illiterate and uneducated. The leaders and the better educated 
have been more susceptible to the influence of the "demonstration effect." 
The divergency of aspirations tends to be reinforced by a cleavage 
between those in the urban centers who have been more thoroughly caught 
up in the exchange economy and those in the rural areas whose productive 
activities are still largely subsistence oriented. 
A further notable cleavage exists between those who have developod 
a more secularist attitude involving a readier acceptance of change and 
those who have retained a more traditionalist attitude that means greater 
resistance to change. Finally, the extreme inequality in the distribution 
of income noted above represents another group cleavage with significance 
for political stability. Those with great wealth tend to oppose policies 
or changes that are likely to undermine their favored position, while 
even those tradition-oriented who are also poverty stricken tend to give 
tacit support to changes in the locus of political power promulgated by 
almost any disgruntled faction so long as the pattern of their lives is 
not directly or immediately disrupted. 
The opposing interests represented by'the cleavages noted are not 
7 
concurrent in a fixed pattern. While there is, in underdeveloped countries 
as in most societies* a tendency for the leaders to coma from the educated, 
for the educated to come from the relatively wealthy* for the relatively 
wealthy to be urbanized and even cosmopolitan, and for the secularists 
to be found among the educated and urbanized* these categories are not 
concurrent. This situation makes for many cross-currents of interest. 
The cleavages noted tend to be more pronounced in underdeveloped countries 
than in advanced countries and marked by a greater inequality in the 
division of the population as between those extremely small categories 
just listed and the extremely large categories of uneducated, poor, rural 
and traditionalist. 
The element of primary political significance that derives from 
this situation is the failure of the bulk of the population in under-
developed countries to be directly involved in the political process,1' 
so that they are more easily swayed by emotional appeals for their alle-
giance when improvement in their lot is slow or non-existent. This in-
creases the possibility of sudden changes in political control through 
political coups. 
Taken together* the political conditions described are one factor 
that makes dramatic economic development with some broader spread of ben-
efits imperative from the point of view both of the underdeveloped 
countries and of the rest of the world, especially the West. In this 
political context, the economic and social factors noted, which militate 
17 See E. Staley, The Future of UnderdevelopediOountries, Council 
on Foreign Relations (Harper & Brothers), New York, 19Sh> pp. 222-227. 
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against private, individual initiative in the economic sphere, lend impor-
tance to this investigation of the commercial policy potential in assisting 
the process of development. The problem is so pressing that underdeveloped 
countries cannot afford to fail to consider any approach which contains 
possibilities of furthering development. 
SCOPE AND METHOD 
In view of the conditions described in the preceding section, the 
analysis in this study has been carried forward on the basis of certain 
assumptions that differ from the usual assumptions on which analysis of 
international trading relations ordinarily has been based. First, it is 
assumed that the governments of the underdeveloped countries will have 
to, and will, play an active role in the economy both to initiate produc-
tive enterprises on its own, especially of the social-overhead-capital 
nature, and to stimulate private enterprise directly and indirectly by 
creating a favorable climate in which individual initiative can become 
much more effective than it has been in the past. Second, the conditions 
of perfect competition which have been deemed necessary for the efficient 
operation of market systems, are inadequate as to refinements and extent 
for the efficient allocation of resources, especially as between produc-
tion for present consumption and for capital formation. The third 
assumption is that the predominant economic objecbive of governments in 
underdeveloped countries is development, involving particularly a change 
in the quality and quantity of resources such that the productivity of 
human effort is raised. A corollary of this third assumption is that 
the economic objective of most efficient allocation of resources must 
be oriented around structural change. Finally, it is assumed that the 
9 
economic factors usually taken as given, i. e., the "parameters" of the 
economy—technology, productive functions, and the pattern of resources— 
are susceptible to deliberate modification in a relatively short period 
of time, say a generation. These assumptions are not designed to super-
cede our inherited body of theoretical tools, but rather to indicate 
necessary modification in the use of those tools, especially in an analysis 
of commercial policy decisions in underdeveloped countries. 
In large measure, Chapter II constitutes a justification of the 
adoption of these assumptions by way of an analysis of the inappropriate-
ness of the traditional model of international trade theory as a basis 
for evaluating commercial policy objectives and measures of underdeveloped 
countries. First the implicit and explicit assumptions of traditional 
international trade theory are outlined, and the functioning of the in-
ternational economy that they imply is described. The significance of 
this theory as a basis for free trade policy recommendations is pointed 
out. The relevance of the traditional theoretical model and its resultant 
free trade policy recommendations as they apply to underdeveloped coun-
tries is then subjected to a detailed criticism. 
On the basis of this analysis, it is concluded that the peculiar 
circumstances of underdeveloped countries and the problems associated 
with originating economic development in these countries make inappropriate 
the application of traditional international trade theory to underdeveloped 
countries. It is further concluded that adoption of a free trade policy 
by underdeveloped countries would tend to perpetuate their underdeveloped 
status, and therefore, that commercial policy controls on foreign trading 
relations can assist them in their efforts to develop economically. 
10 
the primary purpose in Chapter II is to indicate, in a preliminary 
fashion, the manner in which commercial policies of underdeveloped countries 
may be formulated with development needs and objectives always given 
top priority in the policy decisions. This approach is in contrast to 
the usual practice in the past of formulating commercial policies on a 
piecemeal and expedient basis in pursuit of dissimilar and sometimes 
conflicting objectives without a unity of purpose and direction. To this 
end* the nature of the commercial policy instruments and their variants* 
that are treated in this study* is first presented with the purpose of 
summarizing this information and of delimiting the scope of this study. 
There follows a statement of the importance of foreign trade to 
underdeveloped countries in their efforts to develop. The principal 
point is that the use of commercial policy for development does not 
necessarily mean withdrawal from the international economy as -seems -
often implied in the tendency to state the trade control question in 
terms of an either / or choice of trade versus no trade. Specific devel-
opment objectives and needs of underdeveloped countries are then ite-
mized in a brief but systematic form* after which particular commercial 
policy objectives that may be adopted in furtherance of fulfillment of 
various development needs are presented. This discussion is designed to 
facilitate the more detailed analysis of particular commercial policy 
devices in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV is devoted to a theoretical analysis of the best choices 
of commercial policy instruments for achievement of particular development 
needs and objectives as well as the possibilities of coordinating thecuse 
of the commercial policy instruments toward the predominant economic ob-
11 
jective of development. Tariff, quantitative control and exchange control 
systems are capable of being structured in a virtually infinite variety 
of combinations of detailed provisions. In addition, the detailed vari-
ants of the three main commercial policy weapons are for some purposes 
interchangeable with varying degrees of efficiency. 
With those points in mind, the analysis in Chapter 17 is an attempt 
to answer the question: Which commercial policy variants are most 
- - appropriate for fulfilling which commercial policy objectives .that are 
in turn selected for their contribution to fulfillment of development 
needs and objectives? As indicated, this is a theoretical analysis 
based on the assumptions listed at the beginning of this section with 
little reference to actual commercial policy provisions adopted in any 
particular country. 
Chapter V is devoted to an empirical investigation of actual com-
mer.cial policy provisions in the various underdeveloped countries. It 
is designed to check the validity of the theoretical analysis of the pre-
ceding chapter. 
The investigative procedure was to compile as complete information 
regarding actual commercial policy actions of underdeveloped countries 
as available data would permit. For this compilation, primary reliance 
has been on the U.S. Department of Commerce, World Trade Information 
Service, Operations Reports on tariff, quantity licensing and exchange 
control systems of the various countries of the world, and the Foreign 
Commerce Weekly news of trade control changes, supplemented by reports 
of the International Monetary Fund. 
From this information on the various underdeveloped countries, cases 
12 
of actual use of commercial policy devices for furthering development* 
as suggested in Chapter IV, have been selected for evaluation as to the 
effects of the commercial policy actions. The evaluation has been in 
terras of the resultant changes in foreign exchange and gold balances* the 
composition of imports and exports, balances of payments* terms of 
trade, government revenues by sources, real- and money-capital movements, 
and in the aggregates of quantity and value of imports and exports* total 
national income and national income or product per capita, production 
by sectors, foreign and domestic investment* savings and consumption. 
In Chapter VI* tentative conclusions are drawn in light of the 
preceding analysis as to the place of commercial policies in the over-
all development programs of underdeveloped countries* and the pros-
pects of their use in the future'. 
CHAPTER II 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The conclusions of a theory are conditioned by the assumptions of 
the theory. The assumptions of traditional international trade theory 
have led to conclusions and commercial policy recommendations that are 
inappropriate for underdeveloped countries that are attempting to develop. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate the validity of 
the foregoing assertion and to indicate the conditions in underdeveloped 
countries within which commercial policy decisions for furthering 
development Hiust be made. The assumptions of traditional international 
trade theory are detailed, as well as the economic system which those 
assumptions imply. The assumptions are then criticized in relation to 
the conditions in underdeveloped countries, and the commercial policy 
implications of that criticism are made explicit. 
What, then, is the analytical framework of traditional internation-
al trade theory and its relevance for commercial policies of under-
developed countries? 
THE FRAME OF REFERENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 
International trade theory, from Classical to modern, has developed 
within a framework of both implicit and explicit assumptions as to the 
basic nature and environment of economic activity.2 The traditional in-
1 See Oscar Lange. "The Scope and Method of Economics", Review of 
Economic Studies, 19u5-19U6, p. 21. 
2 An excellent resume of the development of international trade theory 
from Classical to modern is presented by P. T. Ellsworth in his The Inter-
national Economy (1950), Chap. 5. This discussion includes a statement 
of assumptions which underlie the general equilibrium of international 
13 
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ternational trade theory model has been the same as that for general 
value theory except for particular assumptions based on peculiarities of 
international exchange as opposed to exchange of goods and services in 
a domestic economy.3 In general terms, that theoretical model has de-
picted economic activity as being individualistic and without interference 
either from government or from other private individuals or groups 
exercising monopolistic power. In other words, the assumption has been 
that international exchange of commodities occurs between private indi-
viduals and businesses of different countries operating in an atmosphere 
of "free private competitive enterprise." 
This general economic framework and the specific assumptions which 
it involves were conceived by Western economists in reference to Western 
economies. The result is a conceptual frame of reference—social, 
political and economic which does not fit underdeveloped economies 
as we know of them today. 
The Specific Assumptions and the Economic System Implied 
General Value Theory Assumptions. The assumptions which set the 
pattern of economic activity as conceived in economic theory are: 4 
trade developed by Bertil Ohlin in Interregional and International Trade 
(1933) which is an extension of modern value theory. Ellsworth's discus-
sion in the latest edition of his book (1958) is somewhat less systematic, 
but carries the analysis of modern theory further, including a discussion 
of the most significant recent development of Romney Robinson regarding 
the effects of varying factor proportions in "Factor Proportions and Com-
parative Advantage," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXX/ May and August, 
1956. For a more detailed discussion of recent developments in inter-
national trade theory up to 19l|8* see Lloyd A. Metzler, "The Theory of 
International Trade", A Survey of Contemporary Economics, Vol. I, 19l|8, 
3 Ellsworth, o£. cit., p. 120. 
k The assumptions listed first are those which are applicable to eco-
15 
(l) the exchange of products and Iactors of production on a purely 
private-capitalist enterprise basis; (2) no government interference," 
(3) no private-monopolistic interference) (k) economically rational 
behavior* i. e.* each individual and enterprise attempting to maximize 
satisfaction (or profit) from the use of his (its) resources* and (5) 
a perfectly, or nearly perfectly, competitive market for each iproduct and 
factor of production. By definition, competitve markets requires (a) 
a large enough number of buyers and sellers of each product and factor 
of production that no one of them by his actions can affect the exchange 
pricej (b) perfect, or nearly perfect, knowledge of market conditionsj 
and (c) perfect, or nearly perfect, mobility of enterprises and 
factors of production.5 
It follows logically from these assumed conditions that the market 
mechanism insures the establishment of one price in the market for any 
particular commodity or factor at any one time, I. e., the price which 
would equate the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied. Any price 
differences which existed in separated markets for the same product or ' 
factor would be fully accounted for by costs of transportation or move-
nomic theory in general. Listed later under a continuation of the num-
bering started here will be assumptions which havo particular significance 
with regard to free trade policy recommendations. For this outline of 
assumptions, the author has relied mainly on the statement, discussion 
and critique of the assumptions of international trade theory contained 
in Ellsworth* op_. cit., Chap. 5* Delbert A. Snider, Introduction to In-
ternational Economics, 1958, p. 31* John H. Williams, "The Theory of 
International Trade Reconsidered," Readings in the Theory of International 
Trade, 19U9, pp. 25U-271; and C. P. Kindleberger* Economic Development, 
Chap. ll(. 
5 The exception to (c) relevant for international trade is noted 
below in assumption (9)* p. 19. 
„t 
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ment. The price would be free to fluctuate* however* in response to any 
changes in particular market demand and,/or supply schedules. 
For purposes of analysis* the influences which lead to changes in 
demand and supply are assumed given under the ceteris paribus assumption, 
i. e.* preferences* incomes* etc. remain unchanged* except as changes 
are postulated in order to analyze the effect of such changes on the 
market equilibrium.6 In the basic theory regarding the factor-allocative 
function of the market, the supply of land, labor, money capital and 
"fixed" capital goods is taken as given. The supply of other capital 
goods is analyzed in much the same manner as that of any other product.7 
Relative price fluctuations in the free competitive markets would 
ration the existing supplies of the various products and factors among 
their various possible uses according to the desires, willingness and 
ability to pay of the buyers and guide the production decisions and/ 
or quantities supplied by sellers, i. e., cause changes in the quantities 
of the various products and factors which are demanded and supplied. If 
individuals behave as postulated, there would be a continual* automatic 
tendency toward a stable equilibrium*0 so far as the variables endogenous 
to the market are concerned* which involves an equality between the 
quantity demanded and the quantity supplied* price and per unit cost, 
6 The assumption of "other things being equal" in market analysis has 
contributed to a static character in international trade theory. See 
below, p. 37. 
7 This fact has special significance for underdeveloped countries 
as noted below, pp. 25f. 
8 An exception to this would be when a time lag m adjustment of 
supply to price changes resulted in disequilibrium conditions as described 
in the "cobweb theorem". See M. Ezekiel, "The Cobweb Theorem", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, XII, February, 1938, pp. 255-80. 
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and factor payments and marginal revenue product of the factor. 
The stable market equilibrium would involve an apportionment of 
resources, i. e., productive factors and income of consumers* so that 
the advantages would be equal in all uses. According to Professor 
Boulding, this "principle of equal advantage...includes both monetary 
o 
and non-monetary advantages. !r However, non-monetary considerations are 
never incorporated into the body of the theory, being discussed only 
as reasons why the logical (one price) results of the solely pecuniarily 
oriented theory are not fulfilled. In fact, demand and supply schedules 
are depicted as though demand and supply were functions of price, i. e., 
monetary considerations, and price alone. It is on the basis of the 
assumption of economic rationality that "non-monetary advantages" are 
presumed to have a money value placed on them by individuals. 
According to the theory, then, unless some force exogenous to the 
market should intervene to start a chain of adjustments toward a new 
equilibrium, there would be no change that an individual could make in 
the use of his resources by which he could improve his position. In 
fact, he could only worsen'it. 
One additional characteristic of the equilibrium toward which the 
operation of this system tends is the automatic realization of full em-
ployment of all productive resources. In other words, full employment 
is a sixth assumption of the value theory that is basic to traditional 
international trade theory. This assumption is implied by the free 
fluctuation of price which brings equality between quantity demanded and 
9 Economic Analysis, p. l85« 
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quantity supplied in the market for every factor of production. 
Additional assumptions of both theories usually merely implied or 
subsumed in the ceteris paribus assumption are (7) a given state of the 
arts, i. e., technology, and (8) given tastes. In traditional inter-
national trade theory, both technology and tastes have been treated 
as though they remained the same after trade is opened internationally 
as they were before trade. 
The general practice in economic analysis is to start with 
simplifying assumptions for a theoretical first approximatLon and then 
to engage in a stop by step qualification of the assumptions in 
applying the basic theory to the complex conditions encountered in 
particular real-world problems. It is contended subsequently that 
the modifications and qualifications commonly made in international 
economic analysis are in effect largely ignored by "free trade" policy 
recommendations.il 
10 The major modification of the theory so far presented which has 
been incorporated into value theory is the "imperfect competition" 
analysis originated by Chamberlin and Robinson and surveyed by B..F. 
Haley in "Value and Distribution", Survey of Contemporary Economics, 
19l|8, pp..l6-2l|. A classic application of this modification to inter-
national trade theory is that of G. Lovasy* "International Trade under 
Imperfect Competition", Quarterly Journal of .Economics, LV (I9lll) pp. 
567-583- The whole body of income analysis originated by Keynes has 
influenced international trade theory mainly in its financial or 
balance-of-payments aspects rather than the "pure" theory. 
11 Ellsworth "admits" in The International Economy, 1958, p. 85* 
"But if more facts must be taken into account, the model must be modi-
fied to deal with them. If this modification can be made successfully, 
the explanatory value of the theory is retained. We shall find that 
even further qualifications have to be introduced, all of which complicate 
our theory. But the facts of life are complex. It would be most 
convenient and gratifying if we could explain them by reference to a 
single touchstone of limpid clarity and unequalled simplicity. If this 
19 
International Trade Theory Assumptions* Based on the assumptions 
already listed and others pertinent primarily to the international 
economy, orthodox international trade theorists have concluded that all 
countries gain from an international exchange of commodities, based on 
comparativeicost advantages which permit international specialization 
and division of labor. The further assumptions are (9) perfect mo-
bility of the factors of production domestically, but perfect immo-
bility of productive factors internationally; (10) a fixed pattern of 
productive resources distribution, at least to the extent of being a 
matter merely of the historically determined stage of development, and 
(11) single, known production functions appropriate for the production 
of each particular product.I2 
In order for the conclusion that all countries gain from an inter-
national exchange of commodities to have significance even as a first 
approximation to reality, all of these assumptions of traditional 
international trade theory must be valid, or nearly valid, descrip-
tions of a real situation. The conclusion does not lose all signifi-
cance by failure of the conditions of any one postulate to be met, 
but the probability; jLnvolved in the stated conclusion is lessened by 
is impossible, if simple explanations are misleading, we must reconcile 
ourselves to using an elaborate kit of tools to deal with complex prob-
lems." 
12. Assumptions 10 and 11 ordinarily have not been explicitly stated 
although 10 is inherent tin the ceteris paribus assumption. Both 
assumptions are implied in the discussions of benefits from free trade 
policy which talk of specialization based on the cost advantages of 
each country in the production of commodities which use mainly the 
relatively abundant resources and economize the use of the relatively 
scarce resources. Furthermore, assumption 11 is clearly implied in the 
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each such failure. 
The subsequent criticism of the traditional assumptions indicates 
that modifications and qualifications of traditional international trade-
theory are required when applying the theory under the conditions in 
underdeveloped countries. The effect of those modifications is to reduce 
the probability of the validity of the conclusion that all countries 
gain from the international exchange of commodities. Each such modifi-
cation increases the number of instances in which such gams from trade 
are, in fact, not realized. 
The Free Trade Policy Recommendation 
The preceding observations become particularly important when we 
turn our attention to questions of policy, for on the basis of the con-
clusion as to the gains to be derived from the international exchange 
of commodities, the recommendation is made that free international 
trade policy is the most appropriate policy for all nations.13 It is a 
discussion of international trade that runs along lines of "capital 
intensive" and "labor intensive" industries. See Romney Robinson, loc. 
cit.; Ellsworth, op_. cit., pp. 82-85; Kindleberger, op. cit., p. 2U3. 
13 Although modern writers in the field of international trade theory 
have contributed to extensive modification of traditional theory through 
criticisms of various points, a brief look at the various standard 
introductory texts on the subject indicates that the various forms of 
governmental restriction are still condemned or frowned upon, even 
when their purpose is accorded some degree of validity as in the case 
of infant industries. Non-interference is considered, at least in 
some sense, "ideal". See especially Ellsworth, op. cit., pp. 198-205. 
Ellis and Metzler also suggest this, "...the pure theory of international 
trade was sorely in need of improvements which would bring it abreast 
of modern price theory. It is surprising, nevertheless, to find that 
the improvements in international price theory, when they were finally 
made during the inter-war years, affected the basic conclusions derived 
from the classical theory only to a moderate extent. On questions of 
commercial policy, for example, Mill and Scitovszky are in substantial, 
agreement, even though their methods of analysis and their underlying 
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long jump from concluding that all countries gain from international 
exchange given the simplifying assumptions of the traditional theory to 
recommending that all countries will be better served economically with 
a free trade policy. 
This jump involves a number of errors in logical reasoning. One 
of these is the tendency to think only in terms of extreme alternatives 
of free trade or no trade.-^ Another of the errors of logic frequently 
committed in this policy recommendation is a confusion between a whole 
and its parts, i. e., that what is good for all countries is good for 
each one.15 
This jump from conclusion to policy recommendation is viewed with 
skepticism by representatives of underdeveloped countries. Underdevelop-
ed countries today appear to be determined to develop economically with 
special emphasis upon industrial development, and solely on grounds of 
economic welfare considerations this determination appears rational.° 
price theories are considerably different1-'. "Introduction", Readings 
in the Theory of International Trade, p. viii. This is hereafter 
referred to as Readings. 
Ill Witness one of the most recent discussions of trade policy by 
C. P. Kindleberger, op. cit., Chap. Hi. A notable exception is to be 
found in P. A. Samuelson* "The Gains from International Trade", Readings* 
pp. 239-252. 
15 Scitovszky points out, "Free trade can be shown to be beneficial 
to the universe as a whole but.has never been proved to be the best 
policy also for a single country." "A Reconsideration of the Theory 
of Tariffs", Readings, p. 358. He adds that Edgeworth made this charge 
of error and" then '.goes on to say, "Later economists either persisted in 
the error pilloried by Edgeworth or adopted the following somewhat 
defeatist attitude. They declared that owing to the impossibility of 
interpersonal utility comparisons it was impossible to choose among 
alternative trade policies from the point of view of a single country." 
(p. 3$9). 
16 Scitovszky observes, "...Free trade favors whichever line of 
activity is already best established in a country...Since the progress 
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We proceed, therefore, to an evaluation of the applicability of a free 
international trade policy recommendation to the peculiar circumstances 
of underdeveloped countries in light of their needs for the attainment 
of rapidl' economic development. 
FREE TRADE POLICY VERSUS DEVELOPMENT IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The Traditional Assumptions Criticized 
It might first be observed that the world is not a world of perfect 
or even pure competition. On this point there is no real dispute.y There 
is, however, an unresolved debate over whether it is a world in which 
there is "effective" competition. The importance of this issue to the 
underdeveloped countries is that the free-competitive-market system, 
operating through the price mechanism, is presumed to allocate resources 
to the satisfaction of future wants, i. e., to economic growth, as well 
as to the satisfaction of present wants.18 
Furthermore, there are two broad views regarding the dominant reason 
of our material welfare depends mainly on technical advance, our civili-
zation offers the greatest rewards to industrial skill and technical 
ingenuity, and the nations specialising in these fields will inevitably 
lead, and agricultural nations lag behind. Hence, the best long-run 
policy a nation can pursue is to create an atmosphere favourable to 
industry and technical progress." Ibid., p. 386. 
17 Myrdal, in his An International Economy, p. 171|* emphasizes the 
need for as rapid a rate of economic development in underdeveloped coun-
tries as possible due to the increasing population pressures that have 
resulted from reduction in infant mortality and the spectacular rise 
in life expectancy. Buchanan and Ellis in Approaches to Economic Develop-
ment and Viner in International Trade and Economic Development favor 
gradualism, even suggesting that development can only be a slow, long-run 
process. 
18 Schumpeter, in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, and more re-
cently Galbraith, in American Capitalism, assert that it is precisely 
those industries that are most nearly perfectly competitive that have 
lagged behind in productive improvement. 
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for the non-existence of free private enterprise where it does not exist. 
Some see the primary peril to free choice in government usurpation of 
economic enterprise and/or interference with private enterprise. Others 
see the primary danger in private concentrations of monopolistic power 
interfering with and/or preventing freedom of enterprise. 
Competition and the Role of Government. Whatever the influences 
responsible, there are countries which have lagged behind others in 
economic—especially industrial—advancement. Furthermore, there has 
not been, either before World War I, i. e., before the period of widest 
i 
restrictions on international trade, or since, any great upsurge of 
private entreprenuerial initiative to narrow the gap. Recognition of 
this fact!9 has led to the conclusion in underdeveloped countries that 
if economic development is to come, it will have to come either through 
direct government economic activity or through special stimulus to private 
enterprise on the part of government,20 or both. 
Even direct government activity is not necessarily incompatible 
with the modern interpretation of a laissez faire policy of government. 
Early nineteenth century liberalist philosophy tended to view the 
legitimate role of government as being essentially only passive protec-
tion both internal (police) and external (defense). Today, nineteenth 
century liberalist philosophy has evolved to the point where it can 
view as legitimate government action, in the economic sphere, projects 
19 Among others to be detailed subsequently. 
20 Special assistance by government is being regarded necessary today 
because of the special obstacles to development in this century which did 
not exist in the last century. See Kleiner, "Economic Development: Nine-
teenth Century and Today," Current Economic Comment, Aug. 1955* PP« 3-12. 
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"...that private business cannot or will not go ahead on...to use re-
sources most efficiently."21 
With reference to both direct and indirect government economic action, 
Easterbroblc, in the Hoselitz symposium, makes some cogent remarks in 
regard to Canadian experience in seelcing to develop. These remarks have 
relevance for all underdeveloped countries: 
...the real issue here [CanadaJ was not that of state 
versus private control but the creation of an environ-
ment in which economic and political expansion could 
be achieved in the face of obstacles so great that 
only the big organization could operate for any 
period of time...Where risks are great, only the big-
gest bureaucracy can carry on, and not uncommonly 
this has been the state. As risks lessen, the pri-
vate firm with state support is enabled to invest 
with some hope of commensurate return. It is only 
in unique environments that state action may retreat 
well into the background, with some allowance for 
lag in the process, (p. 66) 
There is implicit in the title of this paper the 
assumption of freedom of choice; once we know which 
is the better life, we have only to choose and act 
accordingly. Yet the dominance of either form is 
more than a matter of the wisdom and preferences of 
enlightened leader ship... We need to know much more 
about the setting of economic activity before we can 
get at the conditions of enterprise freedom or lack 
of it. (p. 68) 
I have suggested that in the comparatively weak and 
vulnerable economy of Canada the range of choice was 
at best limited and that there was never at any time 
the prospect of the enterpriser breaking out in a rash 
21 Shultz and Harriss, American Public Finance, p. 21. Shultz 
and Harriss go on to say that his position is sometimes broadened to 
include the view that government action is justified in cases where 
private groups "...will not adequately prepare for the distant future." 
It is their opinion, however, that this "...argument has been greatly 
overworked." 
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of rugged individualism, (p. 69)^2 
The last observation is precisely the point intended in the present 
study. 
Fixed Pattern of Resources. The assumptions of traditional inter-
national trade theory imply that the most important oconomic problem 
is the accomplishment of the most efficient allocation of already 
existing productive resources. But it is precisely a change in the 
existing pattern of productive resources that underdeveloped countries 
require for development. It is capital scarcity relative to labor 
and/ or land—but especially labor—and the resultant low per capita 
income level in these countries that places them in the underdeveloped 
category. Consequently* the most imperative economic problem from 
the standpoint of the underdeveloped countries is enlargement of the 
scarce resources rather than better allocation of the existing resources. 
In classfying productive resources* we can narrow the categories 
of land and labor to the extreme of natural resources in their primitive 
state and human effort in its primitive state. This permits restatement 
of the primary economic objective of enlarging scarce resources as the 
accumulation of all types of capital in all sectors of the underdeveloped 
economies. 
It is capital most broadly defined, as man made "means" of pro-
duction, that is the scarce resource in all underdeveloped economies. 
This includes capital as financial resources, and capital as intangible 
22 Easterbrook, "State Control and Free Enterprise in their Impact 
on Economic Growth",. The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, ed. B. F. 
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assets such as general and technical education, training and skills, as 
well as capital as a stock of physical goods useful in production. 
Factor Mobility. There are two broad sources of capital: (l) do-
mestic creation, which involves development of new capital producing 
enterprises either governmental or private, and (2) acquisition from 
foreign countries, which involves mobility of this productive factor 
internationally. Contrary to the assumption of immobility of factors 
internationally, there is no special reason why-capital in the form 
of interm ediate goods should not move in international exchange like 
any other product. 
On the other hand* domestic creation of capital in underdeveloped 
countries requires action predicated on a lack of validity of the in-
ternal mobility aspect of the international-trade-theory mobility 
assumption. The exchange activities in underdeveloped countries are 
predominantly raw-materials exporting and service activities in a 
few metropolitan areas. Yet the principal domestic economic acti-
vity, in terms of the per cent of the population engaged, is sub-
sistance agriculture. In this situation, failure of the assumed 
perfect factor mobility domestically creates the difficulty for 
development.23 This is the main burden of the Singer argument* i. e., 
Hoselitz, pp. 60-70. 
23 - Williams points out, "Inferior organization of capital and labor 
in the more backward country, inferior domestic banking, inferior in-
ternal means of communication, inferior perception of economic oppor-
tunity—these are obstacles to free movement which far outweigh those 
commonly cited as impediments to the movement of factors from the more 
advanced countries. The movement of capital, and to a less degree of 
labor, is therefore likely to be more free from a more advanced to 
a less advanced country than is the internal mobility of factors in 
27 
that the export economy and the domestic economy of underdeveloped 
countries have proved to be quite emphatically segregated insofar 
as intercourse between the economic forces at work in the two sectors 
is concerned. 
Optimum Welfare Results of Free Market Systems. There is a feeling 
in underdeveloped countries of the need for diversification or balanced 
growth which has not occurred in these countries. There are potential 
gains to be derived from diversification of domestic economic activity, 
i. e., domestic specialization, as well as from international special-
ization. In view of the failure of concentrated economic activity in the 
export sector of the economy to bring a level of economic wellbaing 
comparable to that of the more highly developed—synonymous at this 
point with diversified—economies, the feeling of need for diversifica-
tion domestically is understandable. 
The advantages of specialization are too well known to require much 
elaboration here. They are, however, of special significance for under-
developed countries facing the problem of breaking out of the so-called 
vicious circle of poverty. 
The profitableness of an investment in private enterprise depends, 
at least in part, on the size of the market. Because of the low incomes 
in the underdeveloped countries, the size of the domestic market for 
most products and services is insufficient to justify investment on the 
the latter. This is part of the explanation of great cosmopolitan sea-
coast cities... nearer to Europe in...contacts and characteristics than 
to their own interiors..." op. cit., p. 261. 
2li H. W. Singer, "The.Distribution of Gains between Investing and 
Borrowing Countries,"-American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings* 
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part of private individuals whose motivation is primarily^ the maxi-
mization of profit in a relatively short period of time. -> 
External economies of investment, broadly defined for underdeveloped 
countries, involve potential social benefit which justify investments in 
particular industries, not justified by the purely private profit consid-
erations of general equilibrium theory.2° This is true because pecuniary, 
i. e., profitability, external economies* which are experienced by other 
industries than the one in which investment originally occurs* are not 
reflected in market prices receivable by the original investor. Although 
pecuniary external economies tend to exist in all economies,^7 future 
markets for goods and securities help to reduce the discrepancy between 
private profit and public benefit from investment in advanced economies. 
On the other hand, inadequately organized money markets which are 
necessary to support future markets contribute to making the private 
Vol. XL, May 1950* p. 1|?5. 
25 See Nurkse* Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Coun-
tries* chap. I. 
26 See Tibor Scitovsky* "Two Concepts of External Economies," Jour-
nal of Political Economy, April 1951;* pp. Iii3-l5l. Scitovsky distin-
guishes "Technological" ( or productivity) external economies of general 
equilibrium analysis, examples of which are relatively few, and 
"pecuniary" (or profitability) external economies implied in discussions 
of balanced growth needs in underdeveloped countries. He points out 
that, in a situation where investment in one industry, A, causes profits 
to arise for another industry, B, expansion in which in turn raises pro-
fits further for A, investment based on private profit would not be as 
much as was socially beneficial unless expansion in both industries was 
simultaneous. Scitovsky lists five possible sources of such "pecuniary" 
external economies and concludes that* "It is apparent from this list . 
that vertical integration alone would not be enough and that complete 
integration of all industries would be necessary to eliminate all 
divergence between private profit and public benefit." p. Iii9. 
27 For reasons discussed by Scitovsky, ibid., pp. Iii7-l50« 
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profi-c-^ public-benefit discrepancy in underdeveloped economies quite wide. 
Another aspect of the discrepancy between private profit and social 
benefit dorived from investment arises when the distribution of benefits 
from investment is considered from the international point of view as 
opposed to the national point of view. To the extent that private 
profit does indicate social desirability of investment, it does so 
without distinguishing the nationality of the recipients. There are 
pecuniary external economies from investment in export industries, as 
opposed to import-competing industries, that benefit foreigners, and 
there are pecuniary external diseconomies suffered by foreigners which 
result from investment in import-competing industries.2" Therefore, 
private profits from investment approximate benefits to persons all over 
the world more nearly than it does benefits to persons in individual' 
countries where the investment occurs. 
The result for underdeveloped countries is an overstatement of 
the profitability of -investment in export industries compared with the 
profitability.of investment in import-competing industries. The over-
statement of profitability of investment in export industries is reflected 
in market prices when the total of benefits received, by whomever* are 
the basis for judging profitability of an investment instead of just 
those investment benefits received by nationals. ° 
28 Ibid, p. 151. 
29 This case is, in one sense, a reverse of the preceding situation 
where the discrepancy (within a country) between private profit and 
public benefit from an investment was due to the failure of the'price 
system to take account of enough returns from investment. In this the 
price system takes account of too much return from investment so far as 
domestic social benefit is concerned. 
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This difference in viewpoint, i. e., international versus national, 
has led to the argument over the effects of the terms of trade on raw-
materials-exporting countries. If the terms of trade have turned 
against raw-materials-exporting countries as contended by those who 
take the national point of view, there is justification for stimulating 
investment in non-export industries, i. e., industries producing for 
the domestic market—either import-competing or purely domestic industries 
The whole question of the distribution of benefits from particular 
investments raises the problem of just what industries may be justified 
on economic grounds as recipients of encouragement from policies de-
signed to achieve development. The choice of industries for promotion 
is a decision which has to be made by any country deliberately seeking 
to develop, but it is a problem which is beyond the scope of this study.31 
An implication of the preceding discussion, however, is that the range 
of economically justifiable choice of industries for development, at 
least from each individual country's domestic point of view, is broader 
than can be justified by traditional trade theory based upon compara-
In anticipation of analysis in a later chapter, it may be noted that 
the external diseconomies of investment policy oriented around narrow 
domestic benefit that are suffered by the rest of the world in the rela-
tively short period may be offset in the long run by effects of increased 
income in underdeveloped countries. 
30 See Singer, loc. cit., also United Nations, Economic Commission 
for Latin America (R. Prebisch), The Economic Development of Latin America 
and Its Principal Problems* 1950. 
31 The task selected for this study is to analyze the potentialities 
and the results of using commercial policies to aid in effecting 
development regardless of whatever lines are determined suitable. See 
above, p. 1. 
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tive advantage32 and general equilibrium analysis.33 Furthermore* there 
are two other aspects which tend to indicate a wider range of such 
choices* but which are commonly slighted in discussions relating to 
these decisions* i. e., transport costs and international monopoly 
forces.3k 
Transportation Costs and International Markets. Transport costs 
have been abstracted from in most discussions of international speciali-
zation based on comparative cost advantages. Transport costs were said 
to affect relative prices and therefore the volume of international 
trade* but not the basic principle.35 
While transport costs do not affect the basic theoretical principle* 
32 Romnoy Robinson* loc. cit.* criticizes comparative advantage theory 
because it* "...treats international trade as a means of reallocating 
already existing factors of production so as to increase output." 
(p. 3l|6). Robinson attempts to show "...that such an account is mislead-
ing* the most important aspect of trade being its stimulus toward creation 
of new (italics Robinson's) productive factors, the resulting gains being 
far in excess of those likely to be derived by raising the marginal pro-
duct of existing factors." (p. 3l|6) 
Although there are still vast gains to be derived from international 
specialization* the nature of that specialization is not solely depen-
dent upon already existing factor endowments. Robinson1 s analysis is the 
most telling blow to the traditional comparative advantage explanation • 
of international trade yet put forth. 
33 See J. E. Meade, Trade and Welfare, Vol. II of The Theory of In-
ternational Economic Policy, 1931T* esp. chaps. VIII, XVI and XXVI, for a 
thorough general equilibrium treatment of the issues involved in such 
policy decisions. 
3ll The latter involves violation of assumptions 2 and 1| above, p. l5« 
35 Ellsworth makes this observation in the 1950 edition of The Inter-
national Economy* chap. 6. In the 1958 edition, he says, "We can now 
take account explicitly of the fact that the movement of goods involves 
costs* often heavy* that exert a strong influence upon the course of trade 
and upon the location of industry, p.(113.) 
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they do affect what it means for the pattern of specialization as between 
developed and underdeveloped economies. Failure to develop adequate 
transportation facilities in underdeveloped economies may preclude* fpr 
them, development of additional domestic industries that would be 
entirely justified even on the basis of traditional comparative-advantage 
analysis. "Products that should be available domestically may be imported 
from foreign sources thousands of miles away because transport over 
much shorter distances is impossible."36 
Transport costs also affect the distribution of the gains from in-
ternational specialization and trade through the difference in relative 
importance of transport costs in the delivered cost of different types 
of goods. Transport costs as a percentage of total cost are low for 
commodities of relatively high value per unit of weight (e. g., most 
manufacturers) and high for commodities of relatively low value per 
unit of weight (e. g. most primary goods).37 At the same time, advanced 
countries hold a position of relatively greater importance in the trans-
port industry.38 These two facts combined mean that the accrual of payments 
for transportation of goods internationally as a proportion of the gains 
36 W. Owen* "Transportation and Economic Development," American 
Economic Review*.Papers and Proceedings, XLIX* May 1959, p. 179. 
3~7 C. Moneta* "The Estimation of Transportation Costs in Internation-
al Trade," The Journal of Political Economy, pp. hl-58. Moneta ob-
serves, "This ratio (of transportation cost to total cost) is an inverse 
function.of the value per ton of the commodity, so that for very high-
valued items it may approach zero and for low-valued items it may 
approach one." p. I4I. 
38 The readily available data gives only a rough indication of the 
fact. For example, in 1957 the registered merchant shipping tonnage and 
the air cargo ton-kilometers of "developed" countries each amounted 
to about four times that of "underdeveloped" countries. Estimated from 
tables 138 and llil of the United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1958, pp. 
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from trade—especially in regard to the primary-goods exports of under-
developed countries—is heavily i n favor of developed countr ies . 
Competition and Monopoly. The percent by value of in ternat ional 
trade conducted under monopoly or ca r t e l conditions has been variously 
estimated at from one-third^? to one-half^0 of a l l in ternat ional trade 
during the interwar years . While ca r t e l ac t iv i ty in primary products 
exported by underdeveloped countries has been most widely researched 
and reported, a great deal of c a r t e l ac t iv i ty also has been in the 
i 
i 
area of basic metals processing* chemicals and other manufacturing 
Industries.^1 The purpose, among others* has been to maintain price 
above cost through restriction of supply and prevention of the develop-
ment of new competing sources of supply. 
In order to obtain lower costs of large scale production and still 
restrict supply, cartelized firms in advanced economies have sold their 
surplus production abroad at prices below cost. While this practice 
might seem to favor underdeveloped countries, its effect has bean to 
prevent the development of the affected industries in the underdeveloped 
countries without providing a reliable source of the products. Fluctua-
tions in demand and in production have meant that exportable surpluses 
existed at some times and not at others. 
The effect on underdeveloped countries has been to hinder the 
creation of new industries which, once they were established, might be 
309f and 321ff. 
39 By Machlup in A Cartel Policy for the United Nations, Corwin 
Edwards, ed., 19U5* pT "FT. 
i|0 Edward Mason, Controlling World Trade, p. 26 fn. 
Ill See E. Hcxner,"International Cartels, Part Two: Case Studies, p. l8lff. 
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able to compete on the basis of cost in the domestic markets for such . 
products and increase domestic incomes.^ 
Saying and Free Market Provision for Growth. Capital accumulation 
requires saving as wall as investment, and these requirements are affected 
by tha low-income aspects of the "vicious circle of poverty" in under-
developed countries.^3 Incomes, both money and real, are very low so 
that most income goes for merely sustaining the populations at bare 
subsistence, or even lower, levels of living with very little possibility 
for saving.^ 
Extreme inequality in the distribution of incomes in these coun-
tries^ further compounds the problem of achieving adequate saving for 
development. The small percent of the population who receive a very 
large percent of the total income have very little incentive to save 
for investment because of the lack of investment opportunities.^ These 
wealthy tend to spend on consumption of imported luxuries or living on 
the Riviera, rather than to save.^' 
The amounts which the wealthy elite do save they tend to "invest" 
in relatively safe securities in advanced countries or in land and real 
1|2 It will be readily perceived that this point touches on both the 
infant-industry and anti-dumping arguments for protection. 
U3 Nurske, op. cit.* p. 5» 
kk United Nations* National and Per Capita Income in Seventy Countries, 
19l|9, p. H*. 
1|5 Kindleberger* op. cit., p. 8. 
I46 The previous discussion regarding the importance of the size of the 
market and regarding external economies from investment is pertinent to 
this point. See above, p. 27. 
il7 This practice is a possible target of commercial policies dis-
cussed later. See below, p. 7U. 
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estate in anticipation of appreciation in the value thereof as popula-
tion pressures increase. Thus creation of diversified types of venture 
capital is neglected due to the quest for asset security and the fact 
that the domestic markets for the products of venture capital are so 
small. All of these practices of the wealthy elite are part of the 
reason for the feeling in underdeveloped countries that initially the 
development process requires direct government investment, at least in 
social overhead capital, and/or encouragement of private investment. 
Employment and Labor Mobility. One other important circumstance 
in most underdeveloped countries, which holds considerable potential 
for influencing balanced g*w xf, which constitutes both a problem to 
be solved and a potential asset, and which involves another failure 
of the assumptions of traditional international trade theory to be 
fulfilled, is the existenca of considerable underemployment, i. e., 
disguised unemployment, of labor.^ Disguised unemployment constitutes 
a violation of both the traditional assumption of full employment of 
resources and the assumption of the internal mobility of resources. This 
type of underemployment, which is especially characteristic of the sub-
sistence agriculture of the underdeveloped countries, involves a surplus 
of labor in agriculture. 
Under these circumstances a shift of laborers out of agriculture 
could be effected without reducing the total agricultural output. In 
some instances, it might even increase output. The latter would occur 
ll8 See United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Measures for 
the Economic Development of' Under-Developed Countries* 1951 PP• 7ff • 
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if the point where marginal physical output of agriculture labor became 
zero had been passed. This tends to be true of the heavily populated 
countries. The shifting of such labor out of agriculture would tend to 
increase the total real income of the country, although problems for 
those shifting would be serious. 
Such a shift would be speeded and the accompanying difficulties 
eased by policies affecting both domestic trade and foreign trade which 
stimulated diversified development of domestic economic activity. This 
shift of labor would be a continuing process if economic development 
could be maintained. The process would be stimulated by improved agricul-
tural techniques including mechanization, just as it has been in the 
case of every country that has experienced long periods of economic 
growth. Thus economic development of underdeveloped countries cannot 
concentrate on industrialization to the exclusion of agricultural im-
provement. 
Policy Implications. 
The foregoing discussion of the assumptions of traditional internat-
ional trade theory tends- to indicate that commercial policies alone 
cannot bring development. It is generally agraed that one of the prin-
ciple tasks of development in underdeveloped countries is creation of 
capital, and that this requires investment, either foreign or domestic* 
that will result in balanced growth. For private investment in varied 
enough lines to be forthcoming* the climate must be right. The most 
important economic prerequisite for the creation of such a favorable 
climate for private investment in underdeveloped countries is the creation 
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of social overhead capital—e. g., education and training facilities, 
transportation facilities, communication facilities—investment in which 
is not profitable enough in the short period to attract private invest-
ors and entreprenuers. 
Facilities of this type have been developed by export enterprises to 
serve their own needs in many of the underdeveloped countries, but deve-
lopment of such facilities to serve the domestic sector of their economies 
is essential if these countries are to achieve diversification. Creation 
of social overhead capital would tend to stimulate private investment, 
not only by making possible the expansion of the domestic market geographi-
cally, but also by expanding the domestic market in terms' of increased ef-
fective demand resulting from increased incomes. Yet, unless production 
of consumer goods is increased at the same time, increased money incomes 
would lead to inflation. Inflation is an ever-present tendency and threat 
to development in underdeveloped countries. 
The initial steps toward accumulation of varied types of capital in 
underdeveloped countries have to come from government as the only institu-
tion with a long enough life expectancy to reap the full rewards from in-
vestment, the returns from which can only be realized in the relatively 
distant future. Thus, free private, i. e., capitalist, enterprise which 
is assumed in the free trade theory will tend to assume the responsibility 
for diversified capital creation in underdeveloped countries only after 
the groundwork has been laid by governments. As pointed out previously,^ 
1|9 See above, p. 25. 
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this is not inconsistent with the laissez-faire philosophy, which holds 
that the only proper functions of government are those that private enter-
prise either cannot or will not do. Furthermore, original government sti-
mulus to economic growth in the early stages of development has been com-
mon in the history of every country, even in the history of United States' 
development. In other words, development in every case has been initiated, 
at least partially, by state action. 
As noted earlier,50 Easterbrook concludes that the conditions under 
which Canadian development has occurred have been such as to preclude a 
choice between private action and government action. The considerable de-
gree of imperativeness and of risk involved in the task of initiating de-
velopment in the currently underdeveloped countries tends to preclude a 
choice between private action and government action for them in much the 
same way, though for different specific reasons, that it did for Canada 
in her early stages of development. For various socio-politico-eco-
historical reasons, opportunity for private enterprise lies in conjunction 
with government action. In underdeveloped countries, private enterprise 
is enabled to invest with increasing prospects of adequate return only as 
government acts to reduce risks. 
The failure of traditional international trade analysis to be con-
cerned with economic growth is to a large extent due to the static nature 
of the theory imposed upon it by its assumptions. Furthermore, the assump-
tions have been developed essentially only in terms of the institutional 
50 See above, pp. 25f. 
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framework of Western Europe and North America.51 The making of policy re-
commendations for all countries on the basis of economic generalizations 
derived in such restricted manner fails to heed the admonition of Marshall: 
Though economic analysis and general reasoning are of 
wide application, yet every age and every country has 
its own problems; and every change in social conditions 
is likely to require a new development of economic 
doctrines.52 
The analysis of economic development has been sporadic and essential-
ly only a fringe concern in the development of economic thought.53" Fur-
ther, the development analysis which has occurred has been mainly con-
cerned with the problems of maintaining growth or preventing stagnation 
rather than with the origins of economic development. In short, we have 
no satisfactory general theory of economic development, especially of the 
origins of development which are the main concern of the underdeveloped 
countries.54 
However, it is not our purpose in this study to attempt the develop-
ment of such a theory. Since there are not satisfactory theoretical guide 
lines to proper policy for development, the various underdeveloped coun-
tries have embarked upon development programs on a more or less trial and 
error basis. We have, therefore, selected as the task of this study an 
analysis of the potentialities of planning foreign trade controls to co-
51 H. F. Williamson, "Comment" (on "Economics of Growth" by Abramovitz), 
A Survey of Contemporary Economics, Vol. II, 1952, p. 182. 
52 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, eighth edition, p. 37. 
53 M. Abramovitz, "Economics of Growth", A Survey of Contemporary Eco-
nomics, Vol. II, 1952, p. 132. 
BT| This can be partly accounted for by the fact that many of the deter-
minants of the origin of economic development lie outside the traditional 
boundaries of the study of economics. Two interesting tentative efforts 
at devising this are W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, 1953, 
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incide with and complement other policies for development rather than con-
flicting with and hindering them. 
Summary 
To summarize, we have pointed out: (1) That the frame of reference 
of traditional international trade theory is not very well suited for ana-
lysis of the special problems of underdeveloped countries for two main 
reasons: (a) its assumptions are incompatible with the social, political 
and economic institutional framework of the underdeveloped countries, and 
(b) it leads to misplaced emphasis as regards the selection of the most 
vital problems to be solved, 1. e., emphasis upon the problem of alloca-
tion of existing resources rather than on the problem of originating the 
process of economic development. (2) In view of (1), it is inappropriate 
to make international trade policy recommendations for underdeveloped 
countries based on traditional international trade theory, even though the 
conclusions as to the gains from international trade, given the assump-
tions of traditional theory, are logically consistent. (3) Some of the 
basic needs for development include: (a) formation of capital of all types 
and in all sectors, and, therefore, increased levels of saving and invest-
ment, (b) increased domestic mobility of resources, especially labor, from 
the agricultural sector to the industrial sector, (c) stimulus of produc-
tion for the domestic market through the creation of social overhead capi-
tal to serve the entire economy rather than the export sector only. (U) 
and S. Kuznets, "Toward a Theory of Economic Growth," in R. Lekachman, ed., 
National Policy for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad, 1955. 
The outpouring of publications on the subject appears to have been in-
creasing at an increasing rate over the last ten years. See the accompany-
ing bibliography. 
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Control of foreign trade can contribute to the fulfillment of the general 
needs listed under (3). 
The last observation points up the purpose of this study, i. e., to 
.analyze the possible uses and effects of commercial policies of underdeve-
loped countries as they may be, and are, directed toward the attainment of 
economic development. The following chapter gives a brief description of 
the general nature of commercial policies which may be used to combat the 
special problems that arise out of attempts to develop, as well as an in-
troductory discussion and organization of the problems to be attacked. 
CHAPTER III 
COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 
This chapter is designed to lay the groundwork for the more detailed 
analysis in the subsequent chapters. The meaning of the term'"commercial 
policies" is delimited by a description of the instruments of control to 
be included in that category for purposes of this thesis. The importance 
of unifying commercial policy formulation toward development is empha-
sized. The broad, interrelated development objectives most susceptible 
to influence by commercial policy instruments are explicated. Finally, 
the specific commercial policy objectives, fulfillment of which will con-
tribute most directly to achievement of the development ends, are elabo-
rated. 
Governmental interference with market mechanisms operates through 
controls affecting incomes, prices, and quantities of goods and services 
demanded and supplied. The various instruments of governmental inter-
ference lend themselves in varying degrees of effectiveness to control 
over more general economic variables—e. g., totals of income, consump-
tion, and investment—or to control over more specific economic vari-
ables—e. g., incomes of particular products and services, and investment 
in particular industries or sectors of the economy. It is m these terms 
of relative effectiveness that the nature of commercial policies and 
their development uses are discussed in this chapter. 
THE NATURE OF COMMERCIAL POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS THESIS 
The policy techniques included in the category "commercial policies" 
has never been a matter of standard practice. Like all definitions and 
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classifications the term is susceptible of varied interpretation to serve 
particular purposes of study and analysis.1 Primary consideration of 
commercial policies in this study is limited to tariffs and foreign trade 
subsidies, quantity restrictions* and exchange controls to the exclusion 
of such practices as state trading, international cartels, and interna-
tional commodity agreements. 
Reliance on commercial policies as here distinguished, in incor-
porating international trade relations in an overall policy for develop-
ment, as opposed to reliance on state trading for the same purpose 
indicates a significant difference in approach to the problem of develop-
ment. Historically* state trading has dominated international trade 
relations only m those countries already committed to virtually com-
plete control over all economic activity, domestic and foreign.2 Pre-
sumptively, where reliance is on coranercial policies as here distin-
* guished, it is the intention of the government to permit a more extensive 
degree of private enterprise. This is the general tenor of expressions, 
as well as the specific assertion, of representatives of most underdeve-
1 Towle defines the term broadly to include "all measures regulating 
the external commercial relations of a country—measures adopted by a 
government to assist or hinder the export or import of goods and ser-
vices." International Trade and Commercial Policy, Harper, New York, 
1956, p. U23. Krause excludes "broader monetary and fiscal policies". 
The International Economy, Houghton Mifflin, Riverside Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1955* p. 229. Snider excludes "international monetary and pay-
ments policies." op. cit., p. 371. 
For a general classification of the instruments of government con-
trol see Table I m H. B. Chenery, "Development Policies and Programmes," 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, III, No. I, March 1958, p. 56. 
2 Towle says, "Under state trading, tariffs, quantitative restrictions, 
and exchange controls are superfluous." 0£. cit., p. 633. 
hk 
loped countries (with the exception of Communist countries) in their 
discussions of development programs and policies.3 
International cartels are excluded from consideration because they 
are essentially private rastrictions on free international trade* not 
government policy. They havo been supported* however* in; greater or less 
degree by various governments. 
International commodity agreements are excluded primarily because 
they are "agreements" rather than unilaterally determined policies. How-
ever* it is interesting to note that such agreements have usually been 
made in connection with commodities that are exchanged in markets which 
most nearly reflect the perfectly competitive conditions assumed in 
the free trade arguments. It is in such markets* e.g., primary goods 
markets* that sellers have proved to bo at an economic disadvantage in 
their relations with the rest of the more imperfectly competitive inter-
national economy. 
Tariffs 
In terms of the use made of them and the analytical discussion de-
voted to them* tariffs are the most venerable of the instruments of govern-
mental policy in the area of international economic relations. Thoy 
3 See especially United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin 
America* "The Latin American Regional Market," Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, III, March 1958, p. 5* and United Nations* Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East, "Economic Development and Planning 
in Asia and the Far East* Policies and Moans of Implementation*" Econo-
mic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, VII, November 1956, p. 3. For 
a general policy statement in this regard by one important government, 
see Government of India, "Industrial Policy Resolution," April, 1956, 
reprinted in Planning Commission, Government of India, The Now India, 
Progress Through Democracy* Macmillan, New York, 1958* p. 3o7ff. 
are taxes or duties levied upon goods and services imported or exported 
across national boundaries. As tax levies they constitute a source of 
revenue for government when the base upon which they are levied is exis-
tent. Since, however, a tariff increases the delivered price of the 
dutiable item to the potential buyer, or* alternatively, lowers the 
potential return to the seller, it may have the effect of preventing the 
exchange of the dutiable item. Thus* a tariff, like any tax* may reduce 
or eliminate the base upon which it is levied. 
Effects of Tariffs. What the effects of a tariff will be—how much 
revenue is raised* what changes in prices will occur* what changes will 
occur in quantities demanded and supplied* what will be the shifts in 
factor uses—is dependent on market conditions. At one level* these 
conditions involve the degree of refinement in market organization and 
facilities as well as the extent of the markets. At another level* they 
involve the significance of the market structures for the mobility of 
factors and the knowledge of market conditions in terms of opportunities, 
uncertainties and risks. Finally, at that level closest to the actual 
market results, the effects of a tariff involve the more general market 
conditions in their influence upon tha elasticities of demand and supply 
of products and productive services. 
Most analyses and conclusions as to the effects of tariffs have been 
in the context of well organized markets of highly developed-and diversi-
fied economies of economically advanced countries. Analysis of the 
effects of tariffs in the market situations in structurally more rigid 
economies of underdeveloped countries will yield different results. In 
either situation, because of the variety and complexity of responses of 
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supply and demand to change in prices and incomes, the actual effects of 
tariffs are often uncertain and unpredictable. 
Theoretical analysis of a taxonomic nature^ can detail the possible 
effects of tariffs under a variety of assumptions, but the actual effects 
often remain obscure even after they have occurred. Furthermore, tariffs 
may prove to be ineffective instruments of development policy in under-
developed countries because they operate through an initial impact 
upon prices and structural rigidities in many sectors of underdeveloped 
economies dull the quantity responses to price.5 
Tariff Laws and Systems. Historically, tariff systems and tariff 
laws have been marked by variety and complexity. Duty rates are specific, 
or ad valorem, or a combination of the two. The burden of specific 
duties varies inversely with the value of the items upon which they 
are levied. The burden of ad valorem duties remains constant, since the 
tariff collection rises or falls by the same percentage that the value 
of the dutiable item rises or falls. 
Tariffs may be levied to range from completely non-discriminatory 
to extremely discriminatory treatment of products and/ or countries of 
k Such as that by Meade, The Theory of International Economic Policy, 
Vol. II, pp. 193ff. 
5 See Meier and Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 316-318. 
P. T. Bauer takes exception to this view in his Economic Analysis 
and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, Duke University Press, Durham, 
N. C , pp. 39-Ul. Bauer's examples, however, are taken from agriculture, 
especially for export, or from distribution, and do not involve innova-
tions of new techniques in these sectors. The underdeveloped economies 
vary in the degree to which economic activity has been shifted from 
subsistence to exchange orientation, but structural rigidities are 
significant* although in greater or less degree, in all underdeveloped 
economies, especially in those sectors most important for development. 
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origin and destination. A completely non-discriminatory tariff applies 
the same ad valorem rate to every import or export. Such a tariff would 
raise revenue, but has seldom, if ever, been levied. Historically, tar-
iff systems have involved some degree of discrimination, if only to the ex-
tent of allowing some items to enter or leave the country duty-free. 
More commonly, tariff systems have been constructed to incorporate 
considerable discrimination, usually for purposes other than simply 
raising revenue. In view of all the different rates that may be applied 
to all of the different dutiable items, with additional distinctions 
made on the basis of countries of origin or destination, the number of 
discriminatory combinations is infinite. 
Extremely complex tariff systems may be self-defeating of their 
objectives or may call forth retaliatory policies in other countries that 
will defeat the objectives. The less extreme the system is with regard 
to rate levels and discriminatory aspects, the less virulent are retalia-
tory measures likely to be. Also, the fewer the objectives any one tariff 
system is designed to achieve, the more successful it will be in achieving 
those that are set. These aspects serve to bolster the view that with 
uncertainty as to price and quantity effects of tariffs, elaborate, 
multi-purpose tariff systems are ineffective or inefficient means of 
influencing economic behavior of individuals or firms along lines that 
promote economic development. 
The manner in which tariff systems are instituted further increases 
the relative ineffectiveness, of elaborate tariff systems for promoting 
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development. In non-totalitarian countries, which are the principal 
concern of this study, 7 tariff systems are usually instituted by an act 
of parliament. The same is true of important changes in the system. 
Political realities of parliamentary government make tariff systems, 
instituted in such manner, inflexible and difficult to change to meet 
the changing needs and conditions inherent in the dynamic process of 
development. Since, however, the application of the tarnff system is 
usually administered by an executive agency, some 'flexibility may be 
injected into the system by granting the administering agency and cus-
toms officials some discretion in its application. In addition, some 
South American countries have given their chief executive power to 
change tariff laws by edict, although subject to subsequent legislative 
confirmation. 
Foreign Trade Subsidies 
Subsidies to foreign traders are the reverse of tariffs, 1. e., they 
are payments or allowances to exporters or importers rather than levies 
upon their activities. However, they may be substituted for tariffs for 
some purposes, although not for raising revenue. Also, subsidies to 
businesses not engaged in foreign trade may substitute for protective 
tariffs by improving their relative profit position vis-a-vis foreign 
firms.8 
6 For a general discussion of the form and content of tariff laws 
see Towle, op. cat., chap. 18. 
7 See above, p. ll|. 
8 While subsidies have many uses, analysis in this study is limited 
primarily to effects of subsidies on international trading relations as 
these impinge on development. 
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Quantitative Controls 
Quantitative controls take the form of import quotas or export quo-
tas. As such, they constitute the fixing of specific quantities of goods 
that are permitted to be imported or exported during a certain period 
of time. The impact of quotas is on quantities of goods demanded and 
supplied rather than on prices. Although quotas affect prices, the 
price effects of both quotas and tariffs depend on many factors and 
are difficult to predict. 
Quantitative controls, as policy instruments* are more certain and 
precise in their influence on quantites of goods exchanged than are 
tariffs. This is one reason why quantitative restrictions became so 
widespread during the interwar period when, for various reasons* control 
of international trade was more deliberately and frankly practiced.° 
A quota may be combined with a tariff. By this means, a specified 
volume of goods is permitted to pass in international exchange at a 
low duty rate, or free of duty, while any exchange in excess of that 
volume is subject to a higher tariff rate. 
A primary disadvantage of both the simple quota and the tariff 
quota is the tendency for foreign traders to rush to get m under the 
quota or at the lower rate. This causes transactions to be bunched 
early in the quota period, and results in greater price fluctuations. 
9 For a detailed treatment of intarwar commercial policy develop-
ments see Margaret S. Gordon, Barriers to World Trade, Macmillan, N. Y., 
19l*l• Miss Gordon's study is devoted mainly to quotas and exchange 
controls. For a study that deals primarily with tariffs and their 
history see A. Isaacs, International Trade: Tariffs and Commercial 
Policies* Irwin, Homewood, III., 19U8. 
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In practice, an early solution was developed m the form of licensing 
systems. 
Under a licensing system, foreign traders are required to obtain a 
government license to import or export specific commodities.-1-0 A govem-
m ental agency can spread the quota over the quota period, or dispense 
with a specified quota for a specified period and control transactions 
by passing on applications for licenses as they are made. The latter 
procedure makes the quota system a more flexible instrument of control. 
Since quotas control quantities exchanged directly and thus affect 
quantities more certainly and precisely than tariffs, day-to-day licens-
ing decisions can more effectively discriminate between products and 
countries of origin and destination to further economic development in 
underdeveloped countries. An additional element of quota flexibility 
derives from the fact that specific quota decisions are usually made by 
an administrative agency. 
A further important distinction between tariffs and quantitative 
controls has to do with the price and revenue effects of the two systems. 
Whereas tariffs, by their tax nature, involve collection of revenue by 
the government—except when completely prohibitive—and thereby affect 
prices, quantitative controls affect prices through their influence on 
quantities of commodities supplied without guaranteeing that any benefits 
from price changes accrue to the government m the form of revenue. The 
direction of the price influence of quotas is generally toward a price 
10 Alternatively* tho licensing system may be combined with exchange 
controls with the licenses authorizing use of foreign exchange for spec-
ified purposes. This is discussed below. 
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rise that results in windfall profits either for the importers, exporters 
or producers of the commodities affected. Here again a system of licens-
ing quotas can overcome a disadvantage of quotas. Fees charged for quota 
licenses can capture windfall profits for the government. 
The license charges, as well as the dicisions as to whom the lic-
enses will be issued, may be left to the discretion of the administering 
agency, or the licenses may be auctioned off to the highest bidders. 
If these decisions are loft to the discretion of officials, an addition-
al element of flexibility for promoting development is introduced into 
the quota system. On the other hand, auctioning licenses will tend to 
assure the government the greatest revenue possible under the quota 
system and permit the allocation of licenses to be determined by a 
modified price system. 
Quota licensing may be combined with exchange controls by requiring 
a license for the acquisition and use of available foreign exchange for 
specified purposes, rather than licensing the acts of foreign trade 
themselves. Stated in this way, the implication is that foreign exchange 
licensing is primarily concerned with controlling imports. This is 
largely true, although exchange control as practiced usually includes, 
also, controls on foreign exchange earnings from exporting. 
Licenses authorizing the purchase of foreign exchange may carry 
assurance of the availability of the necessary amount of foreign exchange 
or grant permission to buy if the foreign exchange is available. In 
the latter situation greater reliance on modified market forces in the 
determination of exchange rates is implied. Whichever procedure is 
followed, most foreign trade licensing schemes and exchange control 
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systems currently are used together. 
Exchange Controls 
Exchange control is additionally a separate and distinct instrument 
of commercial policy. It can be, and is, used to influence the flow of 
imports and exports of goods and services. 1 
Exchange rates in free markets are determined by the interaction 
of private supply of and demand for the various national currencies, or, 
more strictly, the claims to national currencies. The supply of foreign 
exchange in a particular country is derived from earnings from exports 
of commodities and services as well as money capital inflows, while 
demand for foreign exchange is derived from demand for imports of goods 
and services as well as money capital outflows. Since exchange rates 
react back on the quantities of foreign exchange demanded and supplied, 
controls on exchange and exchange rates can influence imports and exports. 
11 See footnote 1, p. JU3• 
12 Free foreign exchange markets are basically of tuo types: one in 
which exchange rates are fixed as under the international gold standard 
and the other in which exchange rates are flexible. Under fixed exchange 
rates when there is disequilibrium in the balance of payments, adjust-
ment occurs through changes in price, income and employment levels— 
deflationary changes in deficit countries and inflationary changes in 
surplus countries—unless offsetting long-term capital movements are 
forthcoming. Under flexible exchange rates adjustment occurs through 
fluctuations in the exchange rates. The principal disadvantage of flex-
ible rates is the possibility of extreme rate fluctuations arising out 
of destabilizing speculative activities and creating uncertainties and 
risks that disrupt international trade. In a number of instances where 
such extreme rate fluctuations have occurred, stabilization through 
government buying and selling has been attempted, but where large defic-
its were involved, supplies of foreign currencies and gold have usually 
proved inadequate for the task. 
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General Purposes and Effects. Exchange control systems are designed 
to control the use made of available foreign exchange. Like tariff and 
quota systems, exchange control systems can be constructed to exercise 
widely varying1 degrees of control over international transactions. Their 
complexity will tend to vary directly with the number of policy objectives 
they are used to fulfill. Furthermore, the less general, i. o., the 
more detailed, the objectives of exchange control, the more stringent 
the controls are likely to be. 
Since foreign exchange transactions are usually handled by banks as 
intermediaries in international trade, it is possible to exercise loose 
exchange control by having the central bank or even the principal commer-
cail banks simply supervise international payments more carefully. Even 
in more thorough-going exchange control systems, already existing finan-
cial institutions can serve as administrative agencies. 
Under more extreme forms of exchange control, the government re-
quires that all foreign exchange earnings be sold to a government agency 
—the central bank, the treasury, or a specially established exchange 
control board or commission—and authorizes that agency to allocate 
such earnings among potential users as it deems necessary to carry out 
government policy objectives. Such detailed control may be exercized 
through a system of foreign exchange licensing that not only rations 
the quantity, but also fixes the exchange rate, i.e.* the price of for-
eign exchange. An exchange control program of this typo includes the 
impact points 3 of both tariffs and quotas* i.e.* the prices and the 
13 "Impact" is used here m the tax theory sense. 
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quantities of foreign exchange and of imports and exports. 
Foreign exchange licensing makes possible more effective and complete 
control over invisibles—services and capital transfers—in the balance 
of payments than is possible with either tariff or quota systems. Thus, 
exchange control systems can be constructed to provide a wide range of 
versatility in their effects on different commodities and other balance 
of payments items as well as on different countries and .their currencies. 
The advisability of incorporating greater versatility in the system, 
which means additional complexities, depends upon the existing conditions 
and the policy objectives of particular countries, as well as on the 
difficulties of enforcement. 
Exchange Control Systems. No two systems of exchange control are 
the same, for the combination of alternative features is infinite. Broad 
typos* however, can bo distinguished in terms of their degree of com-
plexity. 
In simple form* there may be established an official exchange rata 
at which all foreign exchange must be sold to and bought from the 
controlling agency. The immediate purpose is to mobilize what is a 
short supply of foreign exchange (which implies a balance of payments 
deficit) in order to control its use. The official rate of exchange is 
established by fixing the ratio at which the domestic currency is to 
exchange for a relatively stable currency* say tho U. S. dollar or the 
British pound.1^ 
ill This practice also fixes the ratio of the domestic currency to all 
other currencies. Defining a currency in terms of gold* without estab-
lishing a gold standard* is another method of doing the-same thing. 
I 
Since exchange controls are instituted to avoid what are considered 
less desirable avenues of adjustment in the balance of payments* e.g.* 
currency devaluation or exchange rate appreciation, the official rate 
established is apt to overvalue the domestic currency (underdevaluo for-
eign exchange). Thus, almost inevitably an illegal or "black market" 
will develop in which buyers are willing to pay a higher domestic-
currency price for foreign exchange than the official rate, 
A slightly more complicated system that avoids the harmful effects 
of such illicit activity yet retains some essential control can be 
established by legalizing the black market. This involves discrimina-
tion between different sources of supply of foreign exchange and between 
different uses. Specified categories of foreign exchange earnings are 
required to be sold to the control authorities at the official rate, the 
rest being allowed to be sold on the "free market". Foreign exchange 
demanded for certain purposes is permitted to be purchased at the offic-
ial rate from the authorities, the rest of tho demand having to be sat-
isfied at the higher free market rate.1^ This is tho simplest form of 
the third and most complicated type of oxchango control system, viz., 
multiple exchange rates. 
Deliberately established multiple exchange rate systems of exchange 
control usually involve the fixing of more than one official rate of 
exchange, to be maintained with or without a legal "free" rate. Various 
15 Ellsworth calls this a "dual rata system", op. cit., p. 3U2. 
16 The International Monetary Fund defines a "multiple currency prac-
tice" as an affective buying and selling rate which differs from parity 
by more than one per cent as a result of official action. See IMF, First 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions* 1950* p. lUU« 
official buying rates may be applied to different sources of foreign 
exchange earnings and various official selling rates charged for differ-
ent uses to which foreign exchange is to be put. Such multiple rate 
systems constitute a method of instituting partial devaluation which can 
be used to pursue a much wider variety of policy objectives than is 
possible through general devaluation. Furthermore, multiple exchange 
rate systems provide a government revenue potential, in addition to 
possible exchange license charges, in the form of profits from purchases 
of foreign exchange at a lower average rate than the average rate for 
sales of foreign exchange. 
The raison d'etre of exchange control systems is to cope with diffi-
culties associated with balance of payments deficits. Since under incon-
vertible currency conditions*1? balance of payments deficits tend to 
arise vis-a-vis some countries and not others, bilateral trading, clear-
ing, and payments agreements have frequently accompanied exchange con-
trol systems. While bilateral agreements are not inherent necessities in 
the operation of exchange control systems, they have often beon resort-
ed to as expedient solutions to particularly pressing problems. 
In tho literature on international economies, most discussions of 
the effects of commercial policies have taken the form of discussions of 
tariffs, with a general extension of these discussions to quantitative 
and exchange controls. Quantitative and exchange controls are usually 
deemed to have the same basic effects as tariffs, especially with respect 
17 During 1959 considerable progress was made toward the goal of 
currency convertibility, especially by European countries. Many problems 
of inconvertibility remain. Seo IMF, Tenth Annual Report on Exchange 
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to their influence on the pricing and allocative operations of the market. 
The main distinction that is drawn between the market effects of tariffs 
as opposed to either quantity controls or exchange controls is that while 
the imposition of a tariff constitutes interference with market forces, 
once it is imposed the market forces are free to adjust to the new price 
situation created by the tariff without further interference. Quantity 
and exchange controls, on the other hand, are presented as involving con-
tinuing interference on the part of governmental authorities.!" 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAKING DEVELOPMENT THE DOMINANT CONSIDERATION IN 
COMMERCIAL POLICY FORMULATION 
Past Commercial Policy Objectives 
The purposes of commercial policies usually cited are obtaining 
government revenue, protecting domestic producers, and protecting the 
balance of payments.19 These purposes are general in nature and as such 
are susceptible of partial accomplishment by tariffs, even though a 
particular tariff levy cannot serve well both as a revenue and a pro-
tective device. Even for these general purposes, however, many countries 
learned during the inter-war period how to use quantity and exchange con-
trols with more precision than tariffs. Many special circumstances of 
the inter-war period involving post-World War I adjustments and the 
Restrictions, 1959. 
18 This distinction may or may not be significant depending upon how 
often the tariff laws are changed, how the tariff laws are written, and 
how much discretionary decisions by customs officials affect the appli-
cation of the tariff to the various commodities concerned. 
19 Kindleberger notes m addition, under most of the traditional 
limiting assumption, what he calls the consumption effect, redistribu-
tion effect, terms-of-trade effect, and income (or employment) effect. 
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world-wide depression created some new objectives of commercial policies 
20 
which required more precision than tariffs afforded. 
Many of the problems of the inter-war period have receded far into 
the background, while tho problems of development of underdeveloped coun-
tries have come to the fore as an influence on international trading 
relations. With promotion of development an increasingly important con-
sideration in the commercial policy decisions of underdeveloped countries 
following World War II, there has been increasing reliance upon quanti-
tative and exchange controls in preference to tariffs. This has been 
the tendency in spite of the fact that most of the underdeveloped coun-
tries are members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and /or the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Both organizations* in 
their policy statements* include agreement in principle on the desira-
bility of a gradual reduction of all controls on international trade* 
and reliance on tariffs as opposed to quantity or exchange controls 
when control is deemed necessary. 
When promoting development is recognized as the principal economic 
objective in underdeveloped countries* it becomes not just another pur-
pose of commercial policy on a par with revenue, protection, and balance 
of payments considerations. It becomes the objective. Logical consis-
tency then requires that commercial policy decisions to obtain revenue, 
protect domestic producers and protect the balance of payments be inte-
grated with commercial policy to encourage development. 
International Economics, chaps. 12 & 13• 
20 See M. S. Gordan, op. cit., chap. 1* et passim. 
21 The consistency of approach in commercial policy formulation implied 
here has not yet been adopted. Nevertheless, the general development 
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The Significance of a Shift in Emphasis 
There has been a tendency to equate tho exercise of commercial 
policies with restriction of trade, and more especially with restriction 
of the volume of trade.^2 While commercial policies do place restrictions 
on acts of trade* their use for development in underdeveloped countries 
has a much broader orientation than "restrictionism" in the traditional 
sense that implies an ultimate result of a smaller volume of foreign 
trade. 
For development, control over the type of trade is the primary con-
sideration rather than tho restriction of volume of trade that has trad-
itionally been identified with commercial policies for protection. An 
increased volume of trade is of prime importance to rapid development 
in underdeveloped countries. Their production levels, especially of 
capital equipment, are low. An expanded, and expanding, volume of exports 
would mean increased foreign exchange earnings and increased access to 
the capital goods output in advanced countries. Due to the inadequacy 
of sources for the financing of planned development programs, expendi-
tures of foreign exchange as a proportion of the total cost of such 
programs are significant.^3 
One of tho identifying characteristics of underdoveloped economies 
is the concentration of exchange activities in foreign trade and related 
objective has loomed ever larger in tho background against which commer-
cial policy decisions in response to more immediately pressing (e.g. pay-
ment) problems have bean made in underdeveloped countries. See the dis-
cussions of commercial policy developments and the contributing influences 
in the various annual issues of the Economic Survey of either Latin Amer-
ica or Asia and the Far East. 
22 See Towle, op. cit., pp. 333, l|25f, and 628. 
23 Foreign exchange needs have been estimated at about one-fourth 
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sectors. « While development would be expected to reduce this foreign 
trade orientation of their economies through diversification and en-
largement of the domestic sectors, the reduction would result from less 
relative importance of foreign trade rather than a reduced absolute 
volume. Commorcial policies designed to encourage exports, foreign 
investment and money-capital imports would increase both foreign exchange 
earnings and the absolute volume of foreign trade. 
DEVELOPMENT OBJECT IVES25 TO BE FURTHERED BY COMMERCIAL POLICY 
Increased productivity of human effort is tho prime prerequisite 
of the total public and private cost of India's Second Five Year Plan 
and about one-half of the Philippine Five-Year Economic Development Pro-
gramme. See Planning Commission, Government of India, The New India, 
Macmillan, N. Y.* 1958, p. Ili5* and United Nations* "Economic Develop-
ment and Planning in Asia and tho Far East," Economic Bulletin for Asia 
and the Far East* Vol. VII* Nov. 1956, p. 5l|. 
' 2l| See United Nations* Measures for the Economic Development of Under-
Developed Countries* p. 71. 
2^ The literature on economic development has mushroomed in the last 
ten years and many development problems and objectives have been analyzed* 
documented. Two excellent rocont surveys are Meier and Baldwin, Economic 
Development, 1956* esp. Part 3, and Kindleberger, Economic Development, 
1958.Already classics of a sort arc Nurkse's, Problems of Capital 
Formation in Underdeveloped Countries* 1953* W. A. Lewis' The Theory of 
Economic Growth* 1955* and the United Nations studios Measures for the 
Economic Devolopment of Undor-Developod Countries* 1951* and The Economic 
Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (Probisch), 195°. 
A Wealth of material is available in other occasional studios 
published by tho United Nation's Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East and Economic Commission for Latin America. Economic surveys 
published by tho International Bank for Roconstruction and Development 
are available on Ceylon* Colombia, Iraq, Malaya* and Nigeria among others. 
Much of the development material is in article form. The Univer-
sity of Chicago has published since 195'2 a journal, Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, devoted specifically to this general topic. The 
Economic Bulletins for Asia and the Far East and for Latin America con-
tain articles on tho subject of development. In addition* almost every 
issue of the various professional journals now contains an article or 
more on various aspects of development. 
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for improved economic wellboing. Other development objectives relate 
directly to this basic requirement and include: (l) improvement in the 
quality of human effort, (2) accumulation of capital, (3) structural 
change in the economy, involving reallocation of existing resources and 
change in the pattern of resources* (1|) expansion of the exchange econr 
omy* and (5) improved technology. 
The impoverished populations of the underdeveloped countries are 
largely illiterate and untrained and debilitated by malnutrition and 
disease. For improved quality of human effort* the development needs 
implied constitute a part of what has become known as "social overhead 
capital*" i.e., education and training, health services, and the necessary 
construction for shelter. Financing is the principal problem m creat-
ing social capital, and government revenues can be most efficiently 
raised in the exchange sectors of underdeveloped economies. Since the 
foreign trade sector is a significant exchange sector, tho revenue rais-
ing potential of tariffs can provide direct commercial policy assistance 
in the creation of social capital for improving the quality of human 
effort. ' ^  
Social overhead capiVtal includes more than facilities for improving 
the quality of human effort. In its other forms—transportation and 
communication facilities, power facilities, and irrigation projects— 
social capital represents the infra-structure, creation of which in 
the underdeveloped countries is expected to be primarily a government 
function. For creation of these facilities too, commercial policy can 
provide assistance through tho revenue raising potential of tariffs. In 
addition, priority allocation of foreign exchange to government can 
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assure procurement of necessary equipment obtainable only from abroad. 
The social capital infra-structure provides conditions in which 
more pecuniary external economies of investment will be reflected in mar-
ket prices.26 Thus* private investment in venture capital is stimulated* 
and diversification of economic activity is encouraged. Accumulation 
of capital of all types in all sectors increases labor productivity by 
reducing tho labor/capital ratio. 
Larger volumes of saving and investment are required for increased 
capital formation. Due to inadequacies of market development and the 
prevalence of subsistence production in underdeveloped countries* much 
of the saving and investment that does occur is in kind.^7 Yet* saving 
and investmont can bo encouraged through commercial policy influences 
in existing markets. Foreign trade subsidies can increase private pro-
tection for internal producers* and exchange controls can do both. 
An alternative source of saving and investment may be found abroad 
in the higher income countries with their greater savings potential. To 
some extent* policies that encourage private domestic investment will 
also attract foreign investors. Yet in some aspects, different policies 
are needed to encourage the latter* e.g., exchange regulations favorable 
to repatriation of funds and remittance of earnings. 
Structural changes in underdeveloped economies involving a reallo-
26 For discussion of pecuniary external economies, see above, pp. 27f. 
27 Due to its nature* the extent of saving and investment in kind is 
not susceptible to accurate measurement. It is most likely to be a 
feature of tho agricultural sector of tho economy. The government of In-
dia* in tho community development projects it has sponsored* has attempt-
ed to take advantage of this potential. See Planning Commission* 
Government of India, The New India* p. I76. 
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cation of existing resources and a Changed pattern of resources can be 
designed to increase the marginal and average productivity of labor. 
Commercial policies to promote capital formation can be formulated to 
encourage such structural changes. 
The need for expansion of the exchange economy within underdeveloped 
countries2 is implied in the foregoing discussion of other development 
objectives. Division of labor and specialization of function make 
possible an increase in the productivity of human effort and are depen-
dent on the size of the market* i.e.* on the degree to vrhich economic 
activity has been caught up in a system of exchange. Improvement in 
transportation and communication tends to enlarge exchange areas, as 
does diversified capital formation and structural change. On the other 
hand* expansion and refinement of markets will stimulate economic diver-
sification and factor mobility. While commercial policies cannot lead 
to enlargement of the exchange economy directly, it may do so through 
influences on other objectives. 
A serious deficiency in underdeveloped countries is the retarded 
state of technology. 9 There is open to underdeveloped countries a sub-
stitute for independent technological advancement in the form of imita-
tion of production techniques, old or new, alroady developed in the 
advanced countries. This might bo called the demonstration effect on 
28 See Morton R. Solomon, "The Structure of the Market in Undeveloped 
Economies", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXII, August* 19U8, pp. 
519-537. Reprinted in Underdeveloped Areas (L. W. Shannon, ed.), Harper, 
N. Y., 1957, pp. 131-HJO: 
29 Soma writers have given this a position of importance next to or 
ahead of capital formation. See Kindleberger, Economic Development* 
p. 76, for instances. 
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the production side. Allocation of foreign exchange to encourage imports 
of the latest machines and equipment can further this imitation-process. 
Natural resource conditions are related to technology with respect 
to discovery and availability. Rapid development is made easier the 
larger and more varied the supply of natural resources suitable for use 
in both primary and secondary productive activity. Lack of varied* 
adequate supplies of natural resources, however, should not preclude 
development* for many of any such deficiencies may be overcome through 
importation from abroad. 
COMMERCIAL POLICY OBJECTIVES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 
Commercial policies to promote development are appropriate, and 
sometimes imperative, at the point where each of the development object-
ives is related to foreign markets. The problem of capital accumulation* 
in its various aspects* is the one that most often relates to foreign 
markets. Commercial policies may be centered on this broad objective.3° 
Capital formation may stem from government investment* private do-
mestic investment, or private investment from abroad. Capital goods 
producing industries are few and their production totals negigible in 
the underdeveloped countries.31 The bulk of real capital for expanded 
public projects and private enterprises may have to be imported,32 al-
30 All of the development needs are interrelated. There is no inten-
tion to ignore or low-rate, for example* the need for improved technology 
or expansion of the exchange economy. Most policies that promote capi-
tal formation will also tend to promote the others. 
31 See Solomon, op. cit., p. 138. Of course, this varies somewhat from 
country to country. 
32 Nurkse points out that this has not been the normal state of affairs, 
op^ cit., p. 113. 
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though reliance on capital imports may be reduced as appropriate capi-
tal goods producing industries are developed. 
Increasing the Foraign Exchange Available 
Significant proportions of total development program outlays for 
capital formation must be financed by foreign exchange earnings.33 Com-
mercial policy measures to promote an increase in the availability of 
foreign exchange can assist the financing of development programs. These 
measures can be directed toward increasing the volume of exports of mer-
chandise or invisibles already being exported or toward creation of new 
export enterprises. Foreign exchange availabilities may also be increased 
by commercial policies to encourage investment by foreigners, to prevent 
capital flights, and to improve the terms of trade. Priority allocation 
of foreign exchange in general, and scarce currencies in particular, 
can assure exchange for tho importation of capital goods required for 
development projects. 
Obtaining Government Revenue 
Commercial policy measures for increasing the foreign exchange 
available for capital imports can be used to promote accumulation of cap-
ital of any typa. On the other hand, some commercial policy measures can 
be of particular assistance in the promotion of accumulation of capital 
of particular types. For example, public investment for the creation of 
social overhead capital requires financing. The government revenue pos-
sibilities in control of foreign trade can be used to stimulate social 
33 See above, 'p. 59-
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capital formation. In the underdeveloped countries* foreign trade activi-
ties provide a convenient base for collection of government revenue, and 
revenues from this source are a significant proportion of total government 
receipts.3^ 
While commercial policy measures that reduce imports and exports can-
not at the same time increase revenues* commercial policies to control 
the pattern of imports and exports do not necessarily conflict with re-
venue collection in th„e same way. Furthermore, to the extent that collec-
tion of government revenue reduces private consumption relative to income 
and is ttien used for capital creation, the people or ihe country are 
forced to save, and investment of the savings is insured. In that process* 
direct government action is substituted for indirect promotion of develop-
ment. Governments can use their revenue to promote development indirectly 
by providing subsidies to private enterprises. 
Protection of Internal Producers 
Private domestic investment can be encouraged by making domestic 
investment more profitable through protection from foreign competition. 
The fact that protection can encourage private enterprise, investment, 
and capital formation is not disputed. Even the fact that protection is 
justified in the case of industries that can eventually become competitive 
3k See Table lii.3 in Meier and Baldwin, op. cit., p. 302. This table 
shows the major components of government tax revenue in selected countries. 
For the"poor" countries customs receipts alone, l. e., not including reve-
nue collections of other types from foreign trade controls, as a percent 
of total receipts range from only a small fraction for Turkey (1953) to a-
bout 75 percent for Haiti (195U). For most of the countries listed this 
percentage range is from about 10 percent to over 50 percent. The source 
for this table is Table 166 in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook 
for 1955. 
67 
without continued aid is not disputed. The question that is raised by 
free trade advocates is: for which industries and enterprises can pro-
tection be justified economically? Detailed consideration of this 
question was declared outside the scope of this study,35 but unwise 
decisions in this regard can retard economic devolopment rather than 
promote it. Consequently, evaluation of some of the actual decisions 
of this nature made in the commercial policies of underdeveloped coun-
tries is included in Chapter 5 in terms of the effect of those decisions 
on tho achievement of development needs. 
Allocation of Foreign Exchange for Development 
If commercial policy controls are to influence economic activity 
into new development directions, a system of priorities for imports 
must be established. Regardless of the commercial policy instruments 
35 p» 30, above. A recent analytical approach to the general problem 
of programming development, which necessarily includes in its considera-
tions issues involved in the question raised here, utilizes the tools of 
linear-programming. See H. B. Chenery,uop. cit.? pp. 60-72. For a more 
elaborate model, see Chenery and K. Kretschmor, "Resource Allocation for 
Economic Development", Econometrica, October* 1956* and Chenery, "The 
Role of Industrialization in Development Programs", American Economic 
Review, May 1955* See, also* A. E. Kahn* "Investment Criteria in Develop-
ment Programs"* Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1951* pp. 
36-61* and J. Tmborgen, The Design of Development, 1956. 
While the linear programming approach has much to offer in guiding 
investigation and in demanding more systematic and careful decision mak-
ing, if it is used too literally or rigidly as a basis for policy, it 
could prove misleading. With specific reference to devolopment of 
underdeveloped countries, one serious drawback of this approach is its 
reliance on existing resource, technical, and price conditions which 
may not be appropriate even by the time the analysis has been completed. 
For a discussion of the limitations of this and similar methods, espec-
ially for prediction and policy-making, see S. Schoeffler, op. cit., 
chap. 3* especially pp. 26-28 and 39-Ul. 
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used, i. e., tariffs and subsidies, quantity controls, or exchange controls, 
import priorities constitute a system for the allocation of available 
foreign exchange. The need for allocation of foreign exchange stems 
from the balance of payments position by which countries seeking rapid 
development find themselves confronted. Their development needs in terms 
of plant and equipment, spare parts, and raw materials, as well as con-
sumption goods necessary to maintain even the low levels of living al-
ready attained, are excessive. Their production levels of both capital 
and consumption goods are very low. Therefore, the amount of foreign 
exchange available to them can be an important limiting factor on their 
rate of development. 
Protecting the Balance of Payments 
A corollary of the excessive demand for foreign goods is a tendency 
toward a continuing balance of payments deficit during the process of 
development. This tendency will be greater, the faster the rate of 
development attempted. The more successful are the development attempts 
in the early stages, the sooner the balance of payments pressures will 
be reduced, but also, the more imperative is careful husbanding of for-
eign exchange earnings in the early stages of development. Foreign ex-
change allocation is practiced by all of the underdeveloped countries 
whose governments have moved to pursue deliberate development. Imports 
have been classified into categories as to their essentiality for deve-
lopment and maintenance of living levels, for the purpose of encouraging 
the more essential, reducing the less essential, and preventing the 
non-e s sential.36 
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Controlling the Effects of Inflation 
Another factor affecting the balance of payments is the inflation-
ary tendency that is a common feature of early stages of attempts to de-
velop. The early investment or government expenditures generate income 
which is nearly all spent on consumption due to the low levels of income 
being received. At the same time, production of consumption goods is not 
increasing due to the time lag in the productive process. 
Balance of payments difficulties are aggravated by inflation, for 
higher prices tend to reduce exports and increase the demand for imports. 
This is another reason for emphasis on increased foreign exchange earn-
ings and priority allocation of foreign exenance. it is also a reason for 
including imports of consumption goods, especially necessities or those 
for wnich demand is inelastic, in the "essentials" category. Assurance 
of supplies of necessity consumption goods can constitute a commercial 
policy contribution to combating inflation. 
Influencing the Terms of Trade 
Finally, commercial policies may assist development by helping main-
tain or improve the terms of trade for underdeveloped countries. Most 
underdeveloped countries export relatively few primary commodities. The 
prices of their primary goods exports fluctuate widely in relation to 
relatively stable prices for the manufactured goods which form the bulk 
of their imports. This has meant wide fluctuations in their terms of 
36 The meaning of "essential" in import priorities as established by 
underdeveloped countries is discussed below, p. I3I4.. 
70 
trade with the predominant tendency on the unfavorable s ide . 
In the pas t , wide f luc tua t ions , re la ted to trade cycles, have occurrdd 
in the world demand for the exports of underdeveloped countr ies . This 
f luctuation of demand has tended to disrupt the i r development programs and 
cause t he i r commercial pol icy decisions to be made in response to balance 
of payments emergencies. One of the p r inc ipa l d i f f i cu l t i e s i s t ha t com-
mercial pol icy measures to combat such emergencies, e . g . , r e s t r i c t i o n of 
imports, may be as d isrupt ive of development plans as are the f luctuat ions 
in the terms of t r ade . 
Most underdeveloped countr ies lack the monopoly posi t ion in t he i r ex-
port markets necessary to command higher pr ices and force improvement i n . 
t he i r terms of t r ade . A more effective long-run approach to the problem 
of f luctuat ions in t he i r terms of t rade i s the encouragement of new export 
indus t r i e s . 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF COMMERCIAL POLICIES 
FOR DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter is devoted to theoretical analysis of the capabilities 
of specific commercial policy techniques for furthering development ob-
jectives. As indicated in the introductory chapter, our primary concern 
is with how commercial policies can be used in pursuit of various deve-
lopment ends, rather than with which specific ends to pursue. 1 For ex-
ample, how can commercial policies promote new enterprises? Not, which 
new enterprises should be promoted? 
Much of the GATT analysis, already frequently referred to, deals 
with whether it would be best to encourage primary-goods exports or pro-
cessed-goods exports in view of their relative earnings potentials. Or, 
should export industries with foreign-exchange-earning capacity be en-
couraged in preference to import-competing industries with foreign-ex-
change-saving capacity?2 The present study touches on these aspects of 
economic policy only as it is necessary forcomparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of the various commercial policy instruments for promoting 
development. 
The analysis is oriented around the question of what can be done with 
the commercial policy instruments—tariffs and foreign trade subsidies, 
quantitative controls, and exchange controls—to assist in achievement of 
both the major and minor commercial policy objectives of development set 
1 See p. 1 above. 
2 See the United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far 
East, VIII, 1, May, 1957, pp. 'S-TT. 
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forth in the preceding chapter. It is important to remember that almost 
anything that can be done with one broad category of commercial policy in-
struments can also be accomplished, either more or less effectively, with 
some variant of either of the other broad categories of commercial policy 
instruments. 
A simple analogy may serve to clarify this point and the purpose of 
the present analysis. Wrenches, pliers, hammers, crowbars, etc. are all 
tools designed to perform different basic functions, yet for a wide vari-
ety of purposes they are interchangeable with varying degrees of efficien-
cy. Similar functional interchangeability is characteristic also of com-
mercial policy instruments. The present analysis distinguishes some more 
appropriate basic functions for each of the commercial policy instruments 
in furthering development objectives. This involves consideration of the 
nature of their interchangeability. Empirical study of the success and ef-
fects of such development uses of commercial policy instruments is re-
served for the next chapter. 
TARIFFS. AND FOREIGN TRADE SUBSIDIES 
Non-discriminatory Tariffs 
A non-discriminatory import tariff, i. e., the same rate of ad valo-
rem duty applied to all imports, can be eliminated from consideration as 
a worthwhile commercial policy device for stimulating development, even as 
a means of raising government revenue. The reason is that while such a 
tariff is non-discriminatory, in the sense of involving no deliberate dis-
criminatory decisions, it would not be without its differential effects on 
the various import commodities due to their differing elasticities of de-
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mand and supply. Since differential effects cannot be avoided in a tariff 
levy, they should be taken cognizance of to the extent possible. 
Policy should be deliberately selective of the effects to be encour-
aged rather than allowing them to be of an indiscriminate nature. Whether 
a non-discriminatory import duty is levied at a relatively low rate for 
primarily revenue purposes or at a relatively high rate for prohibitive 
purposes, its indiscriminate effects make it an inefficient means of in-
fluencing the availabilities and allocation of foreign exchange, the bal-
ance of payments, inflationary forces, and the terms of trade. The same 
may be said of a non-discriminatory export duty. 
Discriminatory Import, Tariffs 
ImportrTariffs for Revenue. Much more efficient than a non-discrimi-
natory tariff system for influencing development objectives are tariffs 
which discriminate by type of product and/or country of origin or destina-
tion. However, development use of deliberately discriminatory tariffs is 
influenced significantly by two elements. The first element is the point 
made earlier about the uncertainty of the price and cost, and more espe-
cially, the quantity effects of tariffs.3 The second is the paucity of 
government revenue sources in underdeveloped countries. 
In view of the latter point as well as of the relative administra-
tive ease involved in tariff collection, customs duties may be expected 
to continue as an important source of government revenue in most under-
developed countries, at least in their early stages of development. 4-
3 See above pp. lil|f. 
k See Buchanan and Ellis, op_. cit., Table 15-2, p. 327. 
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Historically, tariffs have been an important early revenue source for 
most countries. 
Yet, a discriminatory tariff, even though levied primarily for rev-
enue purposes, may be made to contribute to achievement of some of the 
other development objectives. For example, to be successful as a revenue 
raiser, a tariff on imports must leave the total volume of imports of 
the commodities on which it is levied relatively undiminished. There-
fore, it must be applied primarily to commodities for which demand is 
relatively price—inelastic, i.e., physiological or psychological 
necessities. Revenue from such a tariff would come primarily from funds 
which would otherwise be spent on consumption and, to this extent, 
would constitute forced savings. Total savings would be increased 
thereby to the extent that the government used its revenue for invest-
ment rather than for current expenditures. 
Additionally, import duties for revenue which discriminated among 
broad categories of imports with low rates on essentials, intermediate 
rates on semi-essentials, and highest rates^on non-essentials? would 
incorporate some control over the pattern of imports with the raising 
of revenue. Also, while even a low tariff rate on essentials would not 
encourage the importation of essentials directly, the greater restrict-
5 The categorizing of imports on tho basis of "essentiality" has 
tended to follow similar patterns in the various underdeveloped countries. 
"Essential" imports have usually included capital goods for industry 
and agriculture and raw materials for development of new industries, as 
well as consumption necessities. Imports classed as non-essential have 
usually reflected considerations of encouraging domestic enterprise as 
well as "luxury" considerations. More detailed information on such 
import classifications is presented in the following chapter. 
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iveness of a higher rate on non-essentials would constitute a backhanded 
allocation of foreign exchange to the importation of essentials. 
The higher duty rates on semi-essentials and non-essentials, if not 
entirely prohibitive, would tend to introduce some degree of progressi-
vity into the customs portion of the tax system. In this regard, the 
demand for luxuries on the part of the wealthy elite may be relatively 
price inelastic.° However, other revenue sources—'.e.g., income and 
property taxation—could provide a more effective means of introducing 
progressivity into the governmental revenue system. 
Whether such a tariff structure would also result in increased pri-
vate saving is highly speculative. Due to the probably one-hundred per 
cent propensities to consume on the part of the low income bulk of the 
population,' any significant increase in private saving that resulted 
would have to come from the small percent of wealthy. The tariff would 
have to result in reduced imports of semi- or non-essential commodities 
without thereby stimulating domestic production of commodities of the 
same type. The possibility of an undersirable diversion of resources 
to production of luxuries has been one of the criticisms of a policy of 
restriction of luxury imports.° 
Whether such diversion would occur would depend upon what particu-
lar luxury commodities were restricted ,from importation, and what the 
6 Sea R. E. Schlesinger, Multiple Exchange Rates and Eonomio Develop-
ment, 1952, pp. 10f. 
7 See United Nations, "Taxation and Economic Development in Asian 
Countries," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, IV, 3, Novem-
ber, 1953, p. 1. 
8 This possibility has become so widely accepted as to be cited in 
most international economics textbooks. See for example, Towle, op. 
cit., p. 8I1O. 
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internal production possibilities for these commodities were. Greater 
assurance that luxury restriction would load to privato saving would 
require other influences which tariffs are relatively less capable of 
exerting, e.g., control over money capital^movements to prevent capital 
flights and internal controls over the use of resources to prevent the 
diversions which might slow development. 
Nevertheless, some protection of internal production of the commo-
dities affected is inherent in an import tariff levy, even if the primary 
purpose is to raise revenue. The degree of protection is less the 
lower tho tariff rate, the smaller the change in import prices and the 
smaller the reduction in the volume of imports. Sinco changes in im-
port prices and quantities are dependent on the price-elasticities of 
demand for tho commodities affected, the protective effects of tariffs 
are uncertain. This is particularly true in tho economies of under-
developed countries with inadequately developed domestic markets and 
structural rigidities, especially factor immobilities.' 
Taken together, the uncertainties as to the price, cost, and quan-
tity effects of tariffs and the paucity of government revenue sources 
in underdeveloped countries favor a commercial policy decision to reserve 
tariffs for the primary function of raising revenue. This is not to 
imply that other revenue sources, as they can be expanded, might not 
be more desirable on most counts such as equity, effects on incentive, 
and stability of revenue.1° 
9 See above, p. 1|5. 
10 See, for example, United Nations, "Taxation and Economic Devolop-
ment in Asian Countries," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, 
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Rather, the revenue potential is the most important contribution 
that tariffs as commercial policy can make to economic development. In 
viow of the fluctuations in tariff revenue that have resulted from 
essentially short-period cyclical fluctuations in exports and imports,H 
the revenue contribution of tariffs would be even more important if 
exports could be diversified so as to provide a higher, more stable 
level of exports, and thus also of imports, as a base for revenue-
tariff levies. 
Import Tariffs for Protection. While import tariffs can be, and 
are, used for protection of internal production, import quotas are more 
effective for this purpose.12 With either a tariff or a quota, the assis-
tance to internal production is expected to derive from a higher price 
in the domestic market resulting from reduced domestic-market supply 
of the restricted commodity. Tho degree of such protection depends on 
(l) the magnitude of the reduction in the quantity of imports, as well 
as on (2) the effect of the import reduction on the domestic-market 
price. 
The price effect of a given reduction in imports depends on the 
elasticity of domestic demand for the restricted commodity irrespective 
of whether tho reduction is achieved by means of a tariff levy or the 
imposition of an import quota. However, the size of the import reduction 
resulting from the levy of a particular tariff rate is more uncertain 
IV, 3. November,.1953, pp. 1-15• 
11 Ibid., p. 5. 
12 More thorough analysis of commercial policy for protection is de 
ferred to the section on import quotas. Sea below, pp. 90ff. 
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than that resulting from the use of a quota. This is true because the 
restrictiveness of a tariff depends on tho elasticities of foreign 
supply and of domestic demand for the commodity upon which the tariff 
is levied. The restrictiveness of an import quota* on the other hand, 
is not dependent on either of these elasticities. 
Furthermore, there is a practical-policy consideration in under-
developed countries which favors tariffs for revenue rather than for 
protection. Data concerning government revenue is more readily available 
and more accurate than data concerning prices or private-individual 
and enterprise-reactions to price changes. Thus, while for theoretical 
precision the knowledge needed for successful tariff policy for revenue 
and for portection is the same, as a practical matter, tariffs for 
revenue can be moro accurately adjusted to achieve desired results 
than can tariffs for protection. 
Import Tariffs and Foreign Exchange Availabilities. Efforts to 
increase the foreign exchange available for development needs may take 
the form of increasing the total supply of foreign exchange or increasing 
foreign exchange, net, for specifically development uses. Increasing 
exports is the most direct path to increasing foreign exchange proceeds, 
although substitution of domestic output for imports will increase 
foreign exchange earnings, net. 
Discriminatory import tariffs may be levied to protect only enter-
prises that compete with imports for tho domestic market* or enter-
prises with export possibilities as well. In view of the small domestic 
markets in underdeveloped countries* enterprises with export possibil-
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ities may be easier to promote.13 However, weaknesses of tariffs for 
protection as compared with import quotas were pointed out in the pre-
ceding section. Furthermore, general production subsidies or other 
commercial policy instruments* e.g.* favorable exchange rates under a 
multiple rate system or export subsidies* can provide more positive 
assistance to desired enterprises. 
Increasing foreign exchange earnings* however, relates only to 
the supply side of the broader objective of increasing foreign exchange 
availajilities for development. Allocation of foreign exchange to develop-
ment needs represents the demand sido. Foreign exchange allocation for 
furthering development involves control over the pattern of imports 
such that goods deemed most essential to the development process are 
given top import-priority. The nature of the assistance in controlling 
the pattern of imports that might be obtained from discriminatory import 
duties was suggested above.^ 
Import tariffs could accomplish much more in allocating foreign 
exchange for development, than was suggested earlier, if it were decided 
that this objective were to be the dominant consideration in structuring 
the tariff system. With a more detailed classification of imports and 
more restrictive (higher) import tariffs on a wider range of individual 
commodities, foreign exchange could be more stringently conserved for 
development purposes. 
However, the use of tariffs for allocating foreign exchange is a 
13 For elaboration of this point, see below, pp. 86ff. 
Ill See pp. 72f. 
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relatively indirect approach.15 A much more direct approach would be 
the use of exchange controls. 
Other Commercial Policy Objectives. Tariffs also have little to 
contribute in influencing money capital movements or "invisibles" trans-
actions on current account.^ -° About the only aid tariffs could give 
in regard to money capital flows would be as the creation of enter-
prises under protective tariffs involved investments by foreigners.1? 
Tho control over invisible transactions and capital movements which 
exchange controls provide is one of the basic advantages of exchange 
controls as one alternative set of commercial policy instruments. 
The balance-of-payments deficits which tend to plague under-
developed countries bent on development represent both long-period and 
short-period problems. The persistence of balance of payments defic-
its^ constitutes a continuing problem over the long run, but this 
condition is aggravated by a tendency toward recurrent, short-period 
crises in the balance of payments. 19 For protecting the balance of pay-
ments during crises or over the long period, tariffs are less effective 
x 
than other commercial policy instruments. 
Balance of payments deficits must be eliminated either by restrict-
/; 
15 On the advantages of "direct" versus "indirect" interference with 
market forces, with special reference to the situation of underdeveloped 
countries, see the discussion of quantitative controls balow, pp. 93f» 
16 For a classification of these items see tho Annex to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, Third Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 
Washington, 1952. 
17 Analysis of commercial policy to encourage investment by both 
nationals and foreigners is elaborated below, pp. 90f. 
"\l8 See below, pp. 92ff. 
19 See below, p..100. 
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ing imports or by increasing foreign exchange proceeds. Since import 
restriction as a long-run policy would retard development, the most 
promising approach to solution of the long-run balance of payments 
problem lies in increasing foreign exchange availabilities. The weak-
nesses of import tariffs relative to other commercial policy instruments 
for increasing foreign exchange availabilities were pointed out in the 
preceding section. 
The recurrent payments crises of underdeveloped countries stem from 
fluctuations in both the volume and prices of their primary goods exports20 
unaccompanied by similar fluctuations in their import needs or the prices 
they must pay. Thus the short-period payments problem requires temp-
orary* but often drastic, reductions in imports. The greater administra-
tive inflexibility and less precise quantitative effects of import 
tariffs relative to import quotas^l moans that tariffs are less effective 
than quotas in protecting the balance of payments during short period 
deficits. 
To tho extent that the balance of payments crises are related 
specifically to fluctuations in the terms of trade, i.e., a reduced ratio 
of export prices to import prices, again tariffs are an ineffectual 
remedy. For import tariffs to improve the terms of trade, the foreign 
suppliers must be forced to bear the burden through a reduced price. 
This would require that the foreign exporters' supply be a significantly 
large portion of the exporters' market. Sincew,most of the imports of 
underdeveloped countries are manufactured products, neither of these 
20 See below, p. 12U. 
21 Seo above, p. Ii5« 
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conditions tend to be met in their situation. 
With respect to a related development objective, that of buying im-
ports as cheaply as possible, the GATT analysis takes a different tack. 
They suggest22 that if it is deemed necessary for purposes of development 
to interfere with foreign trade, interference by tariff would at least per-
mit importers to buy in the market or country where they could buy cheapest. 
This is an objection to practices which channel trade on a bilateral basis* 
an issue which is excluded from primary consideration in this study. 
While multilateralism would further the cause of development in un-
derdeveloped countries, especially if promoted on the initiative of sur-
plus, i. e., hard currency, countries in removing their balance of payments 
surpluses, even tariffs could be formulated to conflict with multilatera-
lism. Other commercial policies, e. g., multiple exchange rates, could be 
formulated so as to allow the same freedom of market access for importers 
as that which the GATT suggests is allowed by tariffs. 
Discriminatory Export Tariffs 
Export tariffs are relatively ineffectual for furthering most of the 
development objectives. 
By nature, export duties work to the disadvantage of internal produ-
cers. Yet export duties that discriminate, through higher rates, against 
exportation of primary commodities can encourage enterprises to process 
those commodities either for domestic or export markets. Whether the selec-
tive promotion of export enterprises involved would on balance further the 
22 0p_. cit., p. 13. 
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development process, would depend upon whether in the changed pattern of 
exports the new export commodities faced a more favorable, stronger world 
market than did the primary commodity exports being discouraged. To as-
sure furtherance of the development process, careful appraisal of poten-
tial exports and their prospective markets, followed by continual reviews 
of the findings and results, would be necessary.23 
The results of such a policy, if successful, would be increased 
foreign exchange earnings which are an important avenue to increased a&-
vailability of foreign exchange for development. Whatever the potential 
benefits from such selective promotion of export enterprises, however, 
other commercial policy instruments are capable of giving more positive 
and effective assistance in encouraging the export enterprises selected 
for promotion. This would be true either of direct export subsidies or 
indirect subsidies built into a system of exchange controls. 
In view of the fact that export duties in their applicability are 
limited to transactions involving tangibles, they can influence money 
capital flows hardly at all. Any infliience along these lines would have 
to be exerted through effective encouragement of foreign investment in 
favored enterprises. By the same token, export duties can accomplish 
little in the way of conserving foreign exchange, "scarce" or convert-
ible. 
Furthermore, export tariffs affect the wrong side of the market for 
having any concerted effect upon the pattern of imports or, therefore, 
for encouraging the importation of essentials. If export duties should 
23 Ibid., p. 16. 
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reduce the overall level of exports, they would also make it difficult 
to maintain the overall level of imports. 
Attempts to influence the terms of trade by means of export duties 
would tend to reduce the overall level of foreign trade. To improve the • 
terms of trade via the export side requires making tho foreign customer 
bear the burden of the export duty by paying a higher price. Simi-
larly to the situation necessary for an import tariff to improve the 
terms of trade, the foreign buyers' demand for the dutiable export com-
codity would have to be relatively inelastic and the exports of-tho 
country levying the duty would have to be a significant proportion of 
the total world supply of the dutiable export. The danger of attempting 
to exploit such a situation when it does exist, is that alternative 
sources of supply, either natural or synthetic, may be cultivated 
eventually by foreign customers* thus undermining tho long-run export 
potential of the duty levying country. 
Actually* however, the markets for most primary product exports of 
underdeveloped countries have been marked by relatively unstable conditions 
of extreme competition, rather than by exploitable monopolistic conditions. 
This has been an important reason why international commodity agree-
ments havo frequently been resorted to in an effort to make primary 
commodity prices more stable through unified action. 
Export Duties For Revenue. In view of the relative ineffectiveness 
of export duties for achieving the other development objectives, they 
can contribute most to development if they, like import duties, are re-
served for raising government revenue. Since foreign exchange""proceeds 
are so important in financing any devolopment program in underdeveloped 
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countries, the relatively lower rates that would tend to characterize 
export duties for revenue make reservation of export tariffs largely 
for revenue even more advisable than a similar policy for import tariffs. 
Whether export duties should be used at all, even for revenue, would 
depend upon whether their possible adverse effects on the volume of 
exports* or more importantly upon foreign exchange earnings* were so 
great as to outweigh tho advantages that might be gained from judicious 
use of the government revenues which they would provide. However, as 
in the.casa of import tariffs* paucity of alternative revenue sources 
in underdeveloped countries makes probable the use of export duties 
for revenue for some time to come. 
Underdeveloped countries have found export tariffs of particular 
assistance in capturing for domestic use a larger portion of the proceeds 
of existing foreign owned export enterprises. As Kindleberger points 
out,2l| any revenue collected from foreign owned enterprises increases 
domestic national income, and this could be a source of net enlargement 
of funds available for promoting development. This aspect is the 
soundest basis for constructing the discriminatory features of a system 
of export duties. Other bases for discriminatory export duty rates 
are lass numerous than for import duties, at least in the early stages 
of development* due to the greater uniformity in the general nature of 
exports of underdeveloped countries. 
Import Subsidies 
From a revenue point of view, subsidies are the exact opposite of 
2l| Economic Development, p. 269. 
tariffs. Rather than providing a moans of raising revenue, they are a 
drain on the government's financial resources. For promoting a number 
of other development objectives, however, import and export subsidies, 
and, for "protection", general production subsidies are nearly perfect 
substitutes for tariffs. For many uses, the principal limitation on 
such substitution in underdeveloped countries is the inadequacy of 
government revenues. 
For a long time, general production subsidies have been advocated 
by economists, especially Western economists, as a substitute for pro-
tective import tariffs. 5 As a practical matter, especially in Western 
countries, this proposal has tended to be politically unrealistic due, 
in considerable degree* to the opposition of the recipients themselves 
to receiving their aid in such a direct and obvious form. In view of 
the more favorable attitude toward a larger economic role for govern-
ment, this objection might be less of a drawback for such a policy in 
most underdeveloped countries than in the West. Even so, the primary 
concern of this study is not with general production subsidies, but 
with foreign trade subsidies. 
Import subsidies may have some advantages over production sub-
sidies as an instrument for promotion of internal production, although 
not in the form of "protection". Selective import subsidies can en-
courage tho importation of goods that are unavailable internally yet 
considered essential for development. Such a policy could provide a 
positive, although indirect, encouragement to investment by private 
enterprisers in industries that are deemed particularly desirable 
25 Towle, op. cit., p. k69> 
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from a development point of view. 
By singling out for particular encouragement imports of goods in the 
fixed capital category, e.g., heavy machinery, initial investment could 
be encouraged in as wide a range of industries as could utilize tho 
subsidized imports. This policy would havo tho advantage, over both 
protective tariffs and general production subsidies, of encouraging 
investment in fixed capital without providing a continuing margin for 
inefficient production and operation. While domestic markets might 
still be inadequate for this policy alone to be sufficient investment 
incentive, it would offset some of the advantages of established foreign 
industries. 
For furthering other development objectives, import subsidies havo 
little to offer except in side effects of the policy just described. 
Much the same effects as those described are possible of achievement 
through indirect subsidization of imports within a system of exchange 
controls. Furthermore, exchange rates favoring particular imports would 
provide a subsidy without incurring the costs of revenue collection 
and disbursement. 
Export Subsidies 
Export subsidies encourage exports by increasing the profit margin 
or lowering the export price on the particular oxport goods subsidized. 
A policy of subsidizing exports could be designed to diversify export 
enterprises so as to increase foreign exchange oarnings and make possible 
an increased volume of imports. New industries should be selected for 
encouragement, since already existing export enterprises do not need sub-
88 
sidies and the potential for primary commodity exports has already heon 
largely tapped in most underdeveloped countries. New oxport industries, 
even those that involve processing of raw materials previously exported 
as raw materials, could produce for the domestic market as well. 
To the extent that thoy prove successful in increasing export 
earnings, export subsidies have tho advantage for the nation as a whole 
of providing a means for converting domestic currency, in which the 
subsidies are paid, into foreign exchange to moot the large foreign 
exchange needs of the development program. They would also tend to im-
prove the balance of payments position, although the terms of trade might 
be worsened initially. Whether or not export subsidies ware also 
inflationary would depend on how the subsidies wore financed. 
A potentially serious difficulty involved in a program of oxport 
subsidies for new industries relates to the relationships among under-
developed countries. A significant proportion of the foreign trade of 
the underdeveloped countries is carried on with other underdeveloped 
countries in tho same area,26 and the proportion of new industry exports 
sold to other underdeveloped countries is even greater. In view of the 
fact that most of the underdeveloped countries are attempting to develop, 
oxport subsidies granted by one are likely to be viewed by the others 
as a form of dumping which will hamper their own efforts at development. 
Difficulties of this typo are given particular attention in recent stud-
ios being conducted by tho Latin American countries pursuant to efforts 
26 For example, in 1958, 26 per cent of the total foreign trade of the 
ECAFE countries, excluding Japan, was among themselves. This is figured 
from Table 7 in tho Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, X, 2, 
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to establish a Latin American common market.^7 
Since subsidies, like tariffs, require legislative action, and, 
like tariffs, oporate through effects on prices, costs and profits, they 
tend to be subject to the same inflexibilities and uncertainty of effects 
as are tariffs. Furthermore, due to the drain of subsidies on govern-
ment financial resources and the possibility that alternative commer-
cial policy instruments are capable of furthering the same development 
objectives with either more precision, or flexibility, or both, subsi-
dies are likely to be used only for promotion of enterprises or industries 
deemed especially worthy in terms of development needs. 
QUANTITATIVE CONTROLS 
For Revenue 
The tax nature of tariffs fits them especially for raising govern-
ment revenue. While it is possible to raise revenue with import or ex-
port quotas when they are established under a licensing system, ° it 
requires a much more elaborate and costly administrative apparatus. 
Therefore, the net government revenue potential of quotas is less. 
In addition, raising revenue by means of a quota licensing scheme 
complicates revenue collection unnecessarily. Two decisions—quota 
size and license fee—have to be made under quota licensing whether 
for revenue or other purposes. With tariffs for revenue, the tariff 
Sept., 1959, pp. 37-UO. 
27 See, for example, U. N., "The Latin American Regional Market", 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. Ill* No. 1, March, 1958. pp. 
- - ^ 
28 See above, p. 50. 
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rate is all that has to bo decided. The volume of imports or exports 
fluctuates in response to price as influenced by the tariff. 
It is possible to avoid the problem of fixing the license fee by 
auctioning quota licenses to tho highest bidder. When the volume of 
imports is reduced by quotas, windfall profits tend to accrue to favored 
importers from increased value of the imports. Competitive auctioning 
of licenses can insure collection of tho windfall profits by the 
government. 
Furthermore, auctioning import licenses tends to reduce the corrup-
tion and bribery that is likely to accompany decree allocation of lic-
enses. This can be a particularly serious problem in underdeveloped 
countries due to lack of an adequate number of experienced administra-
tive officials with a tradition of faithful public service. 
A helpful modification of quota-license auctioning is a foreign 
exchange auction market in which quantitative restrictions are combined 
with exchange controls. One advantage of exchange auctioning is that 
it permits use of the already existing institutions of the banking 
system and their personnel. Nevertheless, neither quota-license 
auctioning nor the exchange auction market have been widely used. One 
of the most serious objections to such systems has come from established 
foreign traders who fear competition from fly-by-night, low-overhoad 
operators.*9 
The point is that quantitative controls even with quota licensing 
29 See, however, A. Kafka, "The Brazilian Exchange Auction System", 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol, XXXVIII, August, 1956, pp. 
308-326. 
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are an inefficient means of raising government revenue. Their direct . 
effect upon quantities imported or exported, however, make them a more 
certain and precise instrument than tariffs for control of the quantity 
of particular goods imported or exported when such control is doomed 
necessary or desirable for development. As noted in the preceding 
chapter, an additional element of precision and flexibility is intro-
duced by quota licensing on a day-to-day basis. 
Import Quotas 
The major objectives of commercial policy for development that can 
be most directly attacked by the use of import quotas are protection of 
internal producers and protection of the balance of payments. 
Protection and Inducement to Invest. The theoretical justification 
of protection of internal producers, at least in some cases, has long 
been recognized in the general acceptance of the "infant industry" 
argument. The justification is the assistance that domestic producers 
in underdeveloped economies need in order to overcome the initial cost 
advantages that already established enterprises in tho advanced countries 
have, especially in industries that require large-scale production to 
achieve lowest per-unit-cost operation. 
The inducement or assistance to creation of internal enterprises is 
the expected higher price in tho domestic market that results from a 
reduced supply of the restricted commodity in the domestic market. The 
strength of the inducement, i.e., the degree of protection, depends 
on the size of the reduction in the quantity of imports and the elastic-
ity of demand for tho commodities affected. The size of the reduction 
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in the quantity of imports can be precise when import quotas are used 
for protection. The import reduction is uncertain whan import tariffs 
are used.30 
Thus* tho use of import quotas for protection, as opposed to tariffs, 
eliminates one area of uncertainty. Furthermore, the greater administra-
tive flexibility of an import quota system, as opposed to a tariff 
system,31 makes possible a readier adjustment to resultant changes in 
price and production should original quotas provide inadequate protec-
tion to induce internal production. The weakness of any protective 
policy is that even complete prohibition of imports may not induce the 
desired investment.32 Dua to the low incomos in underdevoloped countries, 
even reserving tho entire domestic demand for internal suppliers may 
not be sufficient to mako investment profitable. Foreign suppliers often 
have an advantage in that their export markets in underdeveloped coun-
tries are only a small part of their total market. 
Complete prohibition as protective policy would not be desirable 
in most cases. Enterprises first selected for promotion in a low-
income economy need to be those producing for broad consumption, e.g., 
processed foods or textiles. Drastic cuts in imports of such goods 
would generate excessive inflationary pressures.33 
Selection of broad-consumption industries for promotion under pro-
30 See above, p. k%> 
31 See above, p. kS> 
32 This point is elaborated by Nurkse, op. cit., p. 105. 
33 The intended implication of the word' "excessive" is that some in-
flation may stimulate development. For an analysis of tho relation be-
tween economic growth and inflation see F. Pazos, "Economic Development 
and Financial Stability", Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, 
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tective import quotas has two advantages. First, these industries do not 
require heavy initial investment. Second, the products of such indus-
tries are imported by most underdeveloped countries in large volume and 
thus preempt significant portions of available foreign exchange. Crea-
tion of these industries and rapid expansion in their output early in 
the development process would combat inflation, ease pressure on the bal-
ance of payments and conserve foreign exchange for importation of capital 
goods. 
There is another consideration that may influence the selection 
of enterprises to be promoted through protective policy. It would be 
helpful in inducing investment to have, for exploitation, a larger 
demand than is available in the domestic market alone. Export mar-
kets—possibly in other underdeveloped countries—might provide that 
larger demand. With the domestic market as a nucleus of demand, ini-
tially exporting the surplus could mean a larger scale of production, 
lower per unit cost, and greater profitability. 
A final observation regarding protective policy is in order. The 
necessary savings out of which investment can come are more readily 
available in advanced countries than in underdeveloped countries. Actually 
protective policies to promote domestic investment could also stimulate 
foreign investment, and vice versa. With this fact in mind, careful 
selection of the imports to be restricted and permitted under import 
quotas could stimulate the establishment of "tariff factories11 — 
possibly "quota" factories would be a more appropriate term here. 
vol. Ill, October, 1953, pp. 228ff. 
Protecting the Balance of Paymants. There is no more direct means 
for a. country to eliminate a deficit in its balance of payments on current 
account than by restricting tho quantity of imports. For this purpose, 
import quotas are much more certain than tariffs. Furthermore, emer-
gency measures for protecting the balance of payments in a crisis are 
less likely to ba disruptivo of tho development process if import 
restrictions are on a selective basis, and import quotas provide the 
greater precision and flexibility required for such a selective response 
to payments crises. The flexibility in application of import quotas 
is also especially helpful for quick action to meet tho emergency, as 
well as for rapid removal of the stringent controls once the emergency 
is past. During payments emergencies, assurance of continued importa-
tion of "essentials" is of particular importance. 
The objective of GATT is to eliminate all trade controls except 
tariffs and to subject tariffs to negotiatod agreements. The rationale 
of that objective is that^sinco they leave the price systom free to 
guide private economic decisions, tariffs involve less "arbitrary" 
distortion of "normal" trade patterns than do other controls. Yet* 
"normal" trade patterns have not resulted in economic growth for the 
underdeveloped countries. Inadequately developed economic institutions, 
especially the market mechanism, have contributed to this failure.-^ 
There is much to be said for price direction in an autonomously 
developing economy* and the price mechanism may be relied upon to a 
greater extent as autonomous development momentum is achieved. However, 
3l| See above, pp. 23f. 
t 
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there is a discrepancy between individual and social benefit derived 
from the various possible investments which tends to retard the develop-
ment process when direction of economic activity is left exclusively 
to the price mechanism in an underdeveloped oconomy. Decisions that 
are most productive of private profit or private asset security are 
frequently not tho decisions that are best for furthering development.35 
In regard to the pattern of imports, the individual and social 
benefit discrepancy tends to be magnified during balance-of-paymonts 
crises. Assurance of continued importation of "essentials" requires 
the greater certainty of control that import quotas can provide. To 
the extent that import quotas can be administered with greater arbi-
trariness than tariffs, arbitrary withdrawal of quotas is easier once 
the need for protection of tho balance of payments or of internal pro-
ducers is past. 
Other Commercial Policy Objectives. Regardless of the main objec-
tive, or objectives, any import quota system through its control over 
the volume and pattern of imports will affect the allocation of foreign 
exchange. By prohibiting or reducing importation of some commodities, 
available foreign exchange will tend to be automatically directed 
toward other imports, thus making it possible for import quotas to be 
used for conserving foreign exchange—either convertible or scarce 
currencies—for tho importation of essentials. Restriction of imports 
from particular countries can incorporate conservation of scarce cur-
rencies in tho import quota system. For these purposes import quotas 
3$ See above, pp. 27f. 
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are more certain and precise than tariffs, but exchange controls combined 
with quantity licensing can provide more complete control over foreign 
exchange. 
In formulation of import quota policy, it is important to keep in 
mind the protective nature of import restrictions whether the purpose 
of the restrictions is protection of internal production or not. The 
possible conflict of objectiva involved in this fact36 requires a care-
ful balancing of policy objectives and effects. This requirement 
assumes particular significance when economic development is recognized 
as a process involving continually changing conditions. Thus, for 
example, as devolopment proceeds, if it does, it will be necessary 
continually to reorder the priority of goods for importation and for 
internal production. By the same token, the most advantageous 
priorities for aach underdeveloped country at any particular time depend 
upon its particular circumstances and stage of development. 
Export Quotas 
Little direct assistance for development can bo expected from export 
quotas. They can be used, however, in conjunction with other commercial 
policy instruments, to encourage diversification of exports by restrict-
ing tho exportation of commodities in unprocessed form. In this fashion 
they can reinforce policies to encourage foreign and domestic invest-
ment in "tariff factories". As stated previously* diversification of 
exports can lead to improvement in the long-run torms of trade* and 
36 One aspect of such conflict has already boon discussed in connec-
tion with possible undesirable diversion of domestic resources to pro-
duction of luxuries. See above* p. 7U» 
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thereby increase the foreign exchange earning potential of exports. 
Most commonly, export quotas have been aimod at improving the terms 
of trade immediately by raising oxport price through roducod supply. 
Yet in most instances, underdeveloped countries havo not possessed suffi-
cient monopolistic power in the markets for their exports to make 
possible such control over price. In tho relatively few cases where 
underdeveloped countries havo had sufficient market power to improve 
the short-run terms of trade, foreign buyers have tended to develop 
alternative sources of tho same commodities or synthetic substitutes. 
Because of the prevalence of such unfavorable conditions or develop-
ments* the most promising contribution of any commercial policy to 
improvement in the terms of trade lies in furthering diversification of 
exports such that the shift is to exports in the production of which the 
marginal and average productivity of labor is higher. Because of tho 
jLnterconnectedness of objectives* this objective* like others* is more 
susceptible of fulfillment* tho more successful are all policies in 
bringing about a changed pattern of resources* capital formation, en-
largement of the exchange economy, etc., i.e., fulfillment of the broad 
development needs. 
Summary 
In view of the foregoing analysis, it would appear that the wisest 
course might be to reserve quantity controls, especially on imports, for 
assistance in meeting balance of payments crises and in protecting inter-
nal producers. Duo to tho greater certainty of the quantity effects of 
quotas, thoy aro often essential in combating temporary crises in the 
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balance of payments. Their greater precision makes import quotas part-
icularly helpful in the restriction or prohibiton of non-essential and 
semi-essential imports, designed both to protect tho balance of payments 
and internal producers. In protecting internal producers, at least in tho 
early stages, special emphasis should be placed on encouragement of low-
initial-investmont industries. In the long-run, the-emphasis should 
be on diversification of exports and encouragement of foreign invest-
ments • 
Underdeveloped countries are faced with a dilemma posed by the 
fact that economic development is by its very nature a continuing process 
over time, while their very low levels of development place them under 
great pressure to develop rapidly. It is in the context of this dilemma 
that quantity controls, i.e., quotas, have the greatest advantage over 
tariffs. 
Quotas are especially capable of combating unfavorable emergency 
payments and trade conditions* yet* because of their greater flexibility 
of application, they can be moro readily removed when no longer needed 
or desirable. Thus quotas are very helpful short-run oxpodionts which 
can be more readily adjusted so as not'to conflict with long-run 
dovelopmont. Furthermore, this same flexibility m removal of quotas 
when"they are no longer needed, makes them a moro suitable means of pro-
viding protection to internal producers only so long as protection is 
necessary or desirable. 
The analysis of quantitative controls has bean presented largely 
in terms of import and export quotas* although quotas may be combined 
with exchange controls. When quotas are combined with exchange controls 
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thoy tend to lose their distinctive identity. For example* tho quantity 
fixing involved in establishing a quota, when done in conjunction with 
exchange controls, is incorporated in a foreign exchange licensing sys-
tem. Thus, the quantities of the various goods allowed to be imported 
are fixed by the decisions to issue* or not* licenses for the purchase 
of foreign exchange for importing designated goods. The effects of 
quantitative controls are the same whether implemented through quotas 
or foreign, exchange licensing on a quantity-of-goods basis. It may be* 
however* that it can bo more effectively administered in conjunction 
with exchange licensing. 
EXCHANGE CONTROLS 
Controls over foreign exchange as a moans of influencing internation-
al trade have become extremely prevalent throughout the world in the 
postwar years. There are several reasons for such increased reliance 
on exchange controls as opposed to other commercial policy instruments. 
First* exchange controls may be operated largely within already existing 
administrative apparatus. The existing apparatus is the central bank which 
most independent underdeveloped countries have established37 and commer-
cial banks which may bo authorized to deal in foreign exchange under 
regulations supervised either by the central bank or a specially osta-
37 For a brief early description of financial institutions in Asian 
countries sea "Mobilization of Domestic Resources for Economic Develop-
ment and the Financial Institutions in the ECAFE Region" in Vol. I., No. 
I of the Economic Bulletin for Asia and tho Far East (First Quarter* 
1950), pp. iJO-iJO. Development of indigenous financial institutions, 
especially central banks, has tended to await political independence. 
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blished exchange control authority. Second, exchange controls are the 
most versatile of the commercial policy instruments in that they, more 
than tariffs or quotas, can be designed to yield effects in any direc-
tion that other commercial policy instruments can. Exchange controls* 
as noted previously*3° may be designed to operate with an initial 
impact either upon quantities or upon prices and costs* thus making 
possible direction,of economic activity by prohibition* by permission 
and,/or by positive inducement. Third* in extension of the second 
point* exchange control is the only commercial policy instrument that 
makes possible direct control over money capital flows and other invis-
ible transactions in the balance of payments. Fourth* exchange controls 
provide a technique for virtually complete mobilization of the moans 
of consummating foreign trade transactions so as to channel such trade 
along lines most stimulating to economic development. Add to tho fore-
going points the flexibility of exchange control measures in adjustment 
to changing conditions and the increased use of exchange control 
measures* especially by underdeveloped countries* becomes understandable. 
Tho considerable versatility of exchange controls* i.o.* tho fact 
that it is possible with somo exchange control feature to pursue each 
of the commercial policy objectives, is alone nearly sufficient explana-
tion for their having been tried in pursuit of each of the various ob-
jectives, at some time or other, by soma country or other. Such versa-
tility of exchange controls is not, however, justification for their 
being relied on for every development purpose. 
Virtually complete reliance on exchange controls for pursuing 
38 See above, p. 52f. 
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development policy objectives would require constantly changing regu-
latory provisions and make the exchange control system so complex and 
unstable that the uncertainties and risks created would be disruptive 
of private initiative. In general, the less erratic the controls, the 
more conducive thoy will be to private activities that complement 
government policies aimed at steady development. 
However, even limiting exchange control measures primarily to 
furthering a few main development objectives would involve more stringent 
control than mera supervision and / or more than one exchange rate. Con-
sequently, the following analysis is carried on in terms of various 
exchange licensing provisions and multiple exchange rata situations. 
Foreign Exchange Availabilities for Development 
Exchange controls can be most useful in furthering those commercial 
policy objectives for development that involve either the availability 
or allocation of foreign exchange for development. 
Mobilization of foreign exchange for devolopment is a special prov-
ince of exchange controls. Complete mobilization of foreign exchange 
under govornmont control involves a requirement for all foreign exchange 
transactions to be conducted through financial institutions, public 
and /or private, that are authorized to deal in foreign exchange. Pro-
ceeds from investments abroad, e.g., from foreign securities and other 
invisible transactions, as well as from commodity exports, havo to be 
surrendered at the official buying rate, or rates, fixed by the regu-
latory authorities. Foreign exchange for importation has to be obtain-
ed from tho authorized agencies at tho official selling rate or rates. 
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Any such arrangement is likely to ba by-passo'd to some extent by 
the establishment of a black market, although black market operations 
can bo kept;,at a reasonably low level with fairly simple licensing, dec-
laratory, or registration devices.39 Alternatively, it is possible to 
control black markets by legalizing them in a so-callod "free" market^0 
with transactions still to be made through authorized banks. Such "free" 
markets gain some control over the nature and oxtent of otherwise 
illicit•foreign exchange transactions. 
Quantity control can be exercized through licensing foreign exchange 
purchases for particular uses. Price and cost direction can be exer-
cised through tho establishment of differing official buying and sailing 
rates on foreign exchange from the various sources and for the various 
uses. 
Increasing Foreign Exchange Earnings. Exchange controls to increase 
tho foreign exchange available for development uses can function most 
directly through measures to increase foreign exchange earnings, gross 
and net. Measures to increase foreign exchange earnings may include 
measures to control money capital flows, to encourage exports, and to 
encourage foreign investment. 
Reduction of tho total of money capital out-flows can increase net 
exchange earnings. Total exchange oarnings may bo increased by selective 
licensing of foreign exchange for monay capital exports in the form of 
investment in foreign securities or earning assets that are especially 
39 See Mikesell, R., Foreign Exchange in the Postwar World, Twen-
tieth Century Fund, New York, 195U* pp. 65H$8. 
UO For a description see above, p..53. 
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productive of foreign oxchange as dividends or interest. Requirement 
of registration of such investments and surrender of the resultant foraign 
exchange proceeds could convert an otherwise undesirable leakage of 
private savings abroad into a very important source of foreign exchange 
for development uses. 
Permitting an orderly* controlled movement of the money capital of 
tha wealthy could be as productive of foreign exchange for development 
and for combating balance of payments deficits as encouraging investment 
of such funds in new oxport or import-competing enterprises. One dis-
advantage of such a policy is that funds invested abroad in this manner 
do not generate income at homo. Whether or not this would constitute 
a largor leakage from the domestic income stream than would otherwise 
occur would depend upon what disposition would otherwise bo made of the 
funds. Should the funds alternatively be dissipated in increased liqui-
dity* as tends to happen* a policy permitting the funds to flow abroad 
would not constitute a net reduction in the domestic income stream. If 
the proceeds of such financial investments abroad had to be surrendered 
at an unfavorable (low) official buying rate, they could turn up as an 
eventual expansion in domasticxincomo as a result of government spending. 
If invisible transactions of all kinds are not to escape the revenue 
levy applied through tariffs to transactions involving tangibles, differ-
ential official exchange rates—low buying rates relative to high selling 
rateskl—must be applied to invisibles transactions. Such a revenue 
levy could take any of several forms of exchange taxes rather than 
ill See above, p. $$. 
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differential official exchange rates, with a possible advantage of sep-
arating tho revenue objective from the other objectives in terms of in-
struments employed. In either case, tha result would be, in effect, 
a multiple exchange rate system as defined by tho International Monetary 
Fund.^2 Any such use of exchange controls for revenue should be made 
only with judicious coordination with other exchange control objectives 
as hore discussed. Furthermore, revenue maximization requires that tho 
disincentive affects on the transactions affected be hold to a minimum. 
Any outflow of capital funds uses foreign exchange and cannot be 
permitted to assume large proportions in the short-run because the capa-
city to import tangibles of an essential nature on current account would 
be unduly restricted. Capital flights into liquidity, speculation or 
even earning assets abroad which tend to be bunched during periods of 
balance of payments crises aggravate the payments problem and disrupt 
development programs. It is therefore necessary that capital flights 
bunched in the short-run be prevented. Accomplishment of this would 
be facilitated by permission of orderly movements over extended periods. 
This policy could only be exercized by implementation of exchange 
controls requiring that all foreign exchange transactions be conducted 
through authorized banks and subject to registration and licensing. 
Another aspect of control over money capital export is significantly 
related to any policy designed to encourage money capital imports in 
tho form of foreign investments. Mikesell emphasizes the deterrent 
effects that exchange controls may have on foreign investment. In his 
1|2 See footnote 21, p. 80. 
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discussion, restrictions placed on the transfer of earnings or repatria-
tion of invested capital are given prominence.k3 This emphasis is based 
on the responses to a questionnaire by companies responsible for a large 
portion of American investments abroad which indicated that foreign trade 
and exchange controls were important obstacles to private foreign invest-
ment in underdeveloped countries.W* 
It is possible that such obstacles apply primarily to less desirable 
investments from the standpoint of development needs, for these needs do 
not necessarily coincide with the investment objectives of many foreign 
firms. Desirable foreign investments can be encouraged by liberal ex-
change policies toward the transfer of earnings and repatriation of capi-
tal, as well as by favorable treatment of the resultant enterprises with 
respect to necessary imports and to exchange rates for remittances and lo-
cal purchases. The point is that "foreign capital is still warmly wel-
come..., although the new policy is to channel it into selected fields un-
der prescribed conditions, for the purpose of advancing and safeguarding 
the economic interests of the country. ...government assistance to private 
investment in general is larger and growing."^ 
In view of the desirability of foreign investments for development 
when made along specified lines, there is nothing inherently contradictory 
between exchange controls for development and foreign investments in 
1|3 Op. cit., p. Ii5l. 
llll The survey was conducted by the National Industrial Conference Board 
and the results reported in Obstacles to Direct Foreign Investment, April, 
1951. Ibid., pp. Iili9-li56. 
Il5 United Nations, Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East, "Laws and Regulations Affecting Foreign Investment in Asia 
and the Far East", Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. VIII, 
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desired enterprises. In the past* tho deterrent effects of oxchange 
regulations on private investment havo frequently stemmed from uncer-
tainty as to future treatment. An avowed* consistent policy of promot-
ing devolopment can do as much to eliminate uncertainties in the general 
situation in underdeveloped countries and stimulate desired investment 
as absence of specific government regulations. It is possible, for 
example, to reduce uncertainties for foreign investors in approved 
enterprises and thus encourage money capital imports by guaranteeing 
to soil foreign exchange for dividend and interest remittance at "the 
same official exchange rate that is paid for the foreign exchange in-
volved in the money capital import. This policy would eliminate the 
risks involved in possible exchange rate changes-between the time of 
investment and the remittance of earnings. 
The point was made earlier that increasing exports is tho most 
direct approach to increasing foreign exchange oarnings.^6 Thus far in 
this analysis, export subsidies have been doomed the most effective 
means of increasing exports-and* thereby* of increasing export earnings 
of foreign exchange. Actually, for this purpose, exchange controls 
have several advantages over direct payments of export subsidies. 
Export subsidization that can be provided by controls on foreign 
exchange transactions tends to be just as effective as specific payments 
of oxport subsidies and, although less direct, moro flexibly administer-
ed. By requiring tho surrender of all export proceeds to tho exchange 
control authorities x*ith a favorable, i.e, relatively higher, buying 
'No.. I,'.May,' 1957, p. 7. . - . 
1;6 Sea above, p. iiff. 
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rate paid for the proceeds from those exports to be especially encourag-
ed, an automatic export subsidy is established. This method involves 
a less firm committment to export subsidization than legislatively 
established subsidies* and tends to make easiar a reduction or elimina-
tion of tho subsidy by simply changing rates of exchango as tho export 
industries become moro firmly established* more efficient* and loss 
in need of assistance. In fact, once the enterprise is established, 
a gradual reduction in the buying rato of the foreign exchange proceeds 
could be used to induce greater officiancy. 
Furthermore, while export subsidies in whatever form involve pay-
ment of domestic currency to exporters, subsidization through the set-
ting of favorable exchange rates is handled as a routine part of tho 
activities of the exchange control authorities. This tends to be a 
more efficient, i.e., less costly, operation than collecting tax 
revenues and disbursing them as subsidy payments. 
An alternative approach to favorable exchange rates for subsidiz-
ing favored exports under a system of oxchange controls is the granting 
of export retention quotas to the exporters of goods favored for export. 
An export retention quota involves permission for the favored exporter 
to retain a portion of tho foreign exchange proceeds from his exports. 
Tho subsidy usually dorivas from permission to use tho retained exchange 
to import goods otherwise subject to general import restriction,and, 
therefore, capable of being sold domestically at a profit. Asido from 
more general objections to the use of export retention quotas,^ thoir 
ll7 Soo Mikosoll* op^ cit., pp. U61-2. 
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use in conjunction with exchange controls for dovelopment tends to in-
ject greater -complexities into tha system and to weaken efforts to 
mobilize foreign exchange for dovelopment* especially efforts at allocat-
ing foreign exchange according to established import priorities for 
development. 
Protection To Increase Foreign Exchange Earnings. It may be noted 
that exchange controls that encourage now export enterprises or that 
increase money capital imports through encouraging foreign investment, 
constitute measures which provide protection for internal production. 
An additional protective use of exchange controls which could also con-
tribute to an increase in foreign exchange availabilities for develop-
ment involves the encouragement of domestic investment in import-compet-
ing enterprises. Protection of import-competing enterprises would 
involve the charging of a higher domestic currency rata for the foreign 
exchange to be used in importing commodities the internal production of 
which was to ba encouraged. Specific exchange licenses for importation 
would have to bo required in order to apply tha highar oxchange rate to 
particular commodities. 
If exchange licenses under this system limited tho amount of exchange 
made available for such imports, quantity controls would be combined 
with exchange controls for greater effectiveness.^ This combination 
of controls adds a price-cost restriction to supplement a quantity 
restriction. Tha primary advantage of combining control devices in 
this way, as compared with operating them separately* is to achieve 
1|8 See above, p. 99* 
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desired results through one control agency in place of two. 
Exchange licenses coupled with restrictive exchange rates for the 
importation of particular commodities could be issued without quantita-
tive restrictions. In this case, the protective effect would bo 
exorcised through the price mechanism in much the same way as a protec-
tive tariff. The same uncertainties as to the degree of tha protective 
effect would exist in tho use of either of these commercial policy 
devices. However, oxchange rates could be adjusted moro readily than 
tariffs to fit the protoctive needs as actual effects became manifest. 
Nevortholoss, quantitative restriction would be more procisa, and mixing 
exchango rato restriction for protection with quantitative exchange 
licensing tends to create excessive complexity in the exchange control 
system to no great advantage. 
Where analysis of exchange controls for increasing foreign exchango 
earnings touches on the importation of particular goods, that analysis 
merges with analysis of exchange controls for allocating foreign ex-
change for development. 
Allocation of Foreign Exchange for Davelopmant 
The point was made in the preceding chapter that tho primary con-
cern in commercial policy for dovelopment is not the restriction of for-
eign trade in the sense of reducing tho total volume. Underdeveloped 
countries neod expanding foreign trade as a means of obtaining essential 
imports. Rather, commercial policy restriction for development must 
take the form of controls on the type of trade, especially imports. 
Since foreign oxchange is the means of implementing importation of 
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goods and services, exchango controls provide a fundamental approach to 
controlling tho type of trade with a view to furthering development. 
Duo to a tendency toward a general shortage of foreign exchange, relative 
to needs, in underdeveloped countries that are embarked upon develop-
ment programs, a system of allocating foreign exchange for devolopmont 
must be designed to conserve foreign exchango including* especially, 
so-called hard currencies. The system must also provide for control over 
the pattern of imports with special attention paid to encouragement 
of the importation of goods deemed essential to tho devolopment process. 
Conserving Foreign Exchange. For most underdevoloped countries 
foreign exchange must constitute such a largo portion of tho necessary 
-t 
financing of any dovelopment program that foreign exchango budgeting 
is as essential as general governmental budgeting. Exchange controls 
are a virtual necessity for implementing a foreign exchange budget, and 
in any ovent are tho most effective moans* since thoy can utilize 
either quantity or price direction. Since many of the exchange systems 
in underdeveloped countries havo tended to develop on an ad hoc basis, 
foreign exchange budgets could bo one of the most beneficial immediate 
commercial policy innovations for furthering development. 
With economic devolopment as the primary policy objective, con-
servation of foreign exchange for meeting dovelopment needs would be 
the core consideration in tho foreign exchange budget. To this end, 
foreign exchange may be withheld from imports deemed non-essential from 
tha view point of development by a system of quantity exchange licensing 
provisions. Where loss stringent restriction is needed, as of semi-
essentials, foreign exchango could be made available only at unfavorable 
Ill 
exchange rates. As pointed out previously,^ any such priorities of 
imports would need to reflect the conditions of the particular countries 
in which thoy were established and would therefore vary from country to 
country. To avoid undesirabla complexity which might hamper private 
investment and production due to increased uncertainties, the system of 
priorities should be defined only in terms of a few broad categories. 
Imports that would promote development directly are not the only • 
goods that would need to be classed as essential in order to avoid an 
inadvertent* extreme imbalance in the foreign exchange budget* and thus 
in the balance of payments. For example* if capital goods such as 
machinery and equipment constitute a large element of the essential 
category, it will mean an increasing future need for importation of 
parts and equipment for maintenance of an expanding stock of capital. 
Such induced increases in import needs must be carefully projected into 
future budget requirements in order to avoid disruption of the develop-
ment process or extreme imbalance in the foreign exchange budget and 
the balance of payments. 
Another consideration having the same general effects on the for-
eign exchange budget involves imports to meat consumption needs. In 
most underdeveloped countries* sizable portions of the goods necessary 
for maintenance of even the low loveIs of living achieved must be 
imported. Foreign exchange for those imports must be budgeted if living 
levels are not to fall. Furthermore* if the development policies prove 
successful and incomes increase, the pressures on the foreign oxchange 
il9 See above, pp. 67f. 
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budget from consumer demand will become greater. On the othor hand, 
both the increasing consumption and maintenance-of-capital budgat pres-
sures will be mitigated to tho extent that success in development results 
in increased foreign exchange earnings through increased exports* or to 
the'extant foreign exchange availabilities are increased through success-
ful development of truly competitive import-competing enterprises. 
The term "scarce currencies" has coma to be used in reference to 
the currencies of countries that tend to have relatively large year-
to-year surpluses in their balance of payments vis-a-vis the world. 
Since the possibilities of-earning these currencies in trade with third 
countries tend to become more remote tha longer the situation persists* 
underdeveloped countries may find it necessary to give special consider-
ation in their foreign exchange budgeting to conserving scarce currencies. 
This is especially true if the scarce currency countries are important 
sources of both non-essential imports and of imports particularly vital 
to the devolopment process. 
Exchango licensing of tho scarce currencies on a restricted quantity 
basis under-a system of priorities is the most effective exchange control 
method of conserving the scarce currencies for importation of those 
goods vital to devolopment. It may bo necessary to establish a moro 
detailed classification of priorities pertaining to imports from a 
scarce currency country than that governing tho exchange budget in gen-
oral. 
Controlling tho Pattern of Imports. Tho foregoing analysis implies 
that control over the pattern of imports is integral to the budgeting 
of foreign exchange to- conserve foreign exchange for development. The 
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primary consideration in allocating foreign exchange within the budget 
is to assure that foreign exchange will ba used primarily for importation 
of goods essential to tho devolopment process. 
When the general foreign exchango budget objectives of conserving 
foraign exchange for essential development uses and controlling the 
pattern of imports to further the dovelopment process are stated in 
terras of the more specific objective of actual encouragement of the im-
*portation of goods essential to development, another dimension is added 
to the question of. what specific exchange oontrol measures are best 
suited to fulfillment of the objective. While quantitative exchange 
licensing tends to have more precise effects in prohibiting semi- and 
non-essential imports provides only passive encouragement to the impor-
tation of essentials. Although such passive encouragement may ba 
sufficient stimulus to the importation of essential consumption goods 
sinca thoy are needed or desired for their power to satisfy wants dir-
ectly, it may not bo sufficient stimulus to insure importation of goods 
essential for development of productive enterprises. 
Assurance of the foreign exchange moans for importing productive 
machinery, equipment, parts, fuels, etc. may not ba sufficient to induce 
investments in such imports or in the enterprises in which they would 
be utilized. More positive encouragement can be provided through 
multiple exchange rates. Because of the tendency toward a general 
shortage of foreign exchange relative to development needs, a froe 
market rate for foreign exchange in.terms'of domestic^ currency..would 
tend to ba high and thus discourage imports. A multiple rate structuro 
provides a means of permitting partial devaluation of the domestic 
llil 
currency to discourage non-essontail imports and the setting of a rate 
that overvalues domestic currency to subsidize the importation of essen-
tials. An intermediate rate may be applied to at least a third category 
of imports, i.e., semi-essentials. 
Nevertheless, even subsidization of capital imports, although a 
positive inducement, is still only permissive. Yot more strenuous 
policies may bo necessary to attract private investment in such imports. 
Finally, if all inducements to private enterprisers fail, it may be 
necessary for governments to take tho initiative. 
However, another advantage of controlling the pattern of imports 
by means of a multiple exchange rate structure is that tha devalued 
import rates for those goods whoso importation is to be restricted 
provide a means whereby government can capture the windfall profits 
that would otherwise accrue to importers of such goods through increased 
domestic prices. Consequently, even whon greater precision in restric-
tive effects is deemed necessary, it would be well to supplement quanti-
tative restrictions with devalued import rates of exchange 
Exchange Controls for Revenue 
The observations in the preceding paragraph indicate that a system 
i 
of multiple oxchange rates can bo so structured as to raise revenue. 
By permitting the bulk of imports to enter only at exchange rates that 
garner, for the exchange control authority, moro domestic currency per 
unit of foreign exchange than is paid for tho foreign oxchange proceods 
from the bulk of exports, it is possible to raise considerable revenue 
from exchango controls. Various underdeveloped countries havo done 
n5 
so.50 
Yet an' exchango control system that brings in largo amounts of 
revenue conflicts with tho use of oxchange controls for increasing ex-
change availabilities and encouraging essential imports. If foreign 
exchange supplies aro extremely short, tho bulk of imports will tend 
to fail in the essential category and for their encouragement require 
oxchange rates which involve revenue loss rather than revenue gain. 
By the same token, subsidy exchange rates to encourage exports and 
thereby increase foreign exchango earnings reduce government revenues 
rather than raising them. Furthermore, using exchange controls for 
all throe objectives makes the system vory complex. 
Even so, it is possible to structure a multiple rate system to 
increase foreign exchange availabilities and allocate exchange for 
development in such a way as to balance exchange profits and exchange 
subsidies within the system so as not to involve a drain on general 
government revenues. As suggested earlier, this would leave the 
government revenue objective of commercial policy to be pursued through 
a mildly discriminatory system of import tariffs and export duties 
on those primary exports having relative price-inelasticities of 
supply and demand. 
Other Commercial Policy Objectives 
Furtherance of some of the other commercial policy objectives for 
50 Indonesia provides a notable example. See United Nation, "Tho 
Application of Multiple Exchango Rates m Selected Asian Countries", 
Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. 5, No. 3, November* 
195U, PP. 224.-30. 
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devolopment tends to bo moro compatible with a system of exchange con-
trols for increasing foreign exchange availabilities and allocating ex-
change for development than does the revenue objoctivo. Such a system 
is fundamental to protection of the balance of payments. It would be 
particularly offoctivo in protecting the balance of payments if a foreign 
exchange budget wore carefully worked out. In addition* quantity licens-
ing of foreign exchange can provide assistance in meeting balance of 
payments emergencies. 
Another possible by-product of a policy of allocating foreign ex-
ch? .ge for dovolopmont might be increased private saving on tho part of 
tho wealthy elite. Probably the most effective commercial policy instru-
ment for preventing unnecessary spending abroad on luxuries would bo 
the requirement that all such oxchange dealings be made through author-
ized banks under exchango licenses. Whether this would actually in-
crease the volume of private savings would depend on internal controls 
directed to tha same and as suggested previously.51 
If an exchange control policy designed to increase the volume and 
total value of exports wore successful* import capacity would be increas-
ed. An increased import capacity* especially for consumption essentials* 
would do much to alleviate inflationary pressures resulting from other-
wise restricted imports. Inflation and a balance of payments deficit 
are virtually inevitable during a period of rapid devolopment. Factors 
making for complete price level stability tend to retard oconomic growth, 
but so does run-away inflation. While exchange controls could probably 
51 Sao above, p. 75. 
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contribute more to control of inflation than the other commercial policy 
instruments, internal monetary and fiscal policies would probably bo 
required for placing a reasonable dampor on inflation during the 
development process. The contribution of commercial policy to general 
success in economic dovelopment provides its greatest promise for con-
trolling inflation in tho long run. 
Finally, it was pointed out in tha analysis of export quotas that 
few underdeveloped countries are in an export position which will permit 
thorn to do much to influence their torms of trade in the short run. 
If they were, the control over quantity that can be exercized by ex-
chango controls would moan that these could be usod to improve tho terms 
of trade. However, tho support which it was suggested that oxchange 
controls can lend to the diversification of exports does mean that 
exchange controls can contribute as much or more than the other commer-
cial policy instruments to improvement in the terms of trade in the 
long run. 
Summary 
In summary, the foregoing analysis suggests that there are advan-
tages of specialization to bo exploited in tho design of commercial 
policies for dovelopment. The advantages of establishing functional 
specialization in the use of tho broad typos of commercial policy 
instruments—tariffs and foreign trade subsidies, quantitative controls, 
and exchange controls—are to be found in a simpler structure of .each 
instrument's system which will mean fewer internal contradictions in 
each system and more efficient promotion of tho limited objectives of 
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each. 
In terms of tha major commercial policy objectives, it is suggested 
that tariffs should bo resorvad primarily for raising govornmont revenue 
with assistance for othor objectives built into the system only as thoy 
are consistent with tho main revenue purposej that quantitative controls 
should bo reserved primarily for protection both of internal producers 
and of the balance of payments in emargonciesj and that exchange controls 
should be used essentially for increasing foroign exchange availability 
and for allocation of foreign exchange for development. Of the three 
commercial policy instruments* exchange controls can contribute most 
to controlling inflation* although for controlling inflation* improving 
tho terms of trade and adjusting tho balance of payments in the long 
run* commercial policies can mako their greatest contribution by gen-
eral success in furthering development. As development occurs," these 
three problems will become less acute. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL POLICIES IN SELECTED CASES 
19k9-19$9 
The seeming shrinkage of tha world set in at an accelerated rate 
during World War II due largely to such inf luonces as improved, more 
rapid transportation and communication and the far ranging mobility 
of persons that was stimulated by the war. Tho shrinkage has seemed to 
continue at an increasing rate since the war due to such factors as jet 
propulsion, electronics development and apparently impending space 
travel. These changes havo increased tho frequency of what the anthro-
pologist refers to as "culture contacts," and havo contributed to an 
accolerated rate and expanding geographical spread in the occurrence 
of tho "demonstration effect".! 
For purposes of the present analysis* the important point for eco-
nomic dovelopment is tho timing of the expansion in economic aspirations. 
The widespread adoption of oconomic growth as tho primary national ob-
jective has occurred essentially since World War II. Emphasis on eco-
nomic development as national policy did occur on a scattered basis in 
the presently less developed countries as early as tho 1920's, notably 
1 Tho concept of the demonstration effect was conceived by Duesen-
borry in reference to the relation of saving and consumption out of 
high and low family incomos. Sea J. S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving and 
the Theory of Consumer Behavior, Cambridge* Mass., 19il9. The concept 
was enlarged by Nurkse to apply to the relation of saving and consump-
tion out of high and low national incomos. Nurkse, op. cit., Chap. III. 
It is enlarged further hero to refer to tho general of foots of Nuikse's 
concept* i.e., the broadening of the economic aspirations of the peoples 
of underdeveloped countries induced by increasing awareness of oconomic 
attainments in developed countries. 
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^in some South American countries.2 This fact at least partially explains 
why Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Brazil and Mexico had per 
capita incomes in 1953 ranging from 100 to 1|00 per cent greater than tho 
per capita income of any Far East country* with the exception of Japan.3 
Adoption of any policy as "national" policy must await tho achieve-
ment of political independence. Most countries of Asia did not achieve 
political independence until after World War II, and political inde-
pendence is only just coming to most African areas. Furthermore* the 
damping effects of the world wide depression of the thirties contributed 
to a belated pursuit of economic development* as opposed to economic 
recovery, as the primary national policy objective of most of tho 
South American countries. 
Under these circumstances, commercial policies of most underdevelop-
ed countries have only begun to be oriented toward development objec-
tives specifically since World War II. In addition, wartime disloca-
tions and postwar adjustments tondod to oxort the dominant influence 
on commercial policy decisions for some years following tho war. For 
tho foregoing reasons, the analysis in this chapter deals primarily with 
commercial policies during tho decade, 19li9 to 1959. 
Tho chapter has been planned to concentrate primarily on analysis 
of commercial policy actions that were emphasized in the theoretical 
analysis of tho preceding chapter as holding greatest promise for fur-
thering oconomic development. However, the effects of some alternatively 
2 Seo Wytho, Industry in Latin America, Columbia University Press, 
New York, ±9k$^ 
3 Kindleberger, Economic Development, Table 1.1, p. 6. 
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adopted commercial policy actions are analyzed, evaluated and compared. 
A brief background summary of economic conditions and developments over 
the subject decade precedes the analysis of commercial policies. 
By countries, the analysis has been narrowed to cover Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, and the Philippines. 
These countries have been singled out for emphasis in the analysis for 
a variety of reasons. First, they represent a range of stages of 
development, as measured by per capita income, of from very low to rela-
tively high.^ yet, second* they have all demonstrated through general 
policy actions an emphasis on economic development.£ Third, these 
countries represent a geographical distribution, in Asia and Latin Amer-
ica, that represents diversity of natural resource patterns. Fourth, 
the relative population pressures on the natural resource capacities in 
these countries cover a wide range of man/land ratios. A fifth influence 
on this selection of countries hinged on the availability of information 
concerning commercial policy measures and statistical data that give 
indication of policy effects, although even for these countries some 
gaps become evident. Sixth, at least during most of the period under 
discussion, these countries have experienced relative political stabil-
ity. 
The final reason for selecting these countries for study is the 
primary one. These countries represent diversity in the use they have 
made of the different commercial policy instruments. Mexico and Peru 
ll Ibid. 
5 Regarding Latin American countries see Wythe, op. cit.; regarding 
Asia see Table 8, Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, IX (1950), 
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havo depended rather heavily on manipulation of tariff ratos to influence 
their foreign trade along development linos. Mexico, however, espocially 
in moro recant yoars, has increased its use of quantitative restrictions. 
In addition to Mexico, India, Pakistan and the Philippines have empha-
sized quantitative controls over foreign trade. Brazil and Chile, dur-
ing various periods in the decade under discussion, have relied heavily 
upon exchange rata systems. Brazil has tended to avoid "playing favor-
ites" as between tariffs, quantity controls and exchange controls. 
Most of these countries have established foreign trade subsidies in 
various forms, but this is true of Mexico especially.6 
General statements regarding uses of commercial policy for develop-
ment in underdeveloped countries and their effects are based on the 
experience of all nine countries. In order to restrict the length of 
this ompirical analysis, however, the more detailed analysis of-tariff 
and foreign, trade subsidy manipulations concentrates on Mexico and Peru, 
the analysis of quantitative restrictions on Mexico, and of exchange 
controls on both Chile and Brazil. Brazil's exporionco with all of tho 
commercial policy instruments is frequently analyzed for comparison and 
contrast. 
No. 3, p» Hi. 
6 Tha summary information contained in this paragraph has been glean-
ed from a number of sources, but, espocially, Isaacs, op. cit.; Wythe, 
op. cit.; tho IMF Annual Reports on exchange restrictions; tho United 
States Department of Commerce, World Trade Information Service (WTIS), 
Operations Reports and Economic Reports, and Foreign Commerce Weekly 
covering 1950 to 19o07 
I 
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GENERAL INDICATIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SELECTED COUNTRIES* 
19U9-1959 
In tho selected countries, tha changes in national income (1950-
1956 or 1957) have ranged from a low increase of li$ in Pakistan to a 
high increase of $0% in tha Philippines. In terms of annual growth 
rate of national income for tho years presented in Table 1, the 
TABLE 1. CHANGES IN REAL NATIONAL INCOME AND REAL PER CAPITA PRODUCT 
' (OR INCOME*) FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES BETWEEN 
YEARS INDICATED 
(Percentage) 
Country Percentage Change Percentage Change 
in National Income in'Per. Capita Pro-
duct (or Income*) 
Philippines (1950-1957) 50 23* 
Peru (1950-1956) 23 21 
Mexico (1950- ) kk (1957) 18 (1956) 
Brazil (1950- ) 2li (1957) 16 (1956) 
.Ecuador (1950-1957') ^7 15 
Colombia (1950- ) 38 (1957) 15 (1956) 
India (1950-1956) 20 13 
Pakistan (1950-1957) 1^ 2 
Chile (1950-1957) I8 ~3 
Sources: Percentage change in national income was calculated from 
United Nation, Statistical Yearbook 1958* Table 160, pp. l|29f and Table 
159* PP. Ill9ff • Percentage change in per capita product was taken from 
ibid., Table l6l, p. 1|31. The per capita income figure for the Philip-
pines was calculated from tho same sources as the national income data 
plus ibid., Table 1 (on population), p.31. 
Philippines (7.lit), Ecuador (6.7)* Mexico (6.3), and Colombia (5.U) have 
mado the most progress. The progress of Peru (3.83)* Brazil (3.U)* and 
India (3.33) has been moderate. Chile (2.57) and PaldLstan (2.0) had the 
least satisfactory annual growth rates. 
The performance of the economy in Chile has resulted in an actual 
decline in product per capita of three percent between 1950 and 1957* 
12U 
Pakistan experienced only a two percent increase in product per capita 
over the same period. The increase in par capita product (1950-56) in 
India, Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and Mexico covered a five percent spread 
from 13 percent in India to 18 percent in Mexico. The greatest economic 
development among the subject countries occurred in Peru, with an in-
crease in per-capita product of 21 percent (1950-56), and the Philippines, 
with an increase in income per capita of 23 per cent (1950-57)«? 
Over the decade 19U9-1959, international trado of tho selectod coun-
tries has increased both by quantum and value of both imports and ox-
ports.8 However, there have boon fluctuations in those foreign trado 
categories under pressure of variable circumstances in the selected 
7 Whore the terms of trade have turned in favor of the countries for 
which per capita product data is given as between tho prior and later 
years, tho effect would be to understate the improvement in their per 
capita incomes. For tho appropriate periods, tho terms of trado worsened 
considerably for Pakistan (73/0* slightly for Peru (6$) and Mexico (6$), 
improved slightly for Ecuador (1$), Brazil (1%) and Colombia (5/0, and 
improved moderately for Chile (11^). India's terms of trado wore not 
available for 1950, but on a 1953 base stood at 10li in 1956. See United 
Nations* Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)* Economic 
Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. IX, No. 2 (September, 1958), 
p. 56, and Unitod Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. Ill, No. 2 (October, 1958), 
p. 61. These publications will bo referred to in all subsequent cita-
tions as ECAFE* Economic Bulletin* and ECLA* Economic Bulletin. 
8 This is not true for Pakistan whose value of foreign trade declined 
from a^ -high in 195l« For data on the foreign trado by value of tho Latin 
American countries see ECLA* Economic Bulletin* September,- 1958, Table 
16* p. 57 and WTIS* Part 3, No. 60-U, Tables Z and 3, pp. 3-7. For value 
of trado for Asian countries see ECAFE* EoonomiCi-Suryey* 1959* Tablo 15* 
p. 125 and EGKEE, Economic Survey* 1959, Tablo 15* P« 125 and ECAFE* 
Economic Bulletin, November, 1953, Table li, p. 36. For quantum data on 
Latin America see Table 18, p. 58, of the previously citad issue of the 
Survey* 1959. Quantum data is not available on tho foreign trade of 
Pakistan. 
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countries during the period. 
In all of the nine selected countries, the volume of trade by value 
declined in 19U9« This decline coincided with the waning of pent-up 
world demand for goods following the war. The value of exports of all 
of the subject countries, except Colombia and the Philippines, also 
declined in 19U9. In the case of the Philippines, the rise in exports 
was a part of her postwar trend of recovery from wartime destruction of 
productive facilities. 
Exports rose for eight of the nine countries in 1951^ under the 
influence of increased demand stimulated by the Korean War, which started 
in the middle of the preceding year. The factors influencing foreign 
trade in the ensuing years varied from country to country, yet on balance 
exports and total trade by value decreased during the years 1952 and 1953 
and rose from 1951l through 1956. Exports of the selected countries de-
clined on balance in 1957, as did both exports and total trade in 1958. 
Both of these categories were on the rise in 1959. The trade positions 
of the nine countries were apparently little affected by the recession 
in the United States in 1953-51l, yet responsive to the boom period of 
1955-56 and significantly depressed by the recession of 1957-58. Eco-
nomic gains in the United States and Western Europe were partially in-
strumental in the trade rise during 1959. 
Imports by value in the nine selected countries have fluctuated 
widely during the decade, 19ii9-1959. The import fluctuations have ten-
ded to be associated with fluctuations in export earnings or balance of 
9 Ecuador was the exception, but her exports had doubled m 1950 over 
19li9. 
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payments positions, but on a lagged basis. When exports increased sig-
nificantly in one year, the tendency was for imports to rise—and be 
permitted to rise—the following year. The same lagged response of im-
ports was noticeable when exports increased in each of two or three 
years successively. In many of these instances the expansion of imports 
was exorbitant relative to the export levels in the years in which the 
TABLE 2. INCOME PER CAPITA IN THE 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 191|9 
(U. S. Dollars) 
Country Income Per 
Capita 
Chile 188 
Colombia 132 
Mexico 121 
Brazil 112 
Peru 100 
India 57 
Pakistan . 5l 
Philippines kh 
Ecuador llO 
Source: United Nations, Nation-
al and Per Capita Income in Seven-
ty Countries, New York, 191)9, p. lh« 
increase in imports occurred, necessitating policies of contraction of 
imports the next year. 
Several factors have influenced the economic and foreign trade 
development so far described. Some of the significant factors are (1) 
previously attained economic levels, (2) the pattern of natural resources, 
and (3) the man/land ratios. 
The nine selected countries are ranked in Table 2 according 
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to per capita income levels already achieved by 19li9« In view of their 
low levels of attainment generally, tha higher the incoma level tha 
broader is the baso for further progress. However, this generalization 
has not proved valid for Chile, whoso performance in increasing the per 
capita income level has boon the least successful in spito of starting 
tho decade at the highest level. Chile's "commercial policy has been 
protective of domestic producers, but restrictive rather than stimula-
tiv©lO" and hor monetary and fiscal policies havo not been generally 
expansionary. 
On tho other hand, if a country starts at a low income level, a 
small absolute increase in income will represent a larger percentage in-
crease than when it starts at a high level. Ecuador and tho Philippines, 
which are at the bottom in Tablo 2, achieved the highest annual rates 
of increase in national income over the years 1950-1957. 
The diversity among the subject countries in patterns of natural 
resources and tho man/land ratios have influenced tho relative levels 
of economic development which the countries have attained. Those diver-
sities have also affected the relative success of policies for develop-
ment, including commercial policies. 
Tha pattern of natural rasoucos in the various countries has part-
ially determined tho range of primary commodities readily available for 
oxport. If tho range of exportable commodities is narrow, i.e., restrict-
ed to only one or two significant foreign exchange .earners, the prospects 
for foreign trade to act as a reliable "leading" soctdr in the process 
10 The inadequacy of protective policy alone was noted above, p. 92. 
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of development are restricted.^ Furthermore, sudden shifts in demand 
for a few primary-commodity exports tend to ba disruptive of develop-
ment programs, and make devolopment uneven and planning difficult. On 
the other hand* the existence of diversity in the oxport base or of a 
potential for diversification will favor success in development policies. 
Of the selected countries, those with a narrow export base aro 
Brazil (coffee)* Colombia (coffee and petroleum) and PaldLstan (raw jute 
and raw cotton). Chile and Ecuador export only two or three commodi-
ties that aro of significance by value* although the range of minor 
exports is wide enough to provide export diversification potential. The 
exports of India* Mexico* Peru and tho Philippines aro more varied than 
those of the other subject countries. About forty percent of India's 
exports are manufactured commodities. Pakistan appears to have the 
least potential for export diversification.!2 
The man/land ratio underlies the pressure of population on food-
production potential. In underdeveloped countries, the adequacy of food 
production can affect significantly tha international trade position of 
the country. In various of tho selected countries, one or two basic 
grain-food imports can mean tho difference between a surplus or a deficit 
in the balance of payments.13 Expansion in the production of the crucial 
11 For a discussion of foreign trade as a "loading", "lagging", or 
Ubalancing" sector in the development process, see Kindleberger,.Economic 
Development, pp. 2li5-255. 
12 For the data on the Latin American countries see ECLA, Economic 
Bulletin* October, 1958, Tables 29 and 30, pp. 67-71. On the Asian coun-
trios see ECAFE, Economic Survey, 1958, Tables 6 and 8, pp. 188 and 
193f. 
13 For example, in Mexico, in 1958, crop failures of 1957 made nec-
essary an increase in food imports greater than the balance of payments 
129 
commodities can oaso tho.balance of payments problems of a country em-
barked on development. A poor food-crop year can disrupt tho whole 
development process by forcing a shift in foroign oxchange allocation 
from machinery and equipment imports to emergency imports of food. 
Tho relative starting positions of the selected countries in the 
adequacy of food-crop production has a fundamental influence on their 
development potential and tho relative difficulties they face in form-
ulating commercial policies. The countries most favorably situated with 
TABLE 3. RECENT POPULATION DENSITIES AND AVERAGE 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN THE 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Country 
India 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Mexico 
Ecuador 
Colombia 
Chile 
Peru 
Brazil 
Source: 
Persons per Square 
Kilometer 
121 
91 
80 
16 
15 
12 
10 
8 
7 
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 
Average Annual 
Increase in Population 
(Perconts) 
1.25 
1.9 
2.9 
2.83 
2.7 
2.2 
1.7 
2.1 
2.1| 
lY'u, 
respect to this consideration are those that aro able to produce domest-
ically nearly all of their food requirements. 
Of7tho nine selected countries; India, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Peru and Chile face the most difficult food production situations and 
import substantial amounts of basic food stuffs, especially rice or wheat. 
deficit. WTIS, Economic Reports, Part 1, No. 59-36, p. 1. 
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Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and Mexico have achieved tha most favorable 
positions regarding food production* and the latter throe are exporters 
of basic food crops. Table 3* showing population densities and average 
annual growth rates* gives some indication of the reasons for those rela-
tive agricultural performances. The performances of Peru and Chilo* 
however, need further explanation. 
Additionally, Peru faces-a food deficit because of limited arable 
land areas duo to its expanse of Amazon river jungle. Chile, on tha other 
hand, has a potentially high arable land to population ratio, and was 
virtually self-sufficient in food until 19U0. However, due to policies 
restrictive of exports and domestic price controls on food items, 
Chile's agricultural development has not kept pace with her,population 
increase. 
TARIFF EXPERIENCE 
Tariffs for Revenue-A General Summary of Practices 
Before World War II* or during the earliest postwar years for which 
tho information is available, all nine of tho solactod countries obtain-
ed more than one-fourth of their governmental revenues from customs 
duties levied on imports or exports or both. With only two exceptions 
(Colombia and India), the percentage of total revenues obtained from 
customs duties was larger the lower tho por capita income (as estimated 
for 1953), and vice versa. By tho latest year for which data is 
available (1957* 1958 or 1959)* all but two of the countries (Peru and 
Ecuador) had reduced the ratio of customs duty collections to total 
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.31* revenues.' 
The reasons for tho decline in tho ratio variod from.country to 
country. In no case was the decline in the ratio due to an absolute 
decrease in customs collections, even when two postwar years aro com-
pared; rather it was due to increases in other revenues. In tho most re-
cent years for which data is available, six of tha nine subject coun-
tries collected ono-fourth or more of their revenue from customs. 
TABLE ii. RATIOS OF TARIFF (CUSTOMS) REVENUE TO TOTAL GOVERNMENT 
REVENUE FOR THE SELECTED COUNTRIES* 
(Percentages) 
Country Prewar, or Earliest 
Available Data 
Latest Available 
Data 
Chile ($250) 
Colombia ($250) 
Brazil (£215) 
Mexico ($200) 
Peru ($1U0) 
Ecuador ($100) 
Philippines ($90) 
India (§60) 
Pakistan (§60) 
27 (19140) 
UO (1939) . 
30 (1938) 
33 (1939) 
33 (1953) 
35 (1951) 
50 (1950) 
26 (1956) 
$0 (1950) 
20 (1958) 
33 (1958) 
16 (1958) 
25 (1958) 
33 (1958) 
1+2 (1957) 
26 (1959) 
18 (1959) 
,26 (1959) 
*Tho countries are ranked according to per capita incomes for 1953 
takon from Kindleberger* Economic Development, Tablo 1.1, p.6. 
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1958, N. Y., 1958, 
Tablo 171, pp. Ii62-512. 
Tha policy of significant reliance on tariffs for revenue has not 
been a consistent policy of all of tho selected countries.during the 
decade under study. In the Philippines, for example, principle reliance 
for government revenues from the foreign trado sector was on a 17 percent 
111 See Table kp 
132 
tax on sales of foreign exchange during the five years 1951-55. This 
exchange tax was instituted on March 28, 1951* and abolished on December 
31* 1955* It was replaced by a special import tariff on January 1,1956* 
which was followed by a major tariff rovision that became effective on 
July 1* 1957"1-' and garnered 26$ of the government's revenue during 1959.' 
Brazil has con'sistontly collected more revenue from govornmont 
profit on its foreign- exchange control systom than from tariffs. Tariff 
revenues ranged from 2.5 to $.9 percent of total revenues during tha 
years 1953-57* ] A major tariff revision was put into effect in August* 
1957* Tariff revenues wero increased by instituting ad valorem duties 
ranging up to 150 percent. The specific duties which had been in effect 
since 193U had fallen to a low ad valorem equivalent due to increases in 
the general price level during the post-war years.^ Yet, even in 1958, 
foreign exchange control profits appear to havo exceeded tariff revenues 
which wore 16 percent of total revenues.1° 
In tho case of Chile, also* revenue has-been obtained from profits 
on a. multiplo exchange rate systom (up to 1956)* as well as from taxes 
on largo foreign-owned mining companies whose exports of copper and ni-
trates aro the source of approximately three-fourths of Chile's foreign 
oxchange earnings. In 1956* a complex multiple exchange rate system was 
15 WTIS, "Economic Developments in the Philippines-1957"* Economic 
Reports, Part 1, No. 58-19* pp. 8-9. 
l3 See Table k> 
17 U. N., Statistical Yearbook, Table 171, p. I487. 
18 WTIS, Economic Reports, Part 1, No. 58-87, p. 17. 
19 Foreign exchange profits were not listed separately in tho data, 
but were included in a category entitled "Other". This category was 
more than double import tariff revenues. „Soo U. N. Statistical Year-
book, 1958, Table, 171, p.-l+87. 
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abolished with establishment of two free exchange markets, one for 
commodities and the other for invisibles. Revenue was still collected 
from a tax on sales of foreign exchange.20 Nevertheless* revenues from 
tariffs constituted 20 per cent of total revenue in 1958. 
The tariff revenue of all the selected countries, except Mexico, 
has been derived primarily from duties on imports. In Mexico, export 
duties have consistently brought in slightly more tariff revenue than 
import duties during the postwar years. Revenue from Peruvian export 
duties, especially on agricultural and mineral exports, has averaged 
one-third or more of customs revenues. Indian export duties have accoun-
ted for one-sixth to one-fourth of customs revenues. As high as one-
sixth of customs revenue has come from export duties in Ecuador. 
Tariffs with Other Objectives 
Effects"on Inflation. Each of the nine selected countries levies 
specific import duties on a wide range of commodities. Revisions in 
specific duties have not been as frequent as revisions in ad valorem 
duty rates. Furthermore, the unit value of imports for the selected 
countries has tended upward over the decade, although it has fluctuated 
from year to year.21 Due to the nature of specific duties, the revision 
inertia, and the upward import price trend, the burden of the specific 
duties has tended to decline. 
Since the tariff revisions by Brazil and the Philippines in 1957, 
the tariff systems in all nine countries have utilized ad valorem duties 
20 IMF, Eighth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1957, pp. 71-77. 
21 ECLA, Economic~BuTletin, October, 1958, Table 20, p. 60, and ECAFE 
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predominantly. The advantage of this arrangement is its compensatory 
effocts upon price levels. Ad valorem duties keep tariff collections 
moro closely in lino with price level changes. They thus combat further 
inflation by taxing away extra profits during price level increases, and 
relieve tha heavier burden represented by specific .duties during periods 
of price level declines. 
Controlling the Pattern of Imports and Protecting Domestic Pro-
ducers. All of tha selected,countries have established graduated ad 
valorem rata structures in their import tariff systems which reflect 
judgments of priority of imports based on (1) essentiality to the do-
mestic economy and (2) the ability of domestic producers to meet 
domand. Thus they have combined the revenue objectives as described 
above with control of the pattern of imports and protection of domestic 
producers. 
Tho priority categories for imports are spelled out moro explicitly 
in connection1 with quantity or exchange control systems. For example, 
in the oxchange control system of Brazil, 1955* five categories of im-
ports wore established with increasingly less favorable, i.e., higher 
exchange rates applicable from Category I through Category V. The list-
ing, which utilized tariff classification numbers, included the follow-
ing partial list of items by category: 
Category I (Lowest exchange rates applicable to essential commodi-
ties and commodities to promote employment and agricultural production.) 
Economic Survey, Table 226, p. 137. 
22 ECAFE, "Taxation and Dovelopment of Agriculture in Under-developed 
Countries, with Special Reference to Asia and tho Far East", Economic 
/ 
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—'Coal* tinplate* specified mineral oros, pharmaceutical raw materials, 
medical equipment, spocial electrical equipment* agricultural machinery* 
mining equipment, and scientific equipment. 
Category II (Essential raw materials and other essential commodities.) 
—Specified metals, metal mill manufacture.s , industrial chemicals, in-
dustrial machinery for industries "most essential" to the economy, 
railway equipment and parts, and codfish. 
Category III (Other raw materials and "highly ossontial" spare parts 
and oquipmont.) Cement, truck and bus chassis, specified metals and met-
al manufacturer, railway equipment, chemical and other industrial raw 
materials, construction machinery, electrical equipment, and industrial 
equipment for "second-degree ossontial" industries. 
Category IV—Specified fruits and other foodstuffs, machinery for 
processing foodstuffs, machinery for manufacturing clothing and other 
consumer goods, ferro-alloys and metal mill manufacture SJ* and office 
equipment. 
Category V (Highost oxchange ratos applicable.)23—^11 other com-
modities. ^  
Wheat, petroleum products, and oquipmont for production of items 
in categories I, II and III are subjected by Brazil to special treat-
ment in most cases more favorable than that accorded any of tho items 
Bullet in , Vol. IX* No. 1 (June, 1958), pp . 8-9. 
23 For general descriptions of the categories soo IMF, Sixth Annual 
Report on Exchango Restr ic t ions , 1955* p . 62. 
2li For de ta i led l i s t i n g s given soo WTIS, "Licensing and Exchango 
Cont ro ls . . .Braz i l " , Operations Reports, Par t 2, No. 56-1, p . 3« 
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listed in tho five categories. 5 The priorities represented by tho fore-
going exchange control classifications were reflected in tho major 
tariff revision put into affect in 1957. ' 
Work was completed during the year (1955) on a new cus-
toms tariff with the establishment of ad valorem rates for 
aach of tha approximately 8,000 commodities listed in the 
proposed new schedules....The proposed schedules include 
ratos of up to 10 percent ad valorem for essential items; 
11 to 60 percent for items for which partial protoction is 
required; and from 60 to 150 percent for items requiring , 
high protection or not considered essential for the economy. 
The Brazilian priorities are typical for all of the selected coun-
tries, although there are variations from country to country as to the 
specific commodities included in each broad category. These variations 
reflect the unique conditions of the countries involved; for example, 
India and the Philippines givo priority to rice as a staple food im-
port* while Peru and Brazil givo priority to wheat. 
In general, tho commercial policy controls on imports are designed 
to restrict imports of consumer goods and encourago imports of capital 
goods* raw matorials* and fuels. Consumer goods are restricted either 
because they are doomed non-essential luxuries or in order to protact 
domestic producers. 
Thus, it is to be oxpectod that imports of consumer goods would 
decline as a percent of total imports. This, m fact, has happenod* 
25 Ibid* pp. 3-U-
26 WTIS* "Economic Developments in Brazil* 1955", Economic Reports* 
Part 1, No. 56-38* p. 7. . -
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over the period 19ll9-56, for every one of tho selected Latin American 
countries, except Peru.27 This has also been the experience of India 
and tha Philippines, although not of Pakistan, between 1953 and 1956. 
Tho counter-tendency in Pakistan is to bo explained primarily by dis-
28 
asterous floods in 1955 which created a food crisis in 1956. In 
tho case of Poru, the time period is long enough to indicate differ-
ences in tho relative effectiveness of commercial policy instruments. 
Peru is tho only one of the nine countries that utilizes neither 
quotas nor exchange controls extensively. The ratio of consumer-goods 
imports to total imports has increased in spite of the fact that Peru's 
tariff ratos discriminate against luxury imports and imports that com-
poto with domestic production.29 Furthermore, tho discriminatory tariff-
rate structure is buttrossod by a requirement of advance deposits in 
- foreign currency of 100 percent of tho import value, with banks permitted 
to finance the local currency equivalent up to 100$ for wheat, moat and 
milk, up to 50 percent for raw materials, and prohibited from extending 
credit for nonessential imports.30 There is a reasonable prosumption, 
therefore, that tariffs are not as effective for restricting luxury 
imports and protecting domestic producers as are quotas and exchange 
controls. 
Mexico has combined in her tariff policy control over the pattern of 
27 Soo Tablo 5> P« 138. 
28 WTIS* "Economic Developments in Pakistan, 1956", Economic Reports, 
Part 1, No. 57-1*6, p. 1. 
29 WTIS, "Economic Developments in Peru, 1956," Economic Roports, 
Part 1, No. 57-5U* p. 9. 
30 IMF* Fifth Annual Report on Exchango Restrictions* 195U* p. 275• 
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TABLE 5. CHANGES IN RATIOS OF COMMODITY GROUPS OF IMPORTS TO TOTAL IMPORTS 
FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES OVER SPECIFIED PERIODS, RANKED ACCORDING TO 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESS IN DEVELOPMENT* (Percentages) 
Changes in Ratios of Consumer Goods Imports to Total Imports: 
Country 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Chile 
Peru 
19)49-56 
- 6.2 
- 5.2 
-l.ll 
- 1.1 
- 0.1 
+ 3.8 
Country 
India 
Philippines 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Ecuador 
Brazil 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Chile 
1953-& 
-19.2 
-9.6 
- 6.6 
- 3.2 
- 1.9 
+ 0.2 
+ 2.1 
+ 2.7 
+ 3.k 
Changes in Ratios 
Country 
Brazil 
Chile 
Mexico 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Colombia 
of Capital Goods 
19U9-56 
-13.8 
- 1.8 
- 1.2 
-0.5 
+ 0.2 
+ 1.0 
Imports to Total 
Country 
India 
Philippines 
Pakistan 
Mexico 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Colombia 
Peru 
Brazil 
Imports:* 
1953-56 
+19. k 
+ 9.1 
$.9 
2.1 
1.0 
1.0 
-2.5 
- k.k 
-10.6 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Changes in Ratios of Raw Materials Imports to Total Imports: 
Country 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Peru 
19U9-56 
7.7 
lu3 
1.8 
1.8 
0.3 
U.7 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Country 
Colombia 
Brazil 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Philippines 
India 
Mexico 
Chile 
Pakistan 
1953-56 
+10.0 
3.6 
1.5 
0.8 
0.5 
0.2 
0.6 
1.6 
8.1 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Sources: U. N., Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Bulletin 
for Latin America, Vol. Ill, No. 2(0ctober, 1958), Tables 22, 23, 2U, 25 and 
27, pp. 61-66; U. N., Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Economic 
Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. IX, No. 2(September, 1958), Table B, 
pp. 32-33. 
*The ranking for capital imports is more ambiguous than for the other two 
categories. The percentage level of capital imports tends to be lower the 
higher the stock of capital with, which a-conntry starts a particular period. 
However, while an increase in the capital imports percentage may reflect fas-
ter development, a decrease in the capital import percentage may reflect 
greater production of capital domestically. For this reason, the order is 
reversed for the two time periods because of the inclusion in 1953-56 of the 
generally less developed Asiatic countries. 
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imports, protection for domestic industries, and reduction of balance 
of payments deficits. Therefore, Mexico's tariff policies are discussed 
in relation to the balance of payments in the following section. 
Protecting the Balance of Payments with Tariffs. Little use has 
bean mado of tariff rate manipulations to combat balance of payments 
deficits. In periods of payments crises, those countries that have sys-
tems of quantity and exchange controls have tightened restrictions on 
imports in order to reduce demands for foreign exchange.31 Since inter-
national payments deficits for underdeveloped countries usually occur 
during periods of inflation* due either to inadequate production levels* 
a period of relaxod monetary policy, or expansion of govornmont sponding, 
most of tho nine countries havo also responded to payments crises with 
intarnal anti-inflationary monetary and fiscal measures. 
Peru has emphasized the domestic policy approach in conjunction 
with international and foreign agency assistance for reducing deficits 
in its balance of payments. A post-Korean decline in prices of metal 
exports* after high metal prices during tho Korean War period had induced 
expansion of government and private buying abroad* precipitated an inter-
national payments crisis for Peru at tha beginning of 195U. 
As an emergency measure to curb speculation Peru negotiated a 
stabilization credit of $30 million'from the International Monetary Fund, 
tho U. S. Treasury, and a private U. S. bank in February.33 Follow-up 
31 Soo below, pp. Hi5f. and l60f. 
32 WTIS, "Economic Developments in Peru", Economic Reports, Part, 
1, No. 55-70, p.l. 
33 Ibid., p. 9. 
mo 
measures by the government included reduced public works spending, stop-
pod up revenue collections, and a shift to short-term borrowing at 
higher interest rates to finance the large 19,53 government deficit.3^ 
Only a few tariff increases wera insitutad on oonsumor goods imports in 
support of the other measures.35 
Mexico has utilized import tariff rate increases to reduce balance 
of payments deficits more extensively than any of the other selected coun-
tries. However, when balance of payments crises havo become severe, 
Mexico has resorted to peso devaluation supplemented by higher import 
tariffs and stricter quantity controls on imports. The combinod use 
of devaluation, tariff increases, and quantitative import restrictions 
makes separata analysis of tho balance of payments effects of theso three 
policy instruments difficult. 
One indication of the inadequacy of tariffs alone for reducing bal-
ance of payments deficits may be found in their use prior to peso devalu-
ation in August of 19l|8. In 19li7, Mexico was experiencing .inflationary 
pressures and a mounting balance of payments deficit. In that year, ad 
valorem rates wera innovated in its import tariff schedule.36 The new 
ad valorem rates were not high overall, but wero levied on officially 
fixed, arbitrary valuos par unit of commodities. Greater restrictivenogs 
was achieved* whan desired*'by raising official valuations of import 
commqdities. 
This measure proved inadequate to meet the balance of payments 
3l| Ibid. 
3$ Ibid., p. Hi. 
36 U. S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Weakly, January 23, 
1950, p. 20. 
difficulties, and speculative capital flights from tho peso in I9I18 
precipitated tho devaluation action. The devaluation was supplemented 
in 19li9 by increasing both tho list of commodities (150 items) for which 
import permits ware required and tha list of commodities (330 items) 
importation of which was prohibited.37 These combined actions had 
beneficial affects on the balance of payments, but these beneficial 
effects were relatively short lived. 
After achieving balance of payments surpluses in 19l|9 and 1950* 
Mexico again experienced balance of payments deficits in each year from 
1951 through 1951l. A similar pattern of events was repeated starting 
in 195U. In response to inflationary pressures and speculative capital 
flights* tho peso was devalued on April 19* 1951i» This action was 
supplemented by increased import duties and new import quantity restri-
tions.39 Balance of payments surpluses were achieved in 1955 and 1956, 
followed by deficits in 1957 and 1958.^° 
Experionco with Export Tariffs. 
Of tho nine subject countries, Mexico had mado the greatest uso 1 
of export duties. This fact was suggested in connection with tho discus-
sion of tariffs for revenue.^1 More specifically* Mexico instituted a 
37 Ibid. 
38 These events aro reflocted in the fluctuations in gold and for-
eign exchange reserves. Soo U. N., Statistical Yearbook, 1958, Tablo 
166* pp. Li5lff. 
39 WTIS* "Economic Developments in Mexico* 195U"* Economic Reports* 
Part 1* No. 55-60* pp. 1-2. 
I4O U. N.* Statistical Yearbook, 1958, Table 166, pp. k$l££• 
111 See above, p. 133* 
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15 percent ad valorem export surcharge in August of 19l|8 to capture do-
mestic-currency profits realized by exporters as a result of devaluation. 
This duty garnered substantial revenues.^ 
i 
In addition* Mexico, has instituted export tariffs and quantitative 
export controls to encourage development of tho domestic economy/. These 
measures have been applied to the agricultural and livestock industries 
to insure that domestic consumption needs are fulfillod first.^3 They 
have been applied to natural resources used by already established 
domestic industries to discourage exportation^ Differential oxport 
duties and selective quantitative export restrictions have boon applied 
to domestically produced raw materials and thoir processed counterparts 
in order to encourage now domestic processing activities.^5 
With export tariffs and quantity controls usod in pursuit of tho 
same objectives, it is difficult to separate tha affects of tho two 
instruments on tho pattern of exports and the diversification of domestic 
production activities. Therefore* tho results of theso policies are 
analyzed lator in relation to quantitative controls. 
FOREIGN TRADE SUBSIDY EXPERIENCE 
Direct import and export subsidies havo been so seldom usod by the 
k2 Foreign Commerce Weakly* January 23, 1950* p. 20. 
Il3 WTIS, "Basic Data on tha Economy of Mexico", Economic Reports, 
Part 1* No. 59-5, p. 7. 
1|1| Ibid. 
Il5 Ibid., p. 21. 
lii3 
selected countries during the docado under study as to provide no basis 
for evaluating those instruments. The nearest approach to direct import 
subsidies of significance has been government purchases of wheat in 
Brazil and govornmont import monopolies of wheat, rice, sugar, coal and 
chemical fertilizers in Pakistan. The purpose of the import monopolies 
in Pakistan is to control the distribution and prices of necessities that 
aro in extremely short supply.^6 The wheat imports by the Brazilian 
government are affected at exchango ratos lower than for all other imports 
to supplement domestic supplies of wheat.**' 
Both import and oxport subsidization has been most extensively 
instituted in the operation of multiple exchange rate systems of ex-
change control. The effects of such measures aro analyzed later in con-
nection with exchange control experience .^" 
QUANTITATIVE CONTROL EXPERIENCE 
Quotas and Revenues-the Problem of Windfall Profits. 
When quantitative import restrictions aro imposed* the domestic 
prices on the restricted commodities tend to rise, providing a windfall 
profit for the importer of tho quantities of such commodities that aro 
permitted entry. In the theoretical analysis, it was suggested that 
such windfall profits might bo captured by imposing import liconsa fees 
graduated according to tho severity of tho import restriction or by 
.
Jll6 WTIS, "Licensing and Exchango Controls...Pakistan", Operations 
Reports, Part 2, No. 58-Ui, p. 1. 
Il7 WTIS, "Licensing and Exchange Controls...Brazil", Operations Re-
ports* Part 2, No. £6-1, p.ll. 
1|8 See bolow, p. 166.. 
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instituting a systom of competitive auction bidding for licenses.k9 A 
modification of the latter proposal has been utilized by Brazil since 
October* 1953, in tha form of an importers' foreign exchango auction 
market.50 However* tho Brazilian system involves one of several possible 
combinations of quantity and exchange controls in which tho exchango 
control features predominate. Those systems are evaluated in the sec-
tion on exchange control experience.51 
In fact, none of the selected countries has adopted the techniques 
suggested in tho thooretical analysis of tho preceding chapter as a 
means of capturing windfall profits on commodities whose importation 
they rostrict. All havo loviad somo form of taxforthis purpose.52 
In soma cases, this tax has takon the form of a customs surtax 
levied in addition to the specific and ad valorem tariff rates included 
in the regular tariff schedule. In other cases, the tax has taken the 
form of sales or similar internal taxes levied upon tho restricted import 
commodities. In all cases, these taxes have been graduated to bear more 
heavily upon those commodities whose importation has boon most severely 
restricted. 
For example, oven Peru has levied an internal consumption tax 
against tho one commodity (automobiles) on which it has placed quantita-
tive import restrictions. Tho tax is seven percent of tho valuo of all 
automobiles up to $1*500* and is graduated by $100 incroasos in valuo up 
1|9 Soe above* pp. 89f. 
50 IMP, Fifth Annual Roport on Exchango Restrictions, 19$k, pp. 56-60. 
51 See below* pp. I57ff. 
52 Soe WTIS, Oporations Reports (on import tariff systems), Part 2, 
various numbers. 
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to 1|5 percent of the valuo of automobiles valued between $2,901-$3,000. 
Two percent is added for every $100 increase in valuo above $3,000.53 
In tho Philippines: 
Most imported products—as well as most goods locally 
produced—aro subject to excise taxes called percontago 
sales taxes. Rates are 100* 75, 50* 30, or 7 percent* do-
pending on the classification of tha commodities. Tha 
highest rates apply to luxuries and semi-luxuries. Tho 
tax is payable by the importer to the collector of customs 
...calculated on landed costs first inflated by 100 
percent in tho caso of luxuries; by 50 percent for somi-
luxurios; and by 25 percent for other products.5u 
Quantitative Import Restrictions 
Poru is the only one of tha nine selected countries that utilizes 
virtually no quantitative import restrictions on imports together with 
some form of exchango 'controls. However* Chile (until April 20, 1956), 
Colombia, Ecuador and Brazil have employed multiple exchango ratos as 
tho-predominant controlling element in their system of control and will, 
thareforo, be analyzed in connection with exchange controls. 
The Philippines, India and Pakistan utilize quantitative controls 
predominantly. The Philippines achieves this through quantitative ox-
change licensing for essential imports and import licensing on an indi-
vidual quota basis for other than ossontial goods. India and Pakistan 
control imports by licensing imports and making foreign oxchange availa-
ble automatically for authorized imports. Mexico is the only one of the 
$3 WTIS, "Import Tariff Systom of Poru", Operations Reports, Part 2, 
No. 58-11, p. 2. 
51| WTIS, "Import Tariff System of the Philippines," Operations Reports, 
Part 2, No. 57-103, p. 2. 
Hi6 
selected countrios that imposes quantitative restrictions without any 
oxchango controls.55 
Protecting the Balance of Payments. The purpose of instituting 
quantitative import controls (and exchange controls) usually has boen to 
conserve foreign oxchango and gold reserves at a time when tha country 
was experiencing a deficit in tho balance of payments.5° The process 
of conserving payments reserves and of balancing payments is the restrict-
ing of tho total value of imports to the leval of foreign exchango 
receipts. It is possible, by quantitative import restrictions, to erase 
balance of payments deficits if this objective is pursued with a single-
mindodnoss of purpose. 
However, in tho import control systems that have been established 
in the selected countries, protection of tho balance of paymonts with 
conservation of paymonts reserves has not boon an and in itself. Rather, 
it has bean a moans to the and of insuring that scarce foreign exchange 
will bo used to meet tho current oconomic needs and the economic devolop-
ment neods of the nation.57 Thus, it is impossible to judge tho effective-
ness of quantitative import restrictions in protecting the balance of 
payments by what has happened to tho balance of payments. 
^ For this summary soe the entries for the various countries in IMF, 
First Annual Report on Exchange Restriction, 1950* except Pakistan, 
Socond"T!oport, 1951* Brazil* Fifth Report, 1951|* and Mexico* Tenth Re-
port* 1959. 
56 This fact is reflected in the dates of origin of such systems: 
Chile, Colombia and Brazil (1931), Ecuador (1932), India and Pakistan 
(1939), Poru (19li5), Mexico (19l|6) and the Philippines (19U9). Ibid. 
57 WTIS* "Licensing and Exchange Controls..."* Operations Reports* 
Part 2, No. 57-ll5"(India), p. 1, No. ,.58-50 (Mexico/, p. 1, No. 5^-kk 
(Pakistan), p. 1, and No. 58-10 (Philippines), p. 1. 
H*7 | 
Furthermore, tha quantitative import restrictions of the selected I 
\ 
countries have not only reflected policy decisions as to essentially j 
of imports, but havo also provided protection for internal producers. ; 
Protection of Internal Producers-Mexico. In tho lattor 19l|0's, 
Moxico established quantity controls on imports by declaring two lists 
of imports; one was commodities subject to licensing by tha Ministry of 
Economy, the other, commodities prohibited importation. This system 
was originally established to conserve exchange reserves. While the 
balance of paymonts considerations are hardly ever completely submerged, 
the control decisions have increasingly reflected desire to protect 
domestic producers in addition to channeling available exchango resources 
into the acquisition of capital goods, necessary raw materials and other 
essentials.5" 
Tho items which havo boon placed on tho control lists have included 
nonessentials or"-lux-arias and commoditiosowhich would compete with 
"domestically produced equivalents or substitutes".5° Representative 
of the restricted commoditos are consumer goods such as (l) foodstuffs, 
cigarettes and alcoholic boveragos* animal fats and vegetable oils* (2) 
household chemicals* disinfoctants* soaps and detergents* (3) yarns 
and fabrics* wearing apparol and habordashory, (k) leather products, 
footwear, luggago and wallets, (5) household furniture and appliances* 
washing machines, refrigerators, stoves, mixers, radios and television 
sets, and producer goods such as (1) metal products* iron and steal 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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ingots, bars and wire, tinplate, copper wire and pipe, (2) industrial 
chemicals and chemical fertilizers* (3) cement* (li) paper and paper-
beard, glass tubas and containers* (5) machinery, electric motors, 
transformers and switchgaar, (6) automobiles, trucks, buses and 
chassis. ^  
The results of this protective policy of import restrictions, accom-
panied by protective import tariffs, tax concessions and financial aid 
through official credit institutions, are indicated by tha increased 
production of manufacturing industries. Between 1950 and 1957* pro-
duction of producer goods, in physical units, was increased in various 
categories as fdllows: Metal products, about thrae times; chemicals, 
about four times; paper and paperboard, about three times; camont, 
rubber tires and tubas* glass products, automobiles and trucks, and 
railway cars, about double; and electrical equipment, about twanty 
times. Ovar the same period, production of consumer goods was increased 
as follows: Processed foodstuffs* canned foods, and beer, about fifty 
porcent; clothing, textiles, cigarettes* matches, soaps and detergents* 
between forty and fifty percent; and woodon furniture, radio and tale-
vision sets* and electric household appliances, about sixteen times.63 
These gains in industrial production hava accompanied higher levels 
of both private domestic and direct foreign investment. A study by 
J60 Ibid., p.2. 
61 WTLS,"Economic Developments in Mexico, 195U", Economic Reports, 
Part 1, No.-55-60, p.2. " 
62 WTIS, "Basic Data on the Economy of Mexico", Economic Reports* 
Part 1* No. ^9~$, p. H|. 
63 Ibid., Table 9* p. 13. 
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Nacional Financiare* an official credit institution* in 1957* indicated 
by industrial cnasus data that private investments in 1955 and in 1956 
wero higher by about 100 percent-than in 1950."^ The level of direct 
foreign investments in manufacturing in 1957 was slightly over twenty 
times greater than in 1950. 5 The inducements to private domostic in-
vestment included general oconomic prosperity, credit availability 
through official institutions, and the protective commercial policies. 
Tha general economic prosperity and protection of internal producers 
wero of greater relative significance as inducements to direct foreign 
investment. 
Protection of Internal Producers-India, the Philippines, and Pakis-
tan. As in tho case of Mexico, the quantitative import restriction 
policies of India* tha Philippines and Pakistan havo included tho ob-
jectives of protecting internal producers and controlling tho pattern 
of imports for development. ° As indicated by increases in production of 
manufactured products, these import control policies, along with other 
promotional and government investment activities, have boen about as 
successful for these three Asiatic countries as similar policies havo 
for Mexico. 
In Mexico, botwoen 1950 and 1957* manufacturing increased in value 
of putput by approximately fifty-five percent. ' Tho index of manufactur-
61| WTIS, "Economic Developments in Mexico, 1957," Economic Reports, 
Part 1, No. 58-36, p. U. 
65 WTIS, "Basic Data on the Economy of Mexico", Economic Reports, 
Part 1, No. 59-5, Table 10, p. 11*. 
66 See above, footnote, 57* p. 5-28. 
67 U. N.* ECLA, Economic Bulletin, III* 2(0ctober, 1958), Table 8, 
p. hi. 
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ing putput increased over the short period of 1953 to 1958 by thrity-
one percent in India, by 122 percent in Pakistan, and by seventy par-
cent in the Philippines. While those comparisons may be indicative, 
direct comparison is impossible. 
A particularly significant qualification is tha fact that Pakistan 
and the Philippines started the period at much lower levels of manufact-
uring capacity. Pakistan was virtually devoid in industry following 
partition from India in 19ll7, and the Philippines started with little 
else than light manufacturing.?0 In addition, the governments in all 
three Asiatic countries have assumed greater responsibility for invest-
ment than has the government of Mexico.71 Thus, the changes in manu-
facturing as betwaen Mexico and the three Asiatic countries are not 
comparable as indicators of tho inducements to investment effected by 
the protective quantitative import restrictions. 
Controlling the Pattern of Imports. Interpretation of the changes 
in ratios of commodity groups of imports to total imports can give some 
indication of the relative effectiveness of the main commercial policy 
instruments in controlling the pattern of imports. In Table 5, it 
may be observed that India and the Philippines, of the countries using 
predominantly quantitative controls on imports, have bean most successful 
68 U. N., ECAFE, Economic Survey, 1959, Tabla 11, p. 119. 
69 WTIS, "Basic Data on the Economy of Pakistan", Economic Reports, 
Part 1, No. 55-102, p. 1. 
70 WTIS, "Basic Data on the Economy of the Philippines", Economic 
Reports, Part 1, No. 58-57, p. 9. 
71 This may be partially explained by the lower development starting 
points of the Asiatic countries. See above, pp. 23ff. 
72 See above, p."137. 
D 
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in reducing the proportion that consumer goods imports are of total im-
ports as between 1953 and 1956. Mexico is outranked in this respect only 
by Colombia. Pakistan ranks wall toward the bottom, and Mexico is out-
ranked over the period from 19li9~56 by Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador. 
In spita of tha poor showing of Mexico from 19li9-56 and of Pakistan, 
howjver, there is a reasonable presumption that quantitative controls 
on imports are most affective. Two factors tand to explain the poorer 
performance of Mexico during 19li9-56. First, is the relatively greater 
73 increase in incoma in Mexico from 1950-57, which would tand to causa 
a greater increase in the demand for consumption goods. Second is tho 
fact that Mexico has increased its reliance on quantitative import 
controls in tho latter (i.e., 1953-56) period. Pakistan's apparently 
relatively poor performance can ba explained primarily by her difficul-
ties in producing an adequate food supply domostically and her resultant 
need for large imports of foodstuffs.7* 
The judgment of greater effectiveness of quantity controls on 
imports tends to bo supported by tho data on changes in the ratios of 
capital goods imports to total imports, all four quantity control coun-
tries ranking at the top from 1953 to 1956. With regard to raw materials 
imports, India and Mexico have baen relatively successful in producing 
these domestically and in reserving them for usa in domestic industries 
75 through the application of export restrictions, while the Philippines 
has too little industrial capacity as yet to utilize large amounts of 
73 Saa above, Table 1, p. 121*. 
7l* See above, p. 129. 
75 See above, fn. 57, p. H*6. 
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raw materials, and Pakistan has been plagued by the necessity of impor-
ting for current consumption. 
Flexibility of Quantitative Import Controls. 
India, Pakistan, and the Philippines have quantitative import control 
systems with basically the same devices to achieve flexibility and con-
tinuing review of import control policy. All three permit nearly all 
imports only on the basis of individual licenses with specification of 
amounts or quotas. In the Philippines, the individual licenses are 
for specified quantities of foreign exchange for specified purposes. 
In India and Pakistan the licenses are for particular commodities in 
specified quantities with foreign exchange made available automatically.76 
All three countries issue detailed import policy statements semi-
annually. The import policies are based on a consideration of the coun-
try's needs and the overall availability of foreign exchange.77 In addi-
tion, minor changes are sometimes made between regular import policy state-
ments, and the Philippines occasionally revises its policy on a quarterly 
basis. These systems make possible continuing review and revision of im-
port policies. 
Even so, Mexico's system of quantitative import controls makes 
possible even greater flexibility than do the systems just described. 
Since the early 1950's, Mexico has utilized few specific import quotas 
or prohibitions, essentially only those common to most countries for 
public security, health and morals purposes. Import restrictions are 
76 Ibid. 
77 IbTd. 
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exercised through ad hoc issuance of prior import permits for those 
commodities included in the list of controlled imports.78 in 1958, this 
list included about one-third of the items in the Mexican import tariff, 
and comprised about fifty percent by value of Mexico's imports. This 
system permits Mexican officials to tighten or ease import restrictions 
as they see fit.79 
In addition, additions to or removals from the import control list 
may be made by administrative decision upon publication in an Official 
Diary, without advance notice. However, to avoid the adverse effects on 
trading activities which fear of such sudden changes might have, officials 
issue import permits for recently added commodities upon proof that a firm 
order had been placed prior to the effective date of the addition."0 
With regard to removal of import restrictions, it was suggested 
in the theoretical analysis that quantitative controls are a better short-
run expedient for providing protection to domestic producers, than are 
tariffs, because quantitative controls may be more readily removed. 
Partially refuting this suggestion is the fact that many of the Latin 
American countries have given their chief executive the power to 
change tariff duties by executive order.°1 Nevertheless, changes in 
quantitative restrictions, during the decade under study, have been 
78 Similar freedom of action has been retained by Mexico in its tariff 
policy. It has refused to join the GATT, and prefers most-favored-nation 
treaties to specific tariff concessions. See WTIS, "Basic Data on the 
Economy of Mexico", Economic Reports, Part 1, No. 59-5* p. 20. 
79 WTIS, "Licensing and Exchange Controls...Mexico", Operations Re-
ports, Part 2, No. 58-50, p. 2. 
80 Ibid. 
81 A. Isaacs, op. cit., p. 1*60. 
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much more frequent and widespread than changes in tariffs. 
Easing and tightening of import restrictions in all four of the 
quantitative control countries have tended to be associated with fluctua-
tions in their balance of payments positions. However, the only 
significant indications of removals of restrictions due to success in 
development of enterprises that are competitive in world markets are to 
be found in the increasing frequency of removals by Mexico from its 
list of controlled imports. 3 
Import Discrimination by Country of Origin. In the past, India and 
and Pakistan have made a distinction in their import control systems 
between imports from dollar (hard currency) areas, sterling block coun-
tries, and others.k With the easing of the dollar shortage in recent 
years, and the current dollar surplus, such distinctions as to origin 
of imports hava almost disappeared. However, some bilateral trading 
agreements continue to exist in nearly all of tho nine selected countries 
Quantitative Export Controls 
Mexico has tied its quantitative export control policy closely to 
its export tariff policy. ° Furthermore, it ha3 tied its quantitative 
82 This observation is based on spot counts of commercial policy 
changes reported in various issues of the Foreign Commerce Weekly from 
1950 to I960. 
83 See IMF, Eighth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1957, p. 
33U, and subsequent issues. 
&k IMF, Second Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 195l, PP« 107 
and 125. 
85 See the various country summaries in the IMF, Eleventh Annual Re-
port on Exchange Restrictions, I960. 
86 See above, p. il*2.. 
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export control policy closely to its import control policy by administra-
tion (the Ministry of Economy) and objectives. ' The common objectives 
of all of these foreign trade control instruments are (1) assured do-
mestic supplies of foodstuffs, raw materials, and other essentials, and 
(2) encouragement of domestic processing and manufacture, both for 
op 
internal consumption and manufacture. Some commodities are prohibited 
exportation and others require an export permit. 9 
As these policies are successful, production and exports will be 
diversified. Some degree of success is indicated by the fact that between 
1953 and 1958 the fifteen most important export commodities by value 
dropped from 61.7 percent of the total value of exports, to 53.8 par-
cent.90 
India, Pakistan and the Philippines have established quantitative 
controls on exports with similar purposes and patterns (allowing for 
individual country variation) to those of Mexico.91 The combined effects 
of their commercial policies and internal development policies on indus-
trial origin of domestic product indicate some success in achieving 
diversification, although export patterns have not changed significantly 
as yet. In India, manufacturing as a percent of net domestic product 
increased between 1953 and 1957 from 15.9 to 17.2 percent. The same 
87 WTIS, "Licensing and Exchange Controls...Mexico", Operations Re 
ports, Part 2, No. 58-50, p.3. 
88 Ibid. 
89 For a partial list of commodities affected, see Ibid. 
90 WTIS, "Economic Developments in Mexico", Economic Reports, 195U 
and 1958, Part 1, Nos. 55-60, Table 6, p. Ill, and 59-36, Table 5, p. 
12. For changes in domestic production, see above, p. Hi7« 
91 WTIS, Operations Reports, Part 2, Nos. 58-58 (India), p. 3, $9-
77 (Pakistan), p.3, and 5^ -10 (the Philippines), p. 5. 
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change in Pakistan between 1953 and 1958 was from 8.9 to 12.1 percent, 
and in the Philippines, from 11.9 to 16.0 percent. 
EXCHANGE CONTROL EXPERIENCE 
As pointed out previously* Mexico is the only one of the selected 
countries that maintains an entirely free market for foreign exchange. 
Although Peru officially has an exchange control system* in practice 
international payments are made virtually without restrictions. The 
exchange control systems of India* Pakistan and the Philippines are rel-
atively stricter than other systems because control decisions are effect-
ed by rationing exchange, but this characteristic reduces to insignifi-
93 
cance the currency exchange rate features of exchange control. 
Thus, the evaluation of experience with exchange controls is limited 
primarily to those exchange control systems that have utilized mainly 
costs (i.e., exchange rate) influences on trade and payments conditions, 
or a composite of cost and quantitative control features.™ Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Ecuador have maintained such exchange controls, at times 
developing extremely complex systems, but all except Brazil have made 
significant changes in the direction of greater simplicity in recent 
years. 
All four of these exchange control systems have been characterized 
by numerous effective multiple exchange rates combined with import 
92 ECAFE, Economic Survey, 1958, Table N, p. 177, and 1959, Table 
6, p. 113. 
93 See above, pp. llilif. 
91* For these distinctions see, IMF, First Annual Report on Exchange 
Restrictions, 1950, pp. Uff. 
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licensing requirements and import prohibitions. The exchange control 
policies have all established priorities of imports and exports based 
on essentiality and protection of internal producers.7J 
Disadvantages of Complex Exchange Controls 
Chile. The exchange control system of Chile was, until 1956, the 
most complex of the selected-country systems. Its complexity stemmed 
from lumping together, in one system at the same time, virtually every 
96 
exchange control technique and basis of discrimination possible. 
In this Chilean exchange control system, some imports were pro-
hibited; all non-prohibited imports required individual import licenses 
under quotas; and some specified imports were permitted only through 
two different "free markets" supplied by earnings from exports of 
gold and wine. Export licenses were required for all exports, and ex-
change licenses for most non-trade payments. 
The fixed buying rates, one of which was the "official" rate were 
established for the foreign exchange proceeds from various specified 
exports and invisibles. There were also "mixed" buying rates that 
combine five percentage mixes of the "official" and one other fixed 
rate. The mixed rates were applicable to the exchange earnings from 
certain specified exports. At times, some ".mixes" involved percentages 
of a "freemarket" fluctuating rate, and therefore fluctuated also. 
A similarly complex rate structure was applied to the foreign 
9$ I b i d . , p . 92, e t . passim. 
96 For f u l l de t a i l s see IMF* Annual Reports on Exchange Res t r ic t ions , 
1950 through 1956. 
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exchange selling ratescfor imports.and specified in similar detail. 
Some of the exchange rate differentials were based on different treatment 
of large foreign-owned mining companies as opposed to small mining firms. 
Furthermore, the exchange control system included discriminatory treat-
ment of the various currencies used in international transactions, and 
rates for all currencies were stated in the above fashion. There were, 
therefore, broken cross rates throughout the entire rate structure. 
In the "Table of Exchange Rates" for December 31,, 1952,°' there were 
twelve buying rates—six fixed rates (one of which was mixed) and six 
fluctuating rates (two of which were mixed), and eight, selling rates— 
four fixed and four fluctuating. 
Thus Chile's exchange control system has discriminated on the basis 
of importers, exporters, currencies, and products. The structure of the 
system and the policy decisions made in administering it have been 
designed to raise revenue, protect internal producers, protect the 
balance of international payments, and control the pattern of imports 
and exports. Finally, changes in the system have been frequent and 
involved. 
This strict program of foreign exchange controls was accompanied 
by similarly widespread controls in the domestic economy. Together, 
these policies had particularly adverse and disincentive effects on 
agriculture and raining. Restrictions of exports tended to retard 
agricultural development during the first half of the 1950's and turned 
97 IMF, Fourth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1953, p. 98f. 
98 WTIS, ."Licensing and Exchange Controls...Chile", Operations Re-
ports, Part 2, No. 55-93, pp. 1-2. 
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Chile from near self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs in the prewar 
period (10 percent of total imports, 1935-39) to a heavy importer of 
foodstuffs in the early 1950's (29^3 percent of total imports, 1953-56). 
The "great mining" industry, especially copper and nitrates, has histor-
ically provided the bulk of Chile's exports. Discriminatqry' price and 
sales controls, taxation, and exchange rates retarded Chilean mining 
development to such an extent that the world turned to synthetic 
nitrates and Rhodesian copper. 
The effects of these detailed developments on the general economic 
development of Chile are evident in Chile's ranking..at the bottom of the 
selected countries in percentage increase in nati nal income and percen-
tage change in per capita product (an actual decline of three percent) 
over the period 1950-57. Chile also experienced a 3-1* percent rise 
in the ratio of consumer goods imports to total imports from 1953-56, 
and a decline of 1.6 percent in its ratio of raw materials imports to 
102 total imports over the same period. 
The revision of the exchange control system in Chile on April 20, 
1956, -abolished import licensing and substituted an extensive list of 
authorized imports with a requirement of advance deposits graduated on 
the basis of essentiality and availability of domestic supply. °3 Since 
April, 1959, the advance deposits have been applied to seven categories 
99 WTIS, "Basic Data on the Economy of Chile", Economic Reports, Part 
1, No. 59-15, P. 5. 
100 I b i d . , p . 8 . 
101 See above, Table J, p . 121* 
102 See above, Table 5, P- 138. 
103 IMF, Seventh Annual Report on Exchange Restriction* 1956, p . 71 . 
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with rates from five percent of value to 1500 percent of value, the 
latter rate being applied to items not on the authorized list of imports. 
The 1956 revision also abolished the system of multiple exchange rates, 
and established two freely fluctuating rates, one for trade and the 
other for capital transactions and invisibles. These dual rates have 
been unified into a single exchange rate for all import and export 
transactions. ^ 
The immediate effect of the 1956 revision was a rapid deteriora-
tion in the balance of payments which continued through 1957* into 1958, 
under pressure of declining world prices of copper. During May, 1958, 
advance deposits for imports were set at 10,000 percent of c.i.f. value, 
and then lowered to a high of 5,000 percent on June 5» By January, 
1959, the depreciation in the value of the peso, that had been continuing 
since the revision of exchange controls in 1956, was beginning to take 
effect to slow the rise in imports and increase exports. The Central 
Bank entered the exchange market to stabilize the peso when the single 
105 
exchange rate was established in April, 1959. 
Several historical factors in the Chilean economic background have 
contributed to the apparent success of her movement toward freedom of 
international trading relations. Historically, Chile has had an 
101* WTIS, Operations Reports, Part 2, No. 60-8, pp. 1-2, and Economic 
Reports, Part 1, No. 59-1*3, p. 7. 
10T~Ibid. 
106 While Chile's tariffs and advance deposits on imports still in-
fluence the pattern of imports toward consumption and development essen-
tials and away from luxuries, the government has indicated its inten-
tion to remove the advance deposits eventually. In addition, some 
export quotas are still in force on some foodstuffs, agricultural raw 
materials, and on iron ore to assure adequate domestic supplies. Ibid. 
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export balance of trade; ' it began to institute .governmental economic 
development policies as early as 1927; and it had attained the highest 
level of economic development (per capita income) of the nine selected 
109 
countries by the beginning of the decade under study. With these 
factors, and all that they imply for greater ease of development, working 
in her favor, Chile should be able to stimulate development morersuccess-
fully than less developed countries with less strenuous control measures. 
Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. Brazilian experience with exchange 
controls during 191*9-59 divides into two periods, before October, 1953 
and after. Exchange controls in the earlier period were exercised 
through import and export licensing in accordance with a foreign exchange 
budget of the export proceeds which had to be surrendered, and multiple 
exchange rates for imports and exports. The multiple import rates re-
sulted from an exchange tax, and the multiple export rates from a 
requirement of a percentage investment of export proceeds in negotiable 
treasury bills. One of the primary difficulties with this system 
was that import licenses were issued on criteria other than exchange 
availability, and the exchange authorities in allocating foreign exchange 
for licensed imports accumulated a large backlog of pending payments. 
In October, 1953, Brazil established an exchange auction system 
for imports, with minimum auction bids differing by import priority 
107 WTIS, Economic Reports, Part 1, No. 59-15* p. 16. 
108 Wythe,"op. cit., p. 71. 
109 See above, Table 2, p. 126. 
110 IMF, First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1950, p. 92f, 
111 IMF, Fourth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1953, p. 81. 
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categories. A system of differential export bonus rates were estab-
lished to encourage minor exports. 3 
While this Brazilian auction system appears in some respects, 
especially the number of effective exchange rates, to be as complex as 
the Chilean exchange system, it has certain advantages. The Chilean 
system involved detailed allocation of exchange among individual import 
items* while the Brazilian exchange auction system allocated exchange 
to auction markets for broad categories of imports, with the allocation 
of exchange to individual import items within the broad categories on 
a price basis. The result was a loss arbitrary and more orderly system 
for private trading. 
Furthermore, it appears that Brazil's effective control over the 
pattern of imports in favor of development may have improved with the 
auction system. Brazil's ratio of raw materials imports to total imports 
increased over the period 1953-56. The corresponding ratio for consumer 
goods imports increased only slightly, and the ratio for capital goods 
11^ imports declined sharply. ' The decline in the ratio of capital 
goods imports may be partially explained oj increased domestic produc-
116 
tion of machinery and equipment. 
112 See above, pp. 13l*f. 
113 IMF, Fifth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 195U, p. 65. 
For an excellent detailed analysis of the operation of this system, see 
A. Kafka, "The Brazilian Exchange Auction System", Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 38, Aug. 1956, pp. 308ff. . 
llli References to the Chilean exchange control system refer to the 
system prior to April, 1956. 
115 See above, Table 5, p. 137. 
116 ECLA, Economic Bulletin, III, 2(0ctober, 1958), Table 9, p. 1*8. 
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The exchange control system of Colombia has been basically similar 
to the earlier Brazilian system. Its multiple exchange rates resulted 
from discriminatory exchange taxes on imports and permission for proceeds 
from favored exports to be sold in an exchange certificate market 
rather than surrendered at the official buying rate. A special feature 
that protected the balance of payments was the granting of exchange 
licenses for imports each week only to the limit of the gold and foreign 
exchange purchases of the Central Bank during the preceding week.^ 
Colombia, relative to the other selected countries, achieved notable 
success, up to 1956, in controlling the pattern of imports for develop-
ment with this exchange control system. Since late in 1956, Colombia 
has progressively tightened import restrictions in response to large 
balance of payments deficits in 1955 and 1956. Balance of payments surp-
luses were achieved in 1957 and 1958, but at the expense of sharp 
reductions in the value of imports and total trade. These developments 
have occurred under pressure of declining export earnings due to a decline 
of world prices for coffee since 1957. 
Of the four subject countries emphasizing exchange controls, Ecuador 
has incorporated the fewest quantitative control aspects in its system. 
All imports require licenses, but most imports have been licensed 
freely.120 
117 IMF, First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1950, pp. 99 
ff. -
118 See above, Table 5* p. 137. 
119 WTIS, Operations Reports, Part 2, No. 58-l|6, p. 1, and 59-25, p. 
1; U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1958, Table 166, p. 1*60; and ECLA, Economic 
Bulletin, III* 2(0ctober, 1958), Table 16, p. 56. 
120 IMF, First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1950, p. 108f. 
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The influence on the pattern of imports by essentiality and domes-
tic producer protection priorities was earlier obtained by graduated 
exchange surcharges, and more recently by different advance deposits for 
imports in two lists. Ecuador has had essentially dual exchange rates 
(official and free market) for both imports and exports since about 1952. 
List one imports are favored and enter at the official rate. All other 
authorized imports enter through the free market at the less favorable 
rate. There are a few mixed buying rates applied to important, but not 
"major", exports, most minor or marginal exports receiving the bonus 
rate of the free market with major exports obtaining the lower official 
. 121 
rate. 
Ecuador has had moderate success, relative to the other selected 
122 
countries, in controlling the pattern of its imports. 
Mobilizing Foreign Exchange for Development 
The fact that all of the exchange control systems of the selected 
countries were instituted in periods of balance of payments difficulties123 
indicates the importance of the relationship between adequate foreign 
exchange availabilities and satisfactory operation of the domestic econ-
omy in underdeveloped countries. The fact that they have all established 
import priorities in their exchange control systems indicates the close 
relationship between the relative adequacy of foreign exchange availabil-
ities and the need for its careful allocation to meet development needs. 
121 Ibid., and IMF, Tenth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions* 
1959, p."TO. 
122 See above, Table 5, p. 137. 
123 See above, p. 11*5. 
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All of the exchange control systems have been designed to mobilize 
foreign exchange to meet current consumption and development needs. As 
a necessary first step in mobilizing foreign exchange, all of the ex-
change control countries, including Peru* require proceeds from exports 
to be turned over to official agencies or authorized dealers. The two 
parts of the exchange mobilization problem as reflected in the control 
practices of these countries, are (l) increasing foreign exchange 
availabilities and (2) allocating foreign exchange to the most pressing 
consumption and development needs. 
Exchange Control Practices to Increase Foreign Exchange Availabil-
ities 
Practices to Increase Net Foreign Exchange Earnings. All four of 
the composite exchange control countries have at some time utilized 
indirect export subsidies in the form of more favorable buying rates 
for some exports. The practice has been to apply the most favorable 
rate to minor exports and the lowest rate (usually the official rate) 
to the one or two major export commodities which dominate the country's 
exports. There is little indication in the statistics for any of these 
countries that such bonuses have had significantly successful effects. 
Another major source of foreign exchange receipts is in the form 
of investments from abroad. Practices in control of capital movements 
have been marked by similarities in the exchange control countries. 
Typically capital is permitted to enter and leave freely through the 
"free" market, i.e., at the highest exchange rate. In approved cases 
capital may enter at the official (lowest rate), but must be registered 
and foreign exchange proceeds must be surrendered. Approved or register-
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ed investments are ordinarily permitted repatriation and transfer of 
earnings at the exchange rate at which the capital entered. 
Investments abroad by residents are usually permitted at the free 
market rate of exchange, but are subject to prior approval. In contrast, 
India, Pakistan, and the Philippines have not usually permitted resident 
investment abroad, and have restricted transfer of invisibles. 
Little can be accomplished in inducing foreign investment by mani-
pulation of exchange rates. The exchange control countries give evidence 
by their treatment of capital transfers of acceptance of that principle." 
Investment requires investment opportunities, and a consistent policy 
of promoting development, with due consideration for preventing excessive 
inflation, can do most to provide investment opportunities. The trend 
of direct foreign investments in the selected Latin American countries 
and the Philippines from 1950 to 1958 has been upward, while the ex-
perience of India and Pakistan has been more variable. ^ 
Allocation of Foreign Exchange. The principal devices which the 
composite exchange control countries have used to allocate foreign ex-
change have been the exchange auction system of Brazil, differential 
exchange taxes, and advance deposits for imports.1*5 A H
 0f these systems, 
including advance deposits when interest on money is considered* involve 
different effective exchange rates applied to imports. For this pur-
pose priorities of imports are established. The experience of Brazil* 
Colombia'and Ecuador* as opposed to that of Chile (pre-1956), demon-
strates that exchange controls over the pattern of imports operates 
121* IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1959. 
125 See above, pp. 156ff. 
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more effectively when the priorities are established only in terms of a 
few broad categories of imports.126 
In some cases the multiple exchange rates have been supplemented 
by import prohibition, e.g. Ecuador, ' and in all four countries by 
import licensing. Exchange licenses for most trade and invisibles 
transactions have been used to enforce the mechanics of the systems. 
Brazil (in 1953) and Colombia (in 1957) discovered that some direct tie 
between the issue of import licenses and exchange licenses is necessary, 
in lieu of an exchange budget, in order to avoid a backlog of commercial 
128 
payments and make the controls effective. 
The relative effe'ctiveness of exchange controls for controlling 
the pattern of imports was evaluated above. ° It may be noted that the 
development achievements of Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia, in terms 
of percentage increase in per capita product, was moderate relative to 
the other selected countries. 3° The poor showing of Chile was noted 
earlier. 
SUMMARY 
The experience of the selected countries during the decade, 19l*9-
1959, tends to bear out the broad conclusions of the theoretical analysis 
of the preceding chapter. 
Economic development, as the primary natinnal objective in Brazil, 
126 See above, pp. l56ff. 
127 IMF, First Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1950, p. 108. 
128 See above, lbOff. 
129 See pp. l56ff. 
130 See above, Table 1, p. 121*. 
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Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru and the Philip-
pines, emerged in the post-World War II period. The earlier utilization 
of commercial policy instruments to assist economic development in the 
decade under study was often marked by complexity of control systems 
and lack of coordination. In all nine selected countries the tendency 
toward the end of the decade has been to simplify the control systems 
and integrate the commercial policy instruments used. In these tenden-
cies there is an indication of movement toward functional specialization 
in the use of the broad types of commercial policy instruments. 
Toward the end of tha decade, all of the selected countries still 
relied on import and/or export tariffs to obtain significant percentages 
of their total governmental revenues. Brazil, Chile and the Philippines 
had moved in this direction away from relatively greater reliance on 
exchange taxes or profits earlier in the decade. In all of these tariff 
systems, ad valorem rates predominated over specific duties, resulting 
in greater compensatory effects in relation to price fluctuations. 
In each case, the tariff rate structure has combined some control 
over the pattern of imports and exports and protection of domestic 
producers with the revenue objectives. The rates have been graduated 
by import and export priorities based on (l) essentiality to the 
domestic economy and (2) sufficiency of domestic supply. 
Except in the case of Mexico, little use has been made of tariff 
rate manipulations to combat balance of payments deficits. Even Mexico 
has relied primarily on devaluation during payments crises to protect 
its balance of payments and discourage capital flights. It has 
supplemented devaluation increasingly by quantitative import restrictions 
169 
rather than tariff manipulations. 
Direct foreign trade subsidies have been used by the selected coun-
tries only to a limited extent. The principal form of import and export 
subsidization has been indirect through differential exchange rates in 
the exchange control system of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador. 
With the exception of Peru, all of the selected countries have re-
lied primarily upon quantitative trade controls or exchange controls to 
protect their balance of payments, to protect domestic producers and to 
control the pattern of their foreign trade. There has been no signifi-
cant attempt to incorporate revenue collection with quantitative con-
trols through variable license fees. Instead, graduated customs sur-
charges or internal sales taxes have been levied on imported commodities 
according to the degree of restrictiveness of quantitative controls in 
order to capture the windfall profits that would otherwise accrue to 
importers. 
The quantitative and exchange control systems of the selected coun-
tries were all instituted during periods of balance of payments deficits. 
Yet removal of balance of payments deficits has been the dominant ob-
jective of these control systems only during payments crises. Increas-
ingly, the primary objective has been to insure that scarce foreign 
exchange be used for the importation of essentials, i.e., control over 
the pattern of foreign trade. 
In controlling the pattern of imports and exports, both the quantita-
tive and exchange control systems have been designed to increase the 
supplies of capital goods, raw materials and essential consumer-goods in 
the domestic economy and to encourage domestic production of such goods. 
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Changes in the pattern of imports of all of the selected countries during 
the decade indicate that those countries emphasizing quantitative con-
trols, i.e., Mexico, India, Pakistan and the Philippines, have•achieved 
the most notable success in controlling the pattern of trade to promote 
economic development. 
All of the selected countries, except Mexico, have combined quanti-
tative and exchange controls. Those countries emphasizing quantitative 
aspects of control in such joint systems (India, Palcistan and the Philip-
pines) have proved more successful in mobilizing the available foreign 
exchange for development use. The wealcness of exchange control systems 
which emphasize price and cost direction of trade by means of multiple 
exchange rates stems from the difficulty of implementing a foreign 
exchange budget. The experience of Brazil and Colombia in accumulating 
large payments backlogs illustrates this difficulty. 
In efforts to eliminate payments backlogs, Brazil and Colombia 
found it necessary to substitute soma direct tie between import and ex-
change licenses in lieu of an overall exchange budget. However, the 
experience of these two countries in comparison with that of Chile illu-
strates the need for allocating foreign exchange to various payments 
requirements in terms of broad categories of imports and invisibles 
payments rather than in terms of detailed specification. 
The poor development performance of Chile indicates that extremely 
complex and detailed exchange controls disrupt the development process 
rather than assisting it. 
CHAPTER VI 
. CONCLUSION 
THE PLACE OF COMMERCIAL POLICIES IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
For economically underdeveloped countries, obstacles to develop-
ment are social and political in nature, as well as economic. In the 
economic sphere, developmental deficiencies are so varied and pervasive 
of the entire economy that economic development requires coordinated pro-
grams emphasizing' domestic monetary, fiscal and promotional policies. 
Hence, commercial policy, i.e., regulation of foreign trade and payments 
relations, can only hold a supplemental position in economic development 
programs of underdeveloped countries. 
The problem for this study thus was one of determining the effective-
ness and the effects of commercial policy as a supplement to more gen-
eral economic development programs of underdeveloped countries. The 
commercial policy instruments selected for study were (l) tariffs and 
foreign trade subsidies, (2) quantitative controls and (3) exchange 
controls.3 This selection excludes state trading, bilateral trade and 
payments agreements, and international cartels and commodity agreements.^ 
Commercial policy is essentially only supplemental to domestic 
economic development programs, yet it has a unique significance for stim-
ulating development in underdeveloped countries. This unique signifi-
1 See above, pp. $££, 
2 Ibid. See, also, the discussion of free trade policy versus 
development in underdeveloped countries, Chap. II. 
3 See above, pp. l*3ff. 
k For the reasons for these exclusions see above, pp. l*l*f. 
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cance stems from the fact that so much of the market exchange activity 
in underdeveloped countries is centered in or closely related to the 
international trade sector of their economies.5 Thus commercial policy 
is applicable to that sector where a start on development has been made, 
yet where the market mechanism does not always guide private economic 
activity toward internal economic development. Commercial policy instru-
ments are applied at that point where the broad development objectives* 
i.e., (1) improvement in the quality of human effort, (2) accumulation 
of capital, (3) structural change in the economy, involving reallocation 
of existing resources and change in the pattern of resources, (1*) ex-
pansion of the exchange economy, and (5) improved technology, relate 
to foreign markets.' 
PROCEDURE OF INVESTIGATIONS 
The investigation was carried out under the following assumptions! 
(l) That the predominant economic objective in underdeveloped countries 
is economic development in the form of a sustained increase in real 
national income per capita, (2) that the economic objective of most 
efficient allocation of resources must be oriented around structural 
change in the form of changes in the quality and quantity of resources 
such that the productivity of human efforts is raised, (3) that domestic 
markets are inadequate in refinement and extent for efficient allocation 
of resources, especially as between production for present consumption 
5 See above, p. 60. 
6 See above, pp. 28ff. 
7 See above, pp. 60ff. 
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and for capital formation* (1*) that the usual givens of economic analysis, 
i.e., technology, productive functions and the pattern of resources* are 
susceptible to deliberate modification in a relatively short period of 
time, say a generation, and (5) that governments in underdeveloped coun-
tries will have to assume an active role in the economy to initiate 
production and stimulate private enterprises if economic development is 
to occur as rapidly as internal and world political conditions require. 
The evaluation of the applicability of traditional international trade 
theory to underdeveloped countries in Chapter II constitutes a justifi-
cation of adoption of these assumptions. 
The emphasis of the study has been on (l) the potentialities of 
coordinating commercial policies in pursuit of economic development and 
on (2) the relative effectiveness of the particular commercial policy 
devices—tariffs and foreign trade subsidies, quantitative controls, and 
exchange controls—in furthering the various development objectives. 
Almost anything that can be done with one broad category of commercial 
policy instruments can also be accomplished, more or less effectively, 
with some variant of either of the other broad categories, yet differ-
ences in the nature of the commercial policy instruments in regard to 
price and quantity effects make each more appropriate for certain func-
a 
tion3 than each of the others. The question posed for answer in the 
theoretical analysis of Chapter IV was: Which commercial policy vari-
ants are most appropriate for fulfilling which commercial policy ob-
jectives that are in turn selected for their contribution to fulfillment 
8 See above, pp. l*-5ff • 
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of development objectives and needs? 
From the theoretical analysis of Chapter IV, it was concluded that 
functional specialization in the use of the broad types of commercial 
policy instruments can make possible a simpler structure in each instru-
mental system, resulting in fewer internal contradictions in each system 
and more efficient promotion of the limited objectives of each. The 
bases for distinguishing different appropriate functions for tariffs 
and foreign trade subsidies, quantitative controls, and exchange controls 
were primarily their differences in impact points, certainty of various 
price and quantity effects, and flexibility of administration. 
The theoretical analysis suggested that tariffs should be reserved 
primarily for raising government revenue with assistance for controlling 
the pattern of trade and for protection of internal producers built into 
the system only as such assistance to other objectives is consistent 
o 
with the main revenue purpose. Quantitative controls should be reserved 
primarily for protection, both of internal producers and of the balance 
of payments in emergencies, including the control over the pattern of 
trade which protection involves.1 Exchange controls should be used pri-
marily for increasing the availability of foreign exchange and for allo-
11 
cation of foreign exchange for development. 
The theoretical analysis of Chapter IV was subjected to empirical 
examination in Chapter V against the commercial policy experiences of 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru and 
9 See above, pp. 73ff. 
10 See above, pp. 97ff. 
11 See above, pp«- 99ff. 
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the Philippines during the decade 19li9-1959» The primary reason for 
selecting these nine underdeveloped countries^2 was their diversity in 
13 the commercial policy instruments utilized. 
The experience of all nine countries was analyzed in regard to 
tariffs for revenue. The analysis of tariff utilization for other objec-
tives dealt primarily with Peru and Mexico. India, Pakistan and the 
Philippines have utilized primarily quantitative control in conjunction 
with exchange budgeting. Mexico has emphasized quantitative controls, 
and is the only ona of the selected countries that has had no exchange 
controls during the decade under study. The analysis of exchange control 
experience concentrated on Chile and Brazil, but included Colombia and 
Ecuador. 
For information on the commercial policy systems and manipulations, 
main reliance has been placed on the U. S. Department of Commerce, World 
Trade Information Service, Operations Reports on tariff, quantity licen-
sing and exchange control systems* the Foreign Commerce Weekly reports 
of trade control changes, and the International Monetary Fund, Annual 
Reports on exchange restrictions. For economic developments and statis-
tical data to analyze the effects of the commercial policies, primary 
sources have been the United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, the Economic 
Bulletins of the Economic Commissions for Latin America and for Asia 
and the Far East, and the WTIS, Economic Reports of basic data on the 
economies of the selected countries and of economic developments in those 
12 All had per capita national incomes of less than $200 in 19li9« 
See Table 2, p. 126. 
13 For other considerations in selection, see p. 120. 
176 
countries. 
The effects of commercial policy actions of the selected countries 
have been anlyzed in terms of changes in the composition of imports and 
exports, government revenues by sources, industrial origin of production, 
gold and foreign exchange balances, balances of payments, real- and 
money-capital movements, terms of trade, and in the aggregates of total 
national income and national income or product per capita, quantity and 
value of imports and exports, and foreign and domestic investment. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
Only two of the selected countries have failed to increase per 
capita product (1950-56 or '57) at a rate of two per cent or better."^ 
Of the two countries that experienced actual declines in per capita pro-
duct, Pakistan started from an extremely low level and suffered from 
disasterous floods 5 and a 73 percent decline in its terms of trade.^° 
Chile imposed a complex, inconsistent and erratic system of exchange 
controls. 
The most significant contributions that commercial, policies have 
made in assisting the processof economic development in the selected 
countries have been to raise government revenues, to change the pattern 
of foreign trade in the direction of capital accumulation and away from 
unnecessary consumption, and to encourage diversification in domestic 
production. In addition, there..has been a tendency toward coordination 
li* See above, pp. 122f. 
15 See above, pp. 126ff. 
16 See fin 7. p. 123. 
17 See above, pp., l56ff. 
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of the use of commercial policy instruments with greater specialization 
of function for the different instrumental systems. 
Each of the selected countries has used tariffs or exchange control 
profits to raise significant proportions of total government revenues. 
Tariffs have predominated for this purpose* and Brazil, Chile and tha 
Philippines, which earlier relied heavily on revenue from exchange 
controls, have moved toward greater reliance on tariff revenues since 
1956.18 
Each of the selected countries has used a combination of differential 
tariffs with quantitative controls and/or exchange controls to change 
the pattern of foreign trade. The analysis of changes in the pattern of 
imports indicated that those countries emphasizing quantitative controls 
(except Pakistan) have proved most successful in influencing importation 
in the direction of capital goods or raw materials in support of increased 
production levels. In addition to Palcistan, Chile and Peru have been 
least successful in exercising such influence on the pattern of import.1° 
The difficulties of Pakistan and Chile were indicated earlier in this 
section, while Peru most nearly approaches a free trade policy. 
With its combination of quantitative controls on both imports and 
exports, Mexico has demonstrated the greatest success in diversifying 
domestic production, as well as exports. ° There are indications of 
some diversification in changes in the industrial origin of domestic 
18 See above, pp. 130ff. 
19 See Table 5, p. 137. 
20 See above, p. 151*. 
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21 production in India, Pakistan and the Philippines. 
The evidence of commercial policy effects on inflationary forces 
and on the terms of trade was too meager to draw any reliable conclus-
ions. 
The prospects of continued utilization of commercial policies to 
promote economic development vary from country to country on the basis 
of a number of differences in their economic conditions. The level of 
development already achieved is of particular significance. India, 
Pakistan and the Philippines, at the bottom of the per capita income 
scale in 1953, have closely integrated the three instruments of com-
mercial policy as a part of economic development programs. The need 
by these three countries for such concerted promotion of economic develop-
ment is likely to continue indefinitely. 
Chile, at the top of the per capita income scale in 1953 and with 
a bad experience in the use of exchange controls, has moved toward aband-
onment of all controls except tariffs and differential advance deposits 
for imports. 3 As some economic progress has been achieved in the other 
countries, the tendency has been to relax the restrictiveness of the 
commercial policy instruments used, or to move toward retention of 
tariffs only. 
Progress in abandoning commercial policies will likely depend on 
achievement of a stable world economy. When balance of payments crises 
arise, the tendency is to tighten controls on foreign trade and 
21 See above, pp. l51*f. 
22 See Table 1*, p. 132. 
23 See above, pp. l57ff. 
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payments, ^  and balance of payments crises of underdeveloped countries 
are commonly associated with economic fluctuations in the advanced 
25 
countries. 3 
There has been no apparent adverse effect of commercial policies 
in underdeveloped countries on the level of world trade. While it is im-
possible to say what that level would have been without commercial 
policy practices in underdeveloped countries during the decade under 
study, the volume of trade of each of the selected countries, except 
Pakistan, has been observed to have increased. Declines in the trace 
levels of underdeveloped countries have usually been associated, although 
in a lagged relationship, with fluctuations in developed-country demand 
for underdeveloped country exports, rather than deliberately initiated 
by trade restrictions. 
21* See, for example, Colombia's experience, p. 162. 
25 See above, p. 80. 
26 See above, pp. 12l*f. 
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